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Major League baseball, alone among industries of its size in the United States,
operates as an unregulated monopoly. This twentieth century regulatory anomaly has
become known simply as the "baseball anomaly." Major League Baseball developed into
a major commercial enterprise without being subject to antitrust liability. Long after the
interstate commercial character of baseball had been established, and even recognized by
the Supreme Court, baseball's monopoly remained free from federal regulation.
This study explains the baseball anomaly by connecting baseball's regulatory status
to the larger political environment, tracing the game's fate through four different
regulatory regimes in the United States. The constellation of institutional,
ideological and
political factors within each regulatory regime provides the context
for the persistence of
the baseball anomaly. Baseball's unregulated monopoly persists
because of the confluence
of institutional, ideological and political factors which have
prevented the repeal of
baseball's antitrust exemption to date. However, both the
institutional and ideological
factors, which have in the past protected baseball's unregulated monopoly, are fading.
Baseball's owners can no longer claim special cultural significance in defense of the
exemption, nor can they claim that the commissioner system approximates government
regulation sufficiently. Both of these strategies have been discredited by the labor unrest
in baseball over the last decade.
While baseball is one labor strike away from losing part of its exemption, it will
likely retain the aspects of the exemption which cover the contractual relationship between
the major and minor leagues, as well as the part of the exemption which allows Major
League Baseball to regulate the migration of individual franchises. These aspects of
baseball's exemption with likely be codified and expanded to all professional sports
leagues. The eventual partial repeal of baseball's exemption and the likely expansion of
part of baseball's exemption to other sports makes it both an outdated anomaly and a
harbinger of sports antitrust policy in the twenty first century.
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INTRODUCTION
It is said that few things in life are certain. Until the summer of 1994 most
Americans would probably have said that, in addition to death and taxes, one thing that
could be counted on was the World Series. Every fall since 1904 Americans had enjoyed
the world championship of baseball. In 1994, this was not to be. This grand tradition was
not interrupted by economic depression, world war, or even natural disaster Nor was the
Fall Classic canceled by an arrogant pennant winning manager unwilling to play against
inferior talent. The 1994 World Series fell victim to a labor/management dispute. The
player strike, baseball's ninth work stoppage since 1970, was the culmination of three
decades of unrest in the business of baseball.
The 1 994 baseball strike exposed the less wholesome side of our national pastime
more vividly than anything before. The business of baseball took a bit of the shine off
what most considered a national treasure. Indeed, baseball seemed to be losing its special
place in the American psyche. Long separated from discussions of politics and industrial
relations, baseball was suddenly at the center of serious public policy debates at the
highest levels of government. In this more somber atmosphere, the long dormant issue of
baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws acquired a new life. Disgusted with the
failure of the players and owners to come to an agreement, many, inside government and
out, began pushing for repeal of the antitrust exemption as a way to pressure owners into
an agreement with the players. The popular concern with baseball was reflected in both
1
the appointment of a mediator by the President of the United States to bring baseball's
"labor" and management together and by a renewed interest in the exemption by Members
of Congress.
This dissertation will examine what has come to be known as the "baseball
anomaly." Major League Baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws represents a
regulatory paradox in American political development, which the most recent unrest in the
game has brought once more to the fore. Baseball is set apart from most other industries,
including all other professional sports, by its exemption from federal antitrust law. The
decisive question animating this dissertation is, "why?" Why has baseball been granted
this immunity from the laws of the land? And, why has this regulatory anomaly been
maintained for three-quarters of a century?
Analyses of this phenomenon have heretofore lacked comprehensiveness. They
have been too narrow in their methodology and focus. Scholarly inquiries into the
baseball anomaly have generally fallen into one of three categories. They are either legal
histories, unsystematic cultural studies, or interest group studies. Not present in the
literature is a systematic attempt to integrate these approaches and theories into a
comprehensive examination of baseball's unregulated monopoly.
Legal analyses chronicle the history of antitrust litigation in baseball, beginning
with the 1922 Supreme Court decision that granted baseball its sweeping antitrust
exemption. Subsequent challenges to this decision are examined and the exemption's
survival is attributed to historical accident, originating with a Supreme Court whose
Progressive politics and sentimentality for America's national pastime led it to look away
from the true commercial nature of the game. Legal analyses of the exemption focus on
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the power of precedent, or Stare Decisis, and the Court's insistence that the Congress is
the appropriate venue for removing the exemption. Such analyses are uncritical in
attributing the origin of the exemption to sentimentality and then focus too narrowly on
the "rules" of the judicial branch to explain its long life. This approach fails to address
systematically the impact of ideas on the exemption's survival and treats institutional
inertia too narrowly, focusing on the judicial branch to the exclusion of the legislature and
the executive.
1
Several studies have traced the cultural significance of baseball, connecting it to
larger social and economic trends. None, however, attempts to distinguish the role of
baseball's cultural significance in its retention of the antitrust exemption. These studies
are useful in explaining baseball's continued unregulated monopoly insofar as they connect
baseball's cultural significance to the attitudes of legislators and fans. 2 In this, they
integrate cultural ideas and the struggle of interests but fall short of the full explanation
due to their lack of attention to institutional contexts and detail.
1 Legal analyses of baseball's exemption are found only in law reviews or journals. There
are no book length studies of this kind. Noteworthy examples include: Rogers, Paul C,
"Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws,"
Houston Law Review 14 (1977), p. 61 1-634; Berger, Robert, "After the Strikes: A
Reexamination of Professional Baseball's Exemption from the Antitrust Laws,"
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 45 (1983), p. 209-226; Irwin, Richard L., "A
Historical Review of Litigation in Baseball," Marquette Sports Law Journal 1 :2 (1991),
p. 283-300; and, Juarez, Michael H., "Baseball's Antitrust Exemption," Hastings
Communication and Entertainment Law Journal 17 (1995), p. 737-762.
2 Such studies include: Johnson, Arthur T., "Public Sports Policy," American Behavioral
Scientist 21:3 (January/February, 1978), p. 319-344; Lipsky, Richard E., "Toward a
Political Theory of American Sports Symbolism," American Behavioral Scientist 21:3
(January/February, 1978), p. 345-360; and, Johnson, Arthur T., "Congress and
Professional Sports: 1951-1978," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 445 (September, 1979), p. 102-115.
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Political/economic analyses of the anomaly conclude that powerful interests
preserve it by applying continuing political pressure on Congress to protect the
exemption. 3 This pressure is credited with chastening Members of Congress who might
support repeal of baseball's anomalous status. Warren Freedman sums up the logic of the
interest group theory approach when he writes, "The history of antitrust application to the
businesses of professional sports is an absorbing tale of sentimentality and of special
interests.'*
4
While the interest-group explanation of the exemption's continuation is not
without merit, it also tends to be reductionist and too narrow, as it fails to consider
systematically the impact of institutions and ideas on public policy.
The primary objective of this study is an integrated and comprehensive explanation
for the persistence of the "baseball anomaly." It will explore the institutional and
ideological, as well as the political and economic factors, that have contributed to the
paradoxical regulatory status of the business of baseball since 1922. Building on the work
of numerous scholars, this study examines the impact of institutional and ideological
structures and environments, as well as the interplay of interests, to provide a more
comprehensive explanation of baseball's unusual commercial status.
3 Noteworthy in this regard is Ellig, Jerome R., "Law, Economics, and Organized
Baseball: Analysis of a Cooperative Venture." (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Mason
University, 1987). Ellig attributes the preservation of Major League Baseball's antitrust
exemption to the game's vertically integrated governance structure, which enables MLB
to utilize the lobbying power of the minor leagues to prevent the legislative repeal of the
game's antitrust exemption. This lobbying advantage is not shared by other major
professional sports leagues, who either rely on colleges for player development, or have
under-developed minor league systems.
4 Freedman, Warren, Professional Sports and Antitrust , (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1987), p. 31.
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This study employs an historical institutionalist methodology, which is part of an
emerging approach in political science that falls loosely under the heading of"new
institutionalism" or "American Political Development." This newer institutional focus
seeks to expand the narrower "scientific" focus of political scientists since the behavioral
revolution in the discipline that emerged in the 1940s and 50s. The new institutionalism
aspires to synthesize the behavioralist/pluralist approach with an earlier institutional
approach to the study of government, broadening the analytical focus to the interplay of
institutions in an historical and developmental context.
The behaviorist/pluralist methodology grew up in reaction to the rigid
institutionalism of traditional political science, which was criticized for being descriptive
rather than analytical. Behavioral/pluralism was grounded in an understanding of human
nature that finds man an economically rational animal. The methodology operates on the
assumption that behavior is shaped by rational self interest, not by ideals, values, or
institutional constraints. This assumption leads to the conclusion that public policy is the
outcome of the competition between rationally defined interests. 5
New institutionalists charge that behavioral/pluralism has overvalued the
explanatory significance of societal forces in the analysis of politics and the making of
public policy, with the result that institutions as explanatory variables have been greatly
under-valued. Scholars, such as Theda Skocpol, Stephen Krasner, James March, John
Olsen, Eric Nordlinger, and Stephen Skowronek to name only a few, argue that
behavioral/pluralism fails to account for the role of institutions and ideas in the process of
5 See Somit, Albert, The Development of Political Science: From Burgess to
Behavioralism, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Publishing, 1967).
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policy formation and political change. March and Olsen deftly catalogue the indictment of
behavioral/pluralist political science as follows:
[T]he basic vision that has characterized theories of politics
since about 1950 is (a) contextual, inclined to see politics as
an integral part of society, less inclined to differentiate the
polity from the rest of society; (b) reductionist, inclined to
see political phenomena as the aggregate consequences of
individual behavior, less inclined to ascribe the outcomes of
politics to organizational structures and rules of appropriate
behavior; (c) utilitarian, inclined to see action as the
product of calculated self interest, less inclined to see
political actors as responding to obligations and duties; (d)
functionalist, inclined to see history as an efficient
mechanism for reaching uniquely appropriate equilibria, less
concerned with the possibilities for maladaptation and non-
uniqueness in historical development; and (e)
instrumentalist, inclined to define decision making and the
allocation of resources as the central concerns of political
life, less attentive to the ways political life is organized
around the development of meaning through symbols,
rituals and ceremonies. 6
Behavioral/pluralist political science is also charged with being society-centered, an
orientation in which institutions, like the state, have no autonomy in the formulation of
public policy. The causal arrow goes one way, from society to polity, with the state being
merely a neutral referee of societal forces that compete with one another to shape public
policy decisions. These decisions are thus understood as allocations of benefits among
competing groups. In explaining policy decisions, political scientists focus on societal
"inputs" to government and then examine the distributive effects of government policy
("outputs") on societal actors.
7
The government, or the state, is seen as the "black box"
6 March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors
in Political Life," The American Political Science Review (September, 1984), p. 735.
7 See Easton, David, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political
Science,
(New York: Knopf Publishing, 1953).
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that merely processes social interests, which is to say that institutional arrangements in
government are accorded no causal role in the making of public policy.8
A key difference between the behavioral/pluralist approach and the historical-
institutional approach lies in their differing conceptions of the influence of rationality on
public policy making. Behavioralism is reductionist and utilitarian. It sees politics as the
aggregate consequences of individual behavior, ignoring the effects of organizational
structures. Behavioral/pluralism also sees all action as the product of calculated self-
interest irrespective of duties, obligations or rules. From this perspective institutions are
at best constraints upon exogenously defined self-interests. The goals of actors are not
defined by institutions. 9
The historical institutional perspective sees institutions as structuring behavior
more completely. Institutions provide more than the context within which rational
strategies are formulated. They provide the context that shapes the actual goals and
preferences of actors. In other words, historical-institutionalism sees actors' self
definitions of their interests as being shaped by institutional arraignments, as well as by
rational calculation. From the historical-institutionalist perspective, human action is seen
as an attempt to "satisfice"
10
and thereby fulfill expectations that are context specific and
deeply embedded in cultural, socioeconomic, and political fields or structures. Individuals
do not initiate decision making by asking themselves how to maximize their utility in a
8 Skocpol, Theda, Bringing the State Back In, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 4.
9 See Schweers Cook, Karen and Margaret Levi, The Limits of Rationality, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
10 See Simon, Herbert, Reason in Human Affairs , (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1983).
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given situation. They ask instead, what is the appropriate response to a particular
situation given their position and responsibilities? People may make decisions based on a
rational calculation of their own or their group self interest, but the calculus is weighted
heavily by the historical, institutional, and ideological context in which that decision
occurs.
The behavioral/pluralist perspective detaches law, history, and values, as well as
institutions, from the study of politics. The assumed universality of rationality effectively
diminishes the importance of rules, history, ideas, and values. The historical-
institutionalist orientation seeks to reintegrate these variables in a study of politics without
simply abandoning the description of American politics offered by the behavioral/pluralist
theory of democracy. 11
In adopting an historical-institutionalist methodology, this study makes particular
use of the work of Marc Allen Eisner, whose concept of regulatory regimes provides an
historical backdrop for the analysis of baseball's unregulated monopoly. Eisner defines
these regimes as "historically specific configuration[s] of policies and institutions which
establish certain broad goals that transcend the problems specific to particular
industries."
12
Eisner shows how regulatory policy results from the interaction of societal
interests, institutional contexts, and the prevailing philosophy of government regulation.
Eisner posits four regulatory regimes in the United States spanning the decades
from 1880 to the 1990s. He identifies the first such regime as the "market" regime, which
11 March, James and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions , (New York: Free Press,
1989).
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began inl880 and ended in the 1920s. The market regime was characterized by the
implementation of government regulation of the economy with the goal of reproducing
market-like results in the industrial age. The Progressives dominated the market of ideas.
The institutions of the state were struggling to emerge from their nineteenth century
under-development. The politics of the era was marked by the struggles of the
Progressives to seize power from the political party bosses and urban political machines.
Baseball's important place in American society, as well as the game's promotion of
progressive values, allowed its peculiar commercial character to escape scrutiny during
this period.
This Progressive Era regime was followed by the New Deal Era from the 1920s to
the early 1960s, which Eisner calls the "associationalist" regime. He describes this era as a
synthesis of"New Nationalist" Progressivism and the experience of economic planning in
World War I. Cooperative arrangements between government and industry during the
1920s in the form of government supervised trade associations were designed to foster
economic stability. Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal programs would expand these quasi-
corporatist arrangements in order to lift the nation out of economic depression. Baseball's
unregulated monopoly, with Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis at the helm, thrived
in this environment.
This regime was followed in the 1960s and 70s by the "societal" regime, which
was marked by the proliferation of direct government regulation of the economy. This
new era of regulation differed from the past in two important respects. It was not
12 For a thoughtful critique ofNew Institutionalism and a defense of behavioralism see
Almond, Gabriel, "The Return of the State," The American Political Science Review,
9
governed by the desire to reproduce market results or to stabilize a faltering economy.
Government regulation in the 1960s and 70s was designed to promote social justice.
Politics was dominated by rebellion to authority and baseball was not immune from this
larger environment. It was in this era that baseball
1
s unregulated monopoly would face its
most severe challenges. Although the game continued to avoid government regulation
during this period, it did so by transforming its internal policies significantly.
Finally, the 1980s and 90s are characterized as the "efficiency" regime. Like its
predecessor, this regime was and is largely a reaction to what came before. Conservative
economic and political ideology became fashionable in the 1980s. Baseball's monopolists
began to find comfort in the shifting consensus on regulatory politics. Although their
cartel has lost considerable potency in relation to the players, they continue to stand alone
in the enjoyment of the benefits of monopoly control.
This study will trace the evolution of baseball's unregulated monopoly through
Eisner's four regimes, identifying the institutional, ideological and political factors that
have shaped the evolution of this regulatory anomaly. Chapter one describes the early
history of baseball, its evolution from fraternal recreation to major commercial enterprise,
and its place in American society as we entered the twentieth century. The compatibility
of baseball's special commercial status with the ideas, institutions and politics of the
Progressive Era's "market" regime is analyzed. Chapter two examines the place of
baseball in the New Deal Era. The institutions, ideas, and politics of Eisner's
"associationalist" regime are linked to baseball's continued insulation from government
regulation during the Depression and World War II years. The stability within baseball
82:3 (September, 1988), p. 853-874.
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created by the commissioner system is contrasted to the turbulent political and economic
environment in the country at large.
Chapter three examines the onset of instability within baseball, exploring the
effects of shifting political winds from the 1960s to the 1980s. The rise of the baseball
players union, as well as unionism across professional sports, is analyzed. The third
chapter also looks at the challenges faced by baseball with the emergence of television and
the rise of other professional sports to rival the popularity of the national pastime. The
effect of these changing technological and political phenomena on baseball has been
profound. In a period when old values were questioned and even ridiculed, baseball's
special place in American culture was also questioned, and possibly lost. The forth
chapter brings the story of baseball's unregulated monopoly up to the present. The impact
of the game's most recent and most severe labor strike is analyzed.
The study concludes with an examination of the immediate future of the game's
special commercial status. The heightened interest in baseball's antitrust exemption in the
last several years by the Congress and the courts has introduced new variables into the
analysis of baseball's future. The final chapter will attempt to identify the larger
institutional, ideological and political trends that have determined the fate of baseball's
unregulated monopoly for nearly a century. Also examined are the long term future
prospects of baseball's antitrust exemption, as well as antitrust policy in general, in light of
the current transformation of American society from the industrial age to what is variously
called the "information" or "technological" age.
1
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CHAPTER I
PROGRESSIVISM AND THE BASEBALL ANOMALY
Federal antitrust law is a significant legacy of the politics and the political thought
of American Progressivism. Antitrust law represents an approach to the regulation of the
economy born in the last decades of the nineteenth century in the face of burgeoning
industrialization. Baseball was bora in Jacksonian America. It was a sport played by
fraternal "clubs " It was a recreational activity that created camaraderie among neighbors
and fellow toilers in the new urban workplace.
By 1890, when the Sherman Antitrust Act became the law of the land, baseball had
grown into a professional commercial enterprise. The National League had already
replaced the National Association of Professional Baseball Players as Organized Baseball's
dominant institution and the game had already experienced the turmoil of strained
labor/management relations that would be commonplace in the industrial age. 13 As the
new century dawned American industry flowered in the soil of Progressivism' s vision of
industrial regulation, while baseball's evolution continued unchecked by the laws of
commerce. By 1912, when the Clayton Antitrust Act gave further definition to the rules
of the game in the realm of interstate commerce, baseball had weathered considerable
turmoil in its ranks as a result of player revolts and inter-league wars. Despite its highly
visible strife, Major League Baseball, unlike any other industry of its scope, would never
be forced to comply with federal antitrust law, nor would it fall under the jurisdiction of
13 See Pearson, Daniel M, Baseball in 1889: Players vs. Owners , (Bowling Green, OH:
Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1993).
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any federal regulatory agency. The celebrated Holmes decision of 1922 would suspend
Major League Baseball in a seemingly pre-industrial state.
The Early History of Baseball
What historians call the "baseball fraternity" dates to the early decades of the
nineteenth century. Historian Benjamin Rader traces the origins of this fraternity to
shared childhood experiences playing various ball games as well as the "peculiarly
American penchant for forming voluntary associations." 14 The first fraternal baseball club
widely discussed by most historians of baseball was the New York Knickerbockers,
founded in 1 845 by a bank clerk named Alexander Cartwright. Typical of pre-professional
baseball clubs the Knickerbockers were a social as well as athletic club.
These clubs provided a diversion for the workers of the young Industrial Age.
Baseball historian Warren Goldstein describes the atmosphere of mid-nineteenth century
baseball as "not very far removed from the world and culture of the urban workplaces."
He writes of the Eckford Club of Brooklyn, made up of ship builders and mechanics from
the nearby Eckford shipyards. In Washington, DC, government clerks made up most of
the membership of several local clubs.
15
By the 1850's baseball was already being touted as America's national sport.
Sixteen New York area clubs banned together in 1 857 to form the National Association of
13 See Pearson, Daniel M., Baseball in 1889: Players vs. Owners , (Bowling Green, OH:
Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1993).
14 Rader, Benjamin G., Baseball: A History of America's Game , (Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1992), p. 2.
15 Goldstein, Warren, Plaving for Keeps: A History of Earlv Baseball, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989), p. 24.
13
Base Ball Players. By 1861, the NABBP had member clubs in New Haven, Detroit,
Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, DC, raising the number of member clubs to
sixty-two. The purpose of the NABBP was to create uniform rules of play and to bring
organization and order to inter-club competition. The association was also intended to
cultivate and preserve the fraternal character of the game. 16
The Civil War is also generally thought to have contributed to the expansion of
baseball's popularity nationally. New York area troops are often credited with having
introduced men throughout the country to baseball, inspiring them to return home after
the war and start their own clubs. The contention that the war helped nationalize the
game is occasionally supported with unconfirmed stories such as the one about a game
played on Christmas day, 1862, by two teams ofNew York volunteer infantrymen at
Hilton Head, South Carolina, which is said to have attracted more than 40,000
spectators.
17
The NABBP 's founding devotion to amateurism and genteel fraternity began to
erode even before the war. As competition on the field grew more intense, so too did the
desire to win. The dynamic of the baseball fraternity was being transformed. Gradually
clubs became less interested in leisure and more interested in competition. The quest for
victories for the honor and prestige of the club began to transform most of the club
members from players to boosters. Only the most skilled members would comprise the
club's nine on game day. The increasing competitiveness of inter-club baseball also
brought out the commercial potential of the game. Clubs began to charge admission to
16 Rader, p. 12.
14
spectators of the game to be used for club expenses. It was also common for surplus gate
receipts to be divided between the players. 18
By 1859 the competitive rivalry was so intense that the NABBP was forced to
adopt a rule prohibiting the practice of luring players from one club to another to gain a
competitive edge. The association hoped to curb this tactic, known as "revolving," by
requiring all players participating in a game to have been a member of their respective
clubs for at least thirty days.
19
The rule was not enough to stem the tide toward
professionalism Other National Association rules of similar intent, such as the prohibition
of playing for "money, place, or emolument,"20 were seldom enforced.
At first, the wealthy backers of club teams would offer good jobs to players with
hours and duties that would allow for significant practice time. In New York City, for
example, many of the players on the New York Mutuals team were given patronage
positions in city government. In 1867, the young Albert Spalding was hired by a Chicago
wholesale grocery and paid forty dollars a week with the understanding that his nominal
duties would not interfere with his play. 21 This thinly veiled pay for play soon gave way to
outright pay for play. As early as 1 862 the top players were reportedly receiving cash
payments for their services on the diamond. Future sporting goods magnate Al Reach is
17 Voigt, David Q., American Baseball: From Gentleman's Sport to the Commissioner
System (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p. 1 1.
18 See Voigt, p. 14-22.
19 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
nd
Cong., 2
nd
Sess.,
1952), p. 16.
20 U.S., Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball, ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
nd
Cong., 2
nd
Sess.,
1952), p. 17.
21 Rader, p. 22.
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widely reported to have been one such player. Reach was offered a straight salary by the
Athletic Club of Philadelphia in 1863. 22 The embattled National Association gradually
caved in to the inevitability of professional baseball. The NABBP, unable to preserve
amateurism in the face of declining membership in the National Association and without
power to enforce its rules even on its member clubs, finally succumbed to professionalism
in 1870.
One year before the NABBP folded its tent the issue of professionalism had shifted
so much that the Cincinnati Red Stockings were able to put forth the first admittedly all-
salaried professional baseball team One year after the demise of the NABBP the
advocates of professionalism in baseball formed their own organization. The National
Association of Professional Base Ball Players began operation in 1 871 . The NAPBBP is
considered by most historians as the first professional baseball league and the first
organized attempt to structure the business of baseball. 23
The NAPBBP governed baseball for five years. The association had a ten dollar
membership fee for each club, which qualified that club to compete for the "Championship
of the United States." The professional association limped through five seasons.
Financial ruin had cut the number of teams from twenty-five to fourteen in the first year.
By 1875, the association's last season, only four of the original teams remained and none
of these made a profit. In a speech years later about the failure of the association, A.G.
Mills remarked:
[E]ach summer's campaign was planned during the
preceding winter and the habit was general on the part of
22 Voigt, p. 17-18.
"Goldstein, p. 134.
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clubs to take on obligations in the way of players' salaries
that were not justified, as the spring games would inevitably
demonstrate that the majority of such clubs could have no
hope of winning even a respectable number of games.
Moreover, this condition was greatly aggravated by the
general practice on the part of the richer clubs, of stripping
the weaker ones of their best playing talent. Then would
follow the collapse of a number of these clubs in mid-
season, leaving their players unpaid, while the winning
clubs, owing to the disbandment of the weaker ones, would
also frequently fail from inability to arrange a paying number
of games.24
Mills' description of baseball's dilemma reflected the frustration in and around
professional baseball with the difficulty of managing competition between clubs both on
the field and in the marketplace. In addition to its financial woes the National Association
had allowed baseball to become associated with ungentlemanly conduct such as gambling,
drinking, and sundry other unscrupulous behaviors.
In 1 876, William A. Hulbert, president of the Chicago Base Ball Club, mindful of
the failings of the NAPBBP, convinced the owners of seven eastern professional clubs to
break away from the fledgling National Association to create a new professional league.
The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs aspired to be the premier major
league of baseball. The league would limit the number of teams allowed to join, give each
team a territorial monopoly, and honor an inter-league agreement not to raid each others
player rosters during the season. The new league's fewer number of teams was intended
24 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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to reduce demand for players, reduce salaries and enhance profits.25 The territorial
monopolies and restrictions of mid-season revolving were intended to help stabilize
competition between clubs.
Another goal of the creators of the National League was to return respectability to
the game. In the years prior to the formation of the National League the sport's
popularity with the nation's more sophisticated classes had waned. Hulbert and his fellow
National League owners sought to make baseball more compatible with the Victorian
sensibilities then ascendant in the United States. In an effort to market the sport to the
gentry, the National League enacted strict codes of player conduct. They would no longer
play on Sundays. Gambling, drinking, and other ungentlemanly behavior would be
prohibited at the ball park. A standard 50 cent admission price would ensure a more
upscale crowd.26
The National League was created with two goals in mind; 1) to create stable and
profitable professional baseball, and 2) to bring respectability and Victorian sensibilities to
the game. Historians are mixed in their assessments of the second goal's achievement, but
there is unanimity on the question of economic stability in the first few years. None of the
National League clubs showed a profit in 1876, 1877, or 1878, and only one club profited
in 1879.
27 The National League's concerted effort to gain respectability forced it to
attempt the strict enforcement of its rules, which created considerable turbulence in the
25 Zimbalist, Andrew, Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look Inside the Big Business of
Our National Pastime , (New York: BasicBooks, 1992), p. 3.
26 Voigt, p. 60-80.
27 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball , ( H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
nd
Cong., 2
nd
Sess.,
1952), p. 20.
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league. Of the original eight National League teams, two were expelled for failing to
complete their schedules after just one season, three more went out of business due to
financial difficulty after the 1877 season, and one was expelled from the league for selling
liquor at the ball park in 1878. By 1882, the only original National League teams still
afloat were Boston and Chicago, both of which were helped by very successful teams on
the field.
28
One of the most distinctive features of the National League at its inception was the
fact that it was an association of clubs, not players. The effect of this distinction was that
the National League was in fact a business with very distinct and separate roles for the
players (labor) and the owners (management). In this new industrial atmosphere, which
was by then common in many other enterprises, the blame for economic distress was
placed by the owners squarely on the backs of the players. The owners believed that it
was essential to reign in player salaries in order to make National League teams viable.
While the National League had avoided the destructive effects of mid-season movement of
players between teams, its rules allowed for the free competition for player talent in the off
season.
The owners' need to reduce salaries led them to enact the first reserve rule, which
was put in to effect for the 1880 season. The rule allowed each club to reserve five of its
players for the following season in order to reduce the number of players on the market
each year. The number of players each club could reserve would increase to eleven in
1883, twelve in 1885, fourteen in 1887, and by the 1890's all players were covered by the
28 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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reserve rule. In addition to the reserve rule, the owners adopted a standard player contract
in 1879. The purpose of the standard player contract was to "enforce newly adopted
[league] rules giving each club authority to suspend indefinitely any player who was found
guilty of drunkenness, insubordination, or dishonorable conduct."29 These new rules were
backed up by the extra-legal practices of blacklisting and boycotting. All National League
clubs agreed not to hire any player who jumped a National League contract, and the clubs
also agreed not to play any team that hired a contract jumper.
The reserve rule did help stem the rising tide of salaries, and the standard contract
improved inter-league discipline and communication, yet these innovations also opened the
door for competing leagues that could entice players away by offering them free
contracting.
30
The first successful rival major league was the American Association
founded in November 1881. The American Association was organized by financial
backers in six cities that were not part of the National League, including Cincinnati, which
had a club that had been expelled from the National League for allowing alcohol to be
consumed at the ball park. 31 The Association was originally comprised of teams from St.
Louis, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Louisville, as well as Cincinnati. Most of
the teams that would play in the new league were owned by Breweries.
The American Association sought to lure fans from the National League by
allowing alcohol to be sold at the ball park, playing on Sundays, and charging only 25
1952), p. 20.
29U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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30 Zimbalist, p. 4.
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cents for admission. These measures were intended to attract those fans who had been
abandoned by the National League's campaign to instill Victorian values and standards. 32
The Association sought to lure players from the National League by offering free
contracting. There was no reserve rule in the American Association. The new league was
commercially successful, allowing it to compete with the National league for the best
player talent. By 1 883, the competition between the two leagues expanded from players
to territory. Resigned to the viability of the upstart league, the National League president
A.G. Mills decided to negotiate with the American Association in the spring of 1883. The
result of these negotiations was the first national agreement. Historians point to this first
inter-league pact as the birth of Organized Baseball.
The National Agreement of 1883 extended the reserve rule to the American
Association. The new universal reserve rule had the same effect as the old one. One year
after the truce between the American Association and the National League a third league
began operation without a reserve rule. The thirteen-team Union Association was
founded with the backing of railroad magnate Henry Lucas in 1884. However, the Union
Association lacked the fan luring innovations of the American Association and also had
difficulty competing with the two major leagues for talent. The new league was a
commercial failure but it was successful enough to garner its founder, Henry Lucas, a
National League franchise. Essentially, Major League Baseball had fended off its first
challenge by co-opting its challenger.
In 1885, with no upstart leagues on the horizon, the owners in both leagues got
together and announced that they would impose a salary limit of $2,000. The imposition
32 Rader, p. 47.
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of Organized Baseball's first salary cap inspired the players to form the National
Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Payers under the leadership of John Montgomery
Ward. A New York player, Ward charged that the owners had abused the reserve rule.
The salary cap was merely the straw that broke the camel's back. Among the abuses
alleged were the buying and selling of players without their permission, the threat of
blacklisting to force players into unfavorable contracts, and the practice of lending players
to others clubs without the consent of the players. 33
Initially, the owners negotiated with and appeased the players organization by
agreeing to disregard the salary cap and include a negotiated form of the reserve rule in
every standard contract. However, one year later the owners adopted what they called a
"salary classification scheme." According to this "scheme" players would receive salaries
ranging from $1,500 to $2,500 depending upon their length of service. Despite the
owners assurances that the scheme would not apply to current players, the issue sparked a
revolt by the players. 34
On November 6, 1889, Ward's Brotherhood of Professional Baseball Players and a
number of financial backers announced the creation of the Players' League.. With trust
busting rhetoric, the new league announced it would not abide by the national agreement.
Desperate to stop the flow of star players to the Players' League, Organized Baseball
turned to the courts in an attempt to enforce player contracts. In the case of Metropolitan
33 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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Exhibition Co. v. Ward in 1890 the New York Supreme Court held that the reserve clause
was unenforceable due to its lack of definiteness and mutuality. The court also called the
reserve clause unconscionable35
Having failed to use the courts to destroy the Players League, Major League
Baseball returned to the use of extra legal methods. All clubs in the American Association
and National League were prohibited from playing teams in the Players' League. Players
were induced with large salary offers to renounce the Players' League and return to their
former employers. National League and American Association games were scheduled at
the same times as Players' League games so as to compete for attendance. 36 The result of
these measures was lost revenue for all concerned. However, most baseball historians
agree that the Players League slightly outdrew Organized Baseball. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that after one season the Players' League was absorbed into
Organized Baseball with some teams selling out and others being added to the established
37
leagues.
Shortly after the Players League war was concluded tension broke out between the
National League and the American Association over the division of players who had
jumped to the Players League. The inter-League dispute resulted in the withdrawal of the
American Association from the national agreement. The nullification of the national
agreement resulted in bitter wars for players causing salaries to skyrocket. The fierce
35 Rogers, C. Paul, Judicial Reinterpretation ofStatutes: The Example ofBaseball and
the Antitrust Laws, Houston Law Review 14:3 (1977), p. 614.
36 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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unregulated competition for players caused the 1891 season to be a financial disaster for
both leagues. Following the 1891 season the National League absorbed the American
Association and became the only major league. In 1892, the National League and various
minor leagues drew up a new national agreement which included the first player draft as a
way of bringing players up to the big league. 38
The National League monopolized major league baseball for the rest of the
century. However, in 1 892 Ban Johnson created a minor league called the Western
League. During the 1890' s Johnson's Western League grew. The National League
attempted to co-opt the upstart minor league by allowing them to put teams in two of its
cities, Cleveland and Chicago. In 1900, Johnson changed the name of his league to the
American League and sought further concessions from the National League. The National
League's refused to deal with Johnson touching off yet another baseball war. In 1901,
Johnson proclaimed his league to be a Major League. His contention was supported by the
fact that the American League had lured more than 100 players away from the National
League.
39
One such player was Napoleon Lajoie, the second baseman for the National
League's Philadelphia club. The owner of the National League Philadelphia club sued to
block Lajoie' s attempt to play for the American League Philadelphia club in 1901. The
suit was heard by the Court ofCommon Pleas in Philadelphia with Judge Robert Ralston
presiding. Ralston, echoing earlier precedents found Lajoie' s contract lacked mutuality
38 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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and was unenforceable.40 The National League owner of the Philadelphia club appealed
the lower court's decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and won an injunction
against Lajoie, barring him from playing for the American League Philadelphia club.
Justice Potter of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used a partial performance argument in
overturning the lower court. He held that the mutuality of Lajoie's contract had been
made irrelevant by Lajoie's partial performance. That is, because Lajoie played one
season under the terms of the contract and the Phillies had paid him in full for that
performance, mutuality was established.41
The Supreme Court's decision was muted by a swift maneuver on the part of the
owner of the American League club in Philadelphia. He sold Lajoie to the American
League's Cleveland team where he was outside the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts.
Justice Potter's opinion, however, would have far greater implications. In it, Potter
characterized professional baseball as a business with a "peculiar nature and
circumstances." Its production processes, distribution techniques and commercial
practices were distinguished from conventional business practices of the day. It was a
"game," a "sport," that was deserving of special consideration. Potter's opinion laid the
ground work for Major League Baseball's anomalous treatment in the courts thereafter.42
In January 1903, the American League war ended with the signing of a third
national agreement. Under the terms of the agreement the American and National
Leagues formed the organization of Major League Baseball. The two leagues agreed to
40 See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (1890).
41 White, G. Edward, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms Itself (1903-
1953) , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 56-57.
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recognize each other's reserve clauses and to form a three-man commission to oversee
Organized Baseball. The commission would be made up of the two league presidents and
a third member chosen by them The role of the commission was to arbitrate disputes
between the two major leagues and the various minor leagues.43 The ensuing ten years
would see little conflict in Major League Baseball. The only incident of note was a one
day walk out by the members of the Detroit Tigers over the suspension ofTy Cobb. The
period is also remembered for Albert Spalding's creation of the Doubleday origins myth.
Organized Baseball's new found serenity was disturbed in 1913 when an upstart
league called the Federal League declared itself a major league for the 1914 season. In
1913, the new league attracted only a hand full of big league talent, but those who went to
the Federal League earned huge salaries. In the 1914 and 1915 seasons hundreds of
players defected to the Federal League.
44
In 1914, the New York State Supreme Court
handed down a ruling with far reaching implications.
In the case of Hal Chase, a player who defected to the Federal League, the court
overturned the Lajoie precedent in finding Chase's contract lacked mutuality and was
unenforceable. However, the court's language echoed the sentiments of the Pennsylvania
court in terms of its treatment of Organized Baseball as a peculiar and exceptional
enterprise. Building on Justice Potter's logic, the Court in the Chase case declared that
baseball was not a commodity or article of merchandise subject to the regulation of
42 White, G. Edward, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms Itself (1903-
1953) , (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 58.
43 Rader, p. 81.
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Congress. It was a sport, an amusement, and as such was explicitly outside of the purview
of the antitrust laws.45
In 1915, The Federal League sued Major league Baseball for restraint of trade in
violation of section one ofthe Sherman Antitrust Act of 1 890. The case was heard in the
U.S. District Court of Illinois by future baseball commissioner Judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis. Judge Landis made several friendly comments about Major League Baseball from
the bench, then encouraged settlement while he took the case under advisement. During
the nearly one year wait for Landis' decision a settlement was reached between Major
League Baseball and the Federal League.
Not all the teams of the Federal League were content with the settlement, which
consisted of either a $50,000 buy out, or absorption into Major League Baseball. The
Federal League team from Baltimore refused the buy out offer and filed an antitrust suit
against Major League Baseball in 1916. In the restraint of trade suit under sections one
and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Baltimore club was awarded triple damages of
$240,000 by the Indiana State Supreme Court. In April 1921, this decision was reversed
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In its opinion, the DC Court of Appeals held that Major League Baseball was not
subject to federal antitrust laws because it did not constitute interstate commerce. The
court's opinion read in part; 'the players travel from place to place [is] interstate
commerce, but they are not the game [which] is local in its beginning and in its end. The
fact that the [owners] produce baseball games as a source of profit, large or small, cannot
45 Markham, Jesse W. and Paul Teplitz, Baseball Economics and Public Policy ,
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1981), p. 7.
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change the character of the game. They are still sport, not trade."46 This decision was
upheld on may 29, 1922, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Federal Baseball Club of
Baltimore v. National League.47
While the Federal League controversy occupied the courts Major League Baseball
went through a crisis of a different type. The early history of baseball saw numerous
league wars and player/management strife. Also, the shadow of impropriety, gambling
and sundry other ungentlemanly pursuits had occasionally darkened the glow of Organized
Baseball. The creation of the National League was, in fact, partially motivated by the
desire to "clean up" the game. But, it was not until the Black Sox Scandal of 1919 that
the integrity of the game was truly jeopardized. Eight members of the 1919 Chicago
White Sox team conspired to throw the World Series to Cincinnati in return for cash to be
paid by gamblers. Despite the fact that all eight players were acquitted of charges
stemming from the "big fix," as it became known, the scandal exposed bitter divisions in
Major League Baseball as well as the impotency of the National Commission, the
governing body ofMajor League Baseball.48
The Black Sox scandal forced Major League Baseball to get its house in order. In
the new National Agreement of 1921, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was named the
lone Commissioner of Baseball, replacing the ineffectual National Commission. Landis
would rule Organized Baseball with an iron hand, assisted by Justice Holmes' 1 922
decision granting sweeping immunity from federal antitrust law to Major League Baseball.
46 Quoted in Zimbalist, p. 10.
47 Holmes' decision will be fully discussed and analyzed in a later chapter.
48 Rader, p. 100-110.
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Major League Baseball came of age in the Progressive era. However, the
preceding history of baseball's economic structure, labor relations, and its legal and
economic principles seems drastically out of step with the those existing in other
Progressive Era American industries. Antitrust policy is the creation of Progressivism. It
is a cornerstone of Progressive industrial regulatory policy. In order to examine the
compatibility of the "baseball anomaly" with the spirit of Progressivism it is necessary to
understand the place of antitrust policy in Progressive thought as well as action.
Antitrust Policy and the Political Philosophy of the Progressives
Antitrust policy developed after the Civil War in response to developments in
business organization. The creation of large business firms produced hostility and fear,
especially among the agricultural communities. The first manifestations of these fears
took the form of state regulation. Farmers of the South and West, who felt the Eastern
sponsored railroads had taken advantage of them, formed the Granger movement. These
granges became powerful interest groups at the state and local level. They lobbied for the
passage of state anti-monopoly statutes which protected them from exorbitant railroad
rates among other things.
By 1887, the variety of these state regulations had propelled the issue to the
federal level. The railroads themselves were eager for federal regulation as a means of
bringing uniformity to the various state requirements. The Interstate Commerce
Commission Act of 1887, directed at the railroads, became the first attempt by the federal
government to regulate the national economy.
29
By 1890, the fear of spreading cartels, the plight of Western farmers, the size of
Eastern banks, and above all the activities of the Standard Oil Company led to the passage
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.49 In addition, the same forces that motivated the enactment
of the various state anti-monopoly statutes were unquestionably important in the passage
of the Sherman Act. One study supports this view by pointing out that at that time U.S.
Senators were elected by state legislatures and the Sherman Act was introduced in the
Senate.
50
While the passage of the Sherman Act made it clear that the issue of corporate
power had a prominent place on the Progressive public policy agenda, it was the merger
movement around the turn of the century that elevated the issue of unfair corporate
combinations to the forefront. Between 1895 and 1904 more than 1,800 firms were
consolidated into fewer than 160 holding companies. The vast majority of these
corporations would control at least 40 percent of their market shares. 51
Antitrust enforcement was limited prior to 1905, but two Supreme Court decisions
during this period would lay the ground work for vigorous antitrust enforcement in the
wake of the merger movement. In 1899, mAddyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., the court
held that the Sherman Act prohibited all cartel agreements to divide markets or fix prices.
This decision meant that federal courts would treat cartels as unlawful conspiracies
without regard to arguments of equity or efficiency. In 1904, in the case ofNorthern
49 Dewey, Donald, The Antitrust Experiment in America, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1990), p. 4.
50 Boudreaux, Donald, Thomas DiLorenzo, & Steven Parker, Antitrust before the
Sherman Act in McChesney & Shughart's The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 256.
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Securities Co. v. U.S., the Court's ruling had the effect of conferring upon the federal
government the power of corporate divestiture. The Court's holding was based upon the
Sherman Act's authorization of the Attorney General to seek enforcement through
proceedings in equity. 52
The period between 1906 and 1920 saw vigorous enforcement of antitrust under
the Sherman Act. With the notable exception of baseball, no industry was spared scrutiny.
The Court's holdings on cartels and its conferral of divestiture power enabled the federal
government to challenge the big trusts including Standard Oil, American Tobacco,
DuPont, as well as the nation's five leading meat packing companies. Also during this
period, the application of antitrust to labor unions would be clarified by the Clayton
Antitrust Act of 1912, which declared that the labor of a human being is not a commodity
and therefore is exempt from federal antitrust law. This provision of the Clayton Act
would have important implications for the treatment of baseball in the courts.
The regulatory policies of the Progressive Era, manifested in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, as well as in the creation of the Interstate Commerce and Federal Trade
Commissions, reflect two strands of political thought as to the role of government in the
regulation of an industrial economy. The resulting debate was among the most important
between Progressive scholars and public officials and produced a mixed public policy
response.
The two strands of Progressivism came to be known as the "New Nationalism"
and the "New Freedom" While these were the slogans of Theodore Roosevelt and
51
Keller, Morton, Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in
America. 1900-1933 , (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 24.
31
Woodrow Wilson in the 1912 presidential campaign, the substance of these programs had
been developed years earlier by Herbert Croly and Louis Brandeis. Indeed, the 1912
campaign was a watershed event. Wilson and Roosevelt's alternate visions of the
government's role in an industrial economy would define the schizophrenic legacy of
Progressivism, leading generations of scholars to search in vain for a unified Progressive
political philosophy. Many have argued that the coming of the New Deal, with its
development of the administrative state, signaled the fact that, while Wilson won the
election, Roosevelt won the debate.
Wilson's "New Freedom" was a concerted effort to construct a Jeffersonian
concept of individual liberty for the industrial age. Wilson recognized that
industrialization had created a permanent employee class. No longer could every man
compete equally to become his own boss. The advent of corporate combinations had
provided tremendous advantages to a few at the expense of the many. Wilson and
Brandeis' New Freedom sought to recreate a level playing field for economic competition,
giving the small entrepreneur the ability to compete just as he had in the nineteenth
century prior to the advent of the corporation. The goal was to restrain corporations from
abusing their power without stifling their economic freedom
Wilson's program was animated by the Jeffersonian suspicion of a centralized
state. This sentiment made the use of antitrust policy particularly appealing. By using
antitrust law, casting policy as law enforcement rather than direct regulation, market
competition was encouraged in a way that fit nicely with the Jeffersonian norms of limited
Dewey, p. 6.
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government intervention. 53 The name "New Freedom" was carefully chosen to indicate
that the nineteenth century concept of individual freedom was to be adapted to the
Industrial Age by way of the least intrusive means. Antitrust policy was seen as the best
method to restore the "conditions in which the freely operating market mechanism rather
than the political mechanism disinterestedly distributed material wealth and life chances
among its participants."54
While Wilson campaigned using the powerful and populist rhetoric of "trust-
busting," Roosevelt was championing a more radical approach to economic regulation.
Inspired by Herbert Croiy's The Promise of American Life , Roosevelt dubbed his program
the "New Nationalism" and advocated a sharp departure in the direction of American
government's role in the economy. Abandoning Jefferson's suspicion of centralized
government, Roosevelt championed a strong national government, which would take on
the responsibility of regulating the economy.
While the "New Freedom" aspired to recreate the nineteenth century spirit of
competition, Roosevelt's program sought to allow and even welcome the concentration of
industry, subjecting it to direct government regulation. The government would utilize the
power of these industrial combinations to further the national interest. The creation of a
permanent employee class would be mitigated by conferring special benefits on
disadvantaged groups.
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Roosevelt did not propose to repeal the Sherman Act, although he favored
"continuous administrative action" over "necessarily intermittent law suits."55 He argued
that the act should be amended so that only corporate combinations injurious to the public
interest would be prohibited, making a distinction between "good" and "bad" trusts.
Roosevelt proposed giving government supervisory power over businesses engaged in
interstate commerce, as well as a to require comprehensive reporting of all business
activities to the government. To some degree this was already occurring voluntarily due
to the activities of the Bureau of Corporations, which was created by the Roosevelt
Administration in 1902. 56
Roosevelt viewed Wilson's program as a reactionary attempt to reverse the
consolidation movement, which meant breaking up the mechanism ottering the greatest
potential for national collective action. Wilson saw the "New Nationalism" as too intrusive
and as an abandonment of American principles of limited government. Often overlooked
is the third candidate in the 1912 presidential election, William Howard Taft.
Unlike Wilson and Roosevelt, Taft's position on the government's role in the
economy was not the product of a pre-conceived program. During the Taft administration
a record number of prosecutions were secured under the Sherman Act, despite the
President's reported disbelief in the economic soundness of antitrust laws. Ultimately,
Taft abandoned the hope of distinguishing between good and bad trusts and became a
forceful advocate for the vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act.
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Writing about the Supreme Court's role in constructing the parameters of the
Sherman Act, Taft praises the Court for its role in creating a 'Valuable and workable
interpretation [of the Sherman Act] which any one who gives it sincere attention can
understand and can follow in the methods of his business."57 This endorsement of both the
statute and the judicial construction of it meant that Taft's view was ultimately closer to
Wilson than to Roosevelt. However, it is also important to note that Taft's position was
distinct from Wilson in that he was content with what Roosevelt had called "intermittent
law suits."58 Wilson, on the other hand, advocated the use of the power of the Attorney
General to enforce the antitrust laws. Although Taft's view of antitrust was quickly
drowned out by the antitrust enforcement mechanisms of the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission, it may be fair to characterize his perspective as a third strand
of Progressive thought on antitrust.
Despite their differences on specific means, the New Freedom and the New
Nationalism were united in their objectives and ultimately the measure of Progressivism's
regulatory legacy is in the policies of the era. Marc Allen Eisner has skillfully teased out
the unifying themes of the competing visions of regulatory policy in the Progressive Era,
subsuming them within what he calls the "Market Regime." Eisner's Market regime
contains elements of both Wilson's and Roosevelt's visions.
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The Market regime (1880-1920) was characterized by the promotion of market
governance.
60
This is reflected in Wilsonian support for antitrust law, which attempted to
recreate market-like results through administrative means. Roosevelt's vision found
realization in the numerous independent regulatory commissions created in the Progressive
Era. The goal of both strategies was to ameliorate the harmful conditions brought on by
the industrial revolution and the advent of concentrated commercial power, without
stunting the nation's economic growth. Both approaches, which were pursued
concurrently, sought to prevent monopoly control of markets.
With the fateful 1922 Federal Baseball Supreme Court decision, Organized
Baseball found itself the only industry of its size in the United States subject to neither
antitrust laws nor any government regulatory agency supervision. Organized Baseball had
navigated its way through the Progressive Era without being touched by affirmative
government intervention. The high profile of Major League Baseball throughout the era,
including its frequent labor/management squabbles, makes the absence of government
intervention in the business of baseball seem unusual.
Organized Baseball's early history seems to be at odds with the spirit of either of
Progressivism's major strands of political thought regarding the government's role in
economic regulation. How did Organized Baseball slip through the cracks, avoiding the
60 The exact years of the Progressive Era are a matter of scholarly debate. Some bracket
the first two decades of this century. Others locate Progressivism more broadly in the four
decades from 1880 to 1920. This study finds the latter interpretation more instructive and
useful. Studies using the broader period include Marc Allen Eisner's Regulatory Politics
in Transition, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Eldon J.
Eisenach's The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1994).
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subjection to antitrust law envisioned by Wilson as well as the direct regulation advocated
in the "New Nationalism"?
The Compatibility of the Baseball Anomaly with Progressivism
Historians often link the exploding popularity of baseball in the 1880's and 1890's
to its synergy with the culture of the Progressive Era, 61 but scant attention has been paid
to how this cultural affinity contributed to Organized Baseball's ability to conduct its
business without any government supervision or intervention. In an era when state
intervention into the regulation of commerce became the norm, how did the business of
professional baseball, with all of its highly publicized difficulties, such as player revolts,
league wars and gambling scandals, escape federal regulation?
Progressivism had many faces. Political scientists tend to concentrate upon that
part of the movement which drastically altered the political process. The Progressives
transformed our politics from a Jacksonian party system of representative democracy and
a government of the "common man" to a system grounded in direct citizen participation in
the electoral process and a more rationalized, bureaucratized and professional governing
structure. Legal scholars probe the opinions of the nation's jurists, searching for the ways
in which Progressive jurisprudence guided and structured the politics and social relations
of its day. Historians and sociologists view the Progressives differently, studying the
broader social movement and changing social and economic relations of which the liberal
political reforms were only a part.
61 See Riess, Stephen, Touching Base: Professional Baseball and American Culture in the
Progressive Era, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980).
37
in
This broad social movement, which grew up in reaction to the rapidly changing
character of life and community, had a deep and lasting effect on the culture of America
the Industrial Age. Above all, Progressives were reformers who sought to guide the
country through a transition from its agrarian adolescence into an urban, industrial age.
Most profound perhaps was the impact of this period upon American culture. Many
historians have argued that baseball provided turn of the century Americans with an
escape from the harsh, sterile atmosphere of the urban industrial work place, as the
pastoral feel of the game linked Americans to a romanticized, possibly mythical, rural past
when life was simpler. The "good old days" phenomenon seems to find its way into the
sentimental lexicon of every generation. In the increasingly modern atmosphere of the
Progressive Era baseball clearly helped fuel romantic sentimentality for a bygone era.
To say that baseball had great cultural significance in the Progressive Era is to say
that it held special meaning and significance for individuals, especially for the men who
would shape the culture of America in the new century. Historian Ronald Story has
argued that the explosion of baseball's popularity as a spectator sport in the 1880's and
1890's resulted from the popularity of playing baseball in the 1850's and 1860's.62 The
young men of this earlier generation would become the parents, teachers, public officials,
businessmen and social and political reformers of the Progressive Era. In essence, the
opinion makers and cultural trend setters were men who grew up playing a game that their
fathers neither understood nor approved. Their love for the game, forged in the
camaraderie and fellowship of the sand lot, would dispose them to protect and spread this
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game, the cultural significance of which approached that of family traditions and ethnic
heritage for their generation.
For the leaders and reformers of the Progressive Era, baseball was a tool of reform
not the object of reform. Baseball was a game that would be used by these social
reformers to inculcate certain values into American society. Fair play, teamwork, sound
minds and bodies; these were the buzz words of a social movement. Baseball was a prop,
a metaphor used in the social gospel of Progressivism. The ills of the dawning Industrial
Age were in the complexities and intrigues of a changing commercial landscape, baseball
was a cultural institution that served as a bulwark of values from a simpler time.
The social and political reformers of the Progressive Era were not the only ones
initiated to baseball's cultural significance. The owners and promoters of Major League
Baseball were well aware of the sentimental hold the game had on this generation. In a
highly organized campaign throughout the era, baseball marketing touted the special
nature of the business of baseball. In developing its internal regulatory structure,
Organized Baseball was keenly aware of the need to link its commercial strategies with the
prevailing cultural attitudes about the game.
6
G. Edward White argues that Organized Baseball exploited the cultural
significance of the game for the Progressive generation by translating these cultural
attitudes into fundamental assumptions about baseball's largest constituency, the fans.
62 See Story, Ronald, The Country ofthe Young: The meaning ofBaseball in Early
American Culture, in Hall, Alvin (ed.), Cooperstown Symposium on Baseball and
American Culture , (Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1991).
63 Many historians have made a big deal of the partnership between the sports press and
Organized Baseball, arguing that the press and baseball had a quid pro quo type
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These assumptions were: 1) fans appreciate close competition, 2) they get vicarious
satisfaction from identifying with a hometown team, and 3) their attachment to a
hometown team is enhanced if the identity of the players on the team remains relatively
stable.
64
These cultural assumptions would govern the development of "Baseball Law"
which has ruled Major League Baseball since its inception, with only occasional prodding
from external social and political entities. The three fundamental tenets of baseball law
are: 1) a universal reserve clause to stabilize rosters and ensure better competition on the
field, 2) territorial autonomy for major league clubs, which preserves the economic
viability of clubs and enhances the hometown loyalties of fans, and 3) the maintenance of a
monopsony, or one buyer market for top player talent.65 The cultural salience of baseball
to the Progressive generation allowed Organized Baseball to preserve its peculiar
entrepreneurial character. By constructing its governing assumptions around the cultural
expectations of the fans, or the people, Major League Baseball was able to insulate itself
from government intervention.
The idea that the experience of playing baseball as children in the 1850's and
1860's contributed to the popularity of baseball as a spectator sport in the 1880's and
1890's must be clarified in order to see its role in linking culture to Organized Baseball's
anomalous commercial development. In the 1880's and 1890's, when professional
baseball was weathering severe commercial turbulence in the form of player revolts and
arrangement that facilitated the highly effective baseball marketing that was instrumental in
preserving the peculiar nature of the Business of baseball.
64 White, p. 59.
65 White, p. 66-82.
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inter-league wars, political leaders in the states and nation were seeking ways to curb the
abuses of corporate combinations that threatened the competitive heart of our free
enterprise system These same leaders, whose generation made baseball the cultural icon
it became, saw it not as a business, but as a child's game that could be used to instill
proper values in America's youth.66 The leaders of the Progressive Era were predisposed
to see baseball as having special cultural significance. This, combined with Major League
Baseball's exploitation of the cultural appeal of the game in creating its internal governing
principles and structure, left very few advocates for government intervention into the
operation of the sport.
The difference between attitudes within baseball and outside of baseball in the
Progressive Era is striking. While the owners, promoters and players in professional
baseball seem to have developed business-like attitudes as early as the 1870's with the
formation of the first professional leagues, the fans of baseball, among them the political
leaders of the day, maintained a general ignorance of or indifference to the commercial
implications of the game. The concerted marketing campaign of Organized Baseball
combined with a generation's personal experience of playing the game undoubtedly
contributed to the preservation of baseball's unique entrepreneurial character. This
apparent blindness to the commercial difficulties of Organized Baseball is most vivid in
some of the judicial decisions of the day involving professional baseball.
In the 1902 case ofNapoleon Lajoie, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court managed to
treat baseball more like other commercial enterprises even as they provided the grounds
for future courts to treat baseball differently. In addition to ordering Lajoie to honor his
Story, p. 325.
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National League contract, Justice William P. Potter's opinion for the Court explicitly held
that baseball was not to be regarded as a conventional business enterprise. He called it
"light hearted" and "more trivial" asserting that the business of baseball was "more
culturally significant than other American enterprises."67
Justice Potter's conferral of special cultural significance was echoed in the 1914
decision in the Hal Chase case. In Chase, the Court held that Major League Baseball,
although clearly a monopoly, was a peculiar and exceptional enterprise. The Court also
clarified Justice Potter's opinion holding that baseball is not a commodity or article of
commerce subject to regulation by Congress. The Court took pains to say that baseball
was a "sport" and an "amusement," indicating that it was something other than big
business.
68
In the 1915 suit by the Federal League against Major League Baseball, Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis of the Illinois U.S. District Court declared from the bench that
"any blows at . . . baseball would be regarded by this court as a blow to a national
institution."
69
Landis added that, "as a result of thirty years of observation, I am shocked
because you call playing baseball labor"
70 He then sat on his decision for nearly a year,
during which time the suit was settled out of court. Landis' declarations make it clear that
he perceived baseball as very different from other commercial enterprises.
The Court holdings in Lajoie and Chase, as well as the Landis pronouncements set
the ground work for the 1921 District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision that
White, p. 58.
White, p. 56-58.
Rader, p. 109.
Zimbalist, p. 10.
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overturned the antitrust verdict in the Federal League's suit against Major League
Baseball. This Court accepted the cultural significance language of the Lajoie case as well
as the contention advanced by the Court in the Chase case that baseball was not a
commodity or article of trade subject to federal regulation. Furthermore, the court held, in
an opinion written by Chief Justice Constantine Smyth, that the game of baseball "is not
susceptible of being transferred."71
This apparent denial of the commercial nature of Organized Baseball would be
echoed in the Holmes opinion of 1922. Holmes wrote: "But the fact that in order to give
the exhibitions [of baseball] the leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and
must arrange and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the
business." He went on to say, ''the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.
That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money would not be called
trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words."72
Holmes' reference to the terms "trade" and "commerce" are significant. The
cultural grip of baseball on the aforementioned jurists was not the only factor in these
seemingly unrealistic appraisals of the enterprise of Organized Baseball. Progressive Era
jurisprudence was shaped in many cases by pre-industrial, nineteenth century legal
definitions. These antiquated definitions of terms such as "trade" and "commerce"
73
retained their nineteenth century associations into the 1930s.
71 White, p. 73.
72 Waller, Spencer W., Cohen, Neil B. & Paul Finkelman, (ed.). Baseball and the American
Legal Mind , (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), p. 208-209.
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Justice Holmes relied on the very limited understanding of "commerce" set forth in
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
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When Holmes wrote his 1922 opinion for the court the term "trade" was
associated with the buying and selling of products. It was not associated with the buying
and selling of personal services. The term "commerce" was associated with the traffic of
goods, but not the goods themselves. Nor was commerce associated with the production
or manufacture of goods. These more restrictive definitions were also applied in cases
arising out of the Sherman Act unrelated to baseball. 74 The courts did not hold business
combinations liable under Sherman if they could show that their business was local or that
it involved manufacture, production or personal effort not related to production. The
logic of the Holmes Federal Baseball opinion was consistent with Progressive Era
jurisprudence regarding the treatment of "incidental" interstate transportation. 75 This
consistency has been overlooked by virtually all commentators who examine the opinion. 76
The now accepted notion that Holmes' opinion was mere "sentimental folly" which gave
birth to an "historical accident" that is the "baseball anomaly" ignores this consistency
between the Holmes opinion and Progressive jurisprudence.
Baseball's peculiar commercial development is less peculiar after considering the
synergy between baseball and Progressive culture, the marketing campaign of Organized
baseball that exploited that synergy, and the limitations of Progressive jurisprudence. Yet
the question remains whether the prevailing public policy assumptions on which baseball's
virtual self government rested were consistent with Progressive regulatory policy?
74 See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1869), Hooper v. California^ 55 U.S. 648 (1894), &
U.S. v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. (1895).
75 White, p. 74-75.
76 A noteworthy exception to this is G. Edward White's Creating the National Pastime:
BasebaU Transforms Itself. 1903 1955 , (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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At first blush one would be hard pressed to find consistency between the
development of Major League Baseball's apparently unregulated monopoly and either of
the two dominant strands of Progressive thought regarding economic regulation. Both the
"New Freedom" and the "New Nationalism" sought to check such abuses with state
action. The former would use the government's law enforcement mechanisms via antitrust
law, while the latter would empower independent regulatory agencies to regulate the
abuses of the trusts directly. In addition, the views of the Progressive Era President and
jurist, William Howard Taft, who advocated the judicial construction and enforcement of
the Antitrust statutes, sheds no light on the situation. Organized Baseball's immunity from
any of these types of state action, despite its obvious monopolistic nature, seems to
indicate that Progressive public policy cannot be squared with Organized Baseball's
commercial development.
To examine this question more fully, however, requires that we determine what the
goals of Progressive regulatory policy were and what the parameters were of "state"
action as the Progressives understood them. If "state" action refers only to the
enforcement by the federal government of antitrust law and the creation of independent
regulatory commissions, then, indeed, Organized Baseball's commercial development
cannot be squared with Progressive public policy. If, however, we can show that Major
League Baseball's self government furthers the attainment of Progressive public policy
goals, and that it does so within the parameters of "state" action as the Progressives
understood it, then we can square the commercial development of Major League Baseball
with the spirit of Progressivism.
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Two goals of Progressive public policy are well known: 1) it sought to mitigate the
harmful social and economic effects of the Industrial Age, and 2) it sought to liberate
individuals through political reforms that would bring down the corrupt political party
machines, whose pure patronage politics had weakened the moral fabric of the nation. In
the economy, trusts and other large commercial combinations threatened the values of the
free market, sponsoring instead the incubation of a "might makes right" mentality. The
pursuit of narrow, local and sectional interests by party machines had effected the same
type of depravity in the political arena.
Stephen Skowronek describes the pre-Progressive regime as "localist,"
demonstrated by state courts and parties. "These two nationally integrated institutional
systems tied together the state's peculiar organizational determinants and established its
effective mode of operations."77 The U.S. Constitution created a fragmented government
of checks and balances and institutional conflicts. Soon after the enactment of the
Constitution, political parties (not mentioned in the Constitution) were formed as a means
of coordinating the operations of this unwieldy arrangement. Political parties allowed the
separated institutions of the government to be brought together behind one electorally
accountable agenda while the courts gave meaning and effect to the law. The
Progressives saw the need to create stable government institutions that were not
dependent upon electoral coalitions for their continuity. The needs of the Industrial Age
were such that a permanent administrative structure was necessary.
77 Skowronek, Stephen, Building A New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.
24-35.
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Herbert Croly's Progressive Democracy makes clear that the hegemony of political
parties and powerful commercial combinations has greatly weakened the state's ability to
pursue substantive democracy. By destroying the party system and guiding the efforts of
large commercial entities, Progressive reformers hoped to enhance the collective power of
the "state" to pursue truly national interests.
78
The pursuit ofnarrow sectional interests,
which flourished under the nineteenth century hegemony of the courts and the parties, and
which was shrouded in constitutional law and the spirit of Jeffersonian individualism, was
a major obstacle to the realization of the Progressives' vision of democracy.
Through illegitimate combinations in both politics and the economy, powerful
actors pursued their own selfish interests without regard for the national interest.
Progressives were agreed on the necessity of "state" action in the pursuit of the national
interest or public good. The question that remained was the nature of the "state." For
"most of the Progressives, the state is first Tocated' in the good citizen who, in whatever
role and location, spontaneously acts according to consciously held - and shared - ideas of
the public good. ... A good citizen is state-oriented' in the sense of seeking to achieve a
larger public good in his actions in every sphere of life."
79
According to this interpretation, the "state" must be "located" prior to any external
expression in "an internalized idea of membership and shared values."
80
The existence of a
"state" presupposes the existence of a "people" who share a common vision of the public
good and who integrate that vision into their individual purposes. Such a people are said
78 See Croly, Herbert, Progressive Democracy , (New York, MacMillan Publishing, 1914).
79 Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), p. 132.
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to be governed, both individually and collectively, by a "social ethic," which leads to the
realization of "social justice."81 In this formulation, the "state" is equated with the pursuit
of the public good, which is normatively agreed upon by the people. When individuals act
in the pursuit of the public good they are acting as the state. This construction of the
"state" implies that non-governmental entities and individuals can act in a state capacity to
the degree that their actions pursue the public good, or national interest. Eldon Eisenach
labels such public spirited entities "parastates."82
Seen as a "parastate" the political question is; has Organized Baseball acted in the
"national interest," or in accord with the "public good" and was it a good citizen in the
Progressive Era? In Eisenach's formulation, parastates were private entities that pursued
the public good. Included among them were the family, settlement houses, churches,
schools and universities. These institutions in society were "parastates" because they were
"supportive of government both by producing good citizens and by themselves carrying
out the substantive ends that would be desired by an ideal state." It is clear that any
institution or individual who pursued the Progressive vision of democracy was seen by the
Progressives as an agent of the "state." Organized Baseball's peculiar commercial
development is therefore consistent with Progressivism insofar as it sought to produce
80 Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), p. 132.
81 Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), p. 132-133.
82 Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism, (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), p. 131.
83 Eisenach, Eldon, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1994), p. 135.
48
good progressive citizens and to govern itself according to the substantive ends that would
be desired by an ideal "Progressive" state.
Baseball's use by Progressive social reformers as a tool of reform is well
documented. The ostensibly native American game was used to socialize disparate ethnic
traditions. It was instrumental in bringing the Protestant ethic of the reformers to the
urban immigrants and other beneficiaries of the party machines that they were attempting
to destroy. Baseball's symmetry with the nativist, Protestant culture of the Progressive
reformers made it a "special enterprise."
The substantive goals ofMajor League Baseball during the Progressive Era were
in many ways the mirror image of the substantive goals of Progressive reformers. From
the formation of the National League with the goal of "cleaning up" the game to the
installation of Progressive Republican Kenesaw Mountain Landis as Commissioner of
Baseball, Organized Baseball shared with the Progressive reformers the substantive goals
of displacing lower class, ethnic behavior and ways of life with an upper class, nativist, and
Protestant morality in the work place, the voting booth, and the ball park. 84
The Progressive reformers sought to promote an enlightened and far sighted
citizenship, which would be ever mindful of the national interest over narrow, sectional
ones. Major League Baseball's structure for self regulation was designed with the same
communitarian ethos. The monopoly practices of Organized Baseball produced, for the
most part, internal fairness. In addition, these commercial practices, which were
84
It is noteworthy that the creation of the Commissioner system in baseball was similar to
the efforts of the Hays Commission in Hollywood. The Hays Commission was created to
"clean up" the content of movies during the 1920s, bringing them more into line with
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prohibited in other industries, were necessary to produce the kind of baseball that
Americans wanted to see and to patronize.
In a open and free baseball market there is no way to control costs or prevent lop-
sided competition on the field. In essence, there is no way to enforce in baseball a broader
understanding of self interest that is consistent with the public, or national interest, than to
allow Major League Baseball to regulate itself. The connection between the Progressives
campaign for state-minded citizens and Major League Baseball's attention to the greater
good in baseball through the enforcement of Baseball Law is evidenced by the congruity
of the Progressives vision of the national interest and Major League Baseball's vision of
the interests of baseball.
Major League Baseball's development as a legal monopoly, while inconsistent with
the regulatory policies of the Progressive Era national government, was nonetheless
wholly consistent with the spirit and substantive goals of the Progressive movement. In
both the New Nationalism and the New Freedom it is clear that the substantive goal was
to curtail the harmful effects of corporate combinations without stifling their ability to
engage in collective action that was consistent with the public good, or national interest.
Baseball's commercial development was anomalous, not because it was out of step with
Progressivism, but because it was the only industry of its size and scope that was not
subjected to regulation by the federal government.
Baseball's birth and early development as a professional spectator sport coincided
with and helped fulfill certain cultural needs existent in the decades surrounding the turn of
Progressive sensibilities. Will H. Hays became the "Czar" of the movie business in much
the same way that Landis became the Czar of baseball.
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the century. In a time of instability and uncertainty baseball provided continuity and a
sense of shared identity to a generation that was charged with ushering the nation through
its most profound transition. The transition from an agrarian to an industrial society
brought with it explosions of immigrant migration to America's cities and the awkward
integration of these disparate immigrant cultures with an American culture that was itself
in transition.
Those who controlled Major League Baseball in the Progressive Era, from William
Hulbert to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, were vocal advocates of the Progressives
social, cultural and political agenda. The owners and promoters of Organized Baseball
exploited both the cultural significance of the game and the institutional frailties of the
federal government in their development of Baseball Law. Progressive jurisprudence and
the cultivated ambiguity of the commercial nature of Organized Baseball combined to
affect the preservation of Baseball's unregulated monopoly. Moreover, the harmony of
Major League Baseball's substantive goals with those of the Progressive reformers
overshadowed the inconsistency between the regulatory policies affecting other industries
and Major League Baseball's exempted status.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEW DEAL ERA AND THE BASEBALL ANOMALY
Organized Baseball's peculiar entrepreneurial character was forged in the interests,
institutions and ideas of the Progressive Era. In the decades around the turn of the
century Organized Baseball preserved its unique entrepreneurial character by exploiting
the ideas of the Progressives' social gospel as well as the limited institutional capacities of
the federal government. With the onset of the Depression, American regulatory politics
was transformed. Instead of ameliorating the harmful effects of corporate combinations,
the goal ofNew Deal regulatory policy in the wake of market collapse, was recovery. In
these highly volatile economic conditions stability was valued over all else.
The Progressive Era regulatory regime, designed to preserve market conditions
amidst the growth of corporate power, gave way to a new regulatory regime in the wake
of the Great Depression. Marc Allen Eisner calls the regulatory regime of the New Deal
Era the "associational" regime. This regime is rooted in a synthesis of"New Nationalist"
Progressivism and the experience of economic planning during World War One. While
the Wilsonian, or New Freedom, strand of Progressivism sought to recreate the fair
market conditions of the pre-industrial age, Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalist
Progressivism sought to use the institutions of the state to guide and manage the economy
through cooperative arrangements between government and industry. The quasi-
corporatist arrangements envisioned by Croly and Roosevelt would become a prominent
52
feature ofFranklin Roosevelt's New Deal recovery program, and they would also provide
philosophical justification for the continuation of baseball's unregulated monopoly.
The consistency between the public policy goals of the Progressive Era and
"Baseball Law," which spawned baseball's unregulated monopoly, would be extended to
the New Deal Era. While other industries were increasingly becoming subject to
government regulation in an effort to stabilize and improve the economy, Major League
Baseball was seen as a model of stability, effectively coping with economic hard times
while at the same time carving out a special niche in American culture and society. The
turmoil ofeconomic depression and world war overshadowed baseball's anomalous
commercial development. The unprecedented internal stability ofMajor League Baseball
combined with the game's self-conscious role in uplifting the spirits of a troubled nation
during this era contributed to Major League Baseball's ability to avoid government
regulation
While the politics of the nation was undergoing its most profound upheaval since
the Civil War, Major League Baseball was enjoying what might be called a golden age of
stability.
85 From January 1921, to his death in 1944, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis
presided over a sport that saw no player revolts and no challenges from outlaw leagues.
Prior to Landis, baseball had hardly enjoyed a single decade without having to cope with
an outlaw league or disgruntled players. Landis presided over the game through the
roaring '20s, the depressed '30s and the Second World War of the early '40s without so
much as a whisper about government intervention in the governance of the baseball.
85 A more complete and detailed treatment of the politics of the New Deal Era will be
undertaken in section III of this chapter.
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With the close of the Landis era and the end of World War II, baseball began to
experience adversity. The national pastime, which had served as a window to better times
during the nation's most troubling decades, begin to reflect the ills of society rather than
provide a pristine escape from them. Having just fought a war for freedom Americans
began to grapple with oppression at home. A new activism among minority Americans
would find expression in the triumphs of Jackie Robinson and the integration of baseball.
The ugliness that greeted Robinson in the big leagues ended forever the days when
baseball evoked only the joys of a child's game. As the post-war economy picked up
professional baseball players began to realize that they deserved a bigger slice of the pie.
Eventually it would be the players pursuit of workers rights that would erode the pillars of
baseball law and threaten the game's unregulated monopoly.
The Golden Age of Stability: The Landis Years
From 1 903 to 1 920, baseball was governed by the National Commission made up
of the National and American League Presidents and a third member chosen by them. The
National Commission enjoyed about ten years of stability before it began to falter with the
Federal League war. While many historians charge that the National Commission was
dissolved as a result of the Black Sox scandal, historian Harold Seymour disagrees. He
86
argues that the Commission would have been replaced in any event.
In its later years, the National Commission was weakened by scandal. In 1918, the
National League President, John K. Tener, was forced to resign amidst charges of
86 Seymour, Harold, Baseball: The Golden Age , (New York: Oxford University Press,
1971), p. 311-312.
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corruption. The members of the Commission were often accused of allowing their
financial interests to interfere with their duties on the Commission. In the summer of
1920, the Commission's Chairman, August Herrmann, resigned under pressure, leaving
the Commission without a chairman for the remainder of its existence. 87
Organized Baseball foresaw the end of the National Commission. The so-called
Lasker plan for a governing structure in baseball was circulating a full year before the
Black Sox scandal. Albert D. Lasker, a Chicago advertising executive and prominent
member of the Republican party, was part owner of the Chicago Cubs. His plan was to
create a commissioner of baseball and two associate commissioners in whom total
authority would be vested to govern the game. These commissioners would be prominent
men who had no financial interest in the game. The idea was that the owners should not
and could not govern themselves. They needed an impartial governor. The owners were
not attracted to this plan for obvious reasons, however, the Black Sox scandal made it
much more palatable. 88
On November 12, 1920, the owners of the 16 major league clubs met at the
Congress Hotel in Chicago, where they created the governing structure of baseball that
continues to this day. With the Lasker plan as a benchmark, the owners unanimously
chose to have a single commissioner. They dropped the associate commissioners, fearing
that they would dilute the authority of the commissioner. They also chose to make the
commissioner a virtual "czar" of baseball, vesting him with absolute authority to rule in the
87 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball, (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
nd
Cong., 2
nd
Sess., 1952),
p. 57-59.
88 Seymour, p. 311-312.
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interests of the game in the hope that his strong hand could restore the integrity of baseball
in its time of profound crisis. The confidence of the American people in the
incorruptibility of baseball was badly shaken and was thought to require swift, decisive
action.
The commissioner's post was officially created in the new National Agreement
adopted on January 12, 1921, and Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was named to the
position. Chosen over such notables as former President William Howard Taft, General
John J. Pershing and Senator Hiram Johnson, Landis had illustrated his affinity for the
game as the federal district court judge. In 191 5, Landis hastened the settlement of the
original Federal League challenge by delaying his decision from the bench and encouraging
an out of court settlement.
Baseball's first commissioner was born in Millville, Ohio, in 1866, the son of
Doctor Abraham Landis, who had served as a Union Army surgeon in the Civil War.
Landis got his distinctive name from the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, which his father
had experienced only two years earlier. Landis was appointed to the federal bench by his
idol and family friend, President Theodore Roosevelt. As a jurist, Landis was not shy
about imposing his Progressive values. He distinguished himself as a "trust buster" in
1907 by fining Standard Oil company $29,240,000 in what would become the most
famous antitrust decision of the era. His widely acknowledged love of baseball combined
with his storied resolve in the face of the mighty "trusts" made Landis appear to be the
perfect choice for the job of restoring baseball's image and preserving the game's
unregulated monopoly.
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The owners created a quasi-public post by constructing the office of commissioner
much like the independent regulatory commissions of government. By empowering
Landis to rule in the best interests of baseball free from the influence of the owners,
Organized Baseball had effectively regulated itself in a manner consistent with the New
Nationalism principles that would animate regulatory politics in the New Deal Era. One of
the terms of the National Agreement of 1921, which created the commissioner's position,
was that in the event of the commissioner's death or incapacity, the President of the
United States would choose a new commissioner of baseball. 89 This provision illustrates
the owners conscious attempt to make the governance of the game consistent with the
regulatory philosophy of the day.90
The commissioner would be the final judge in all disputes. The owners and the
leagues surrendered their rights to appeal rulings of the commissioner to the courts.91
Landis quickly exercised his sweeping power by banning the eight Chicago Black Sox
players from baseball for life, despite the fact that they were acquitted of wrong doing in a
court of law. This established both his authority and his authoritarian style. Even the
appearance of impropriety would not be tolerated. Landis would impose his Progressive
sensibilities and values on the game for a quarter of a century.
Baseball historian David Voigt describes the chagrin of the majority of owners
when they realized what they had done in the face of the Black Sox scandal. Their fear of
89 Voigt, David Q., American Baseball Vol. IT (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1970), p. 140.
90 The provision for Presidential appointment of the next commissioner was dropped after
Landis' first seven year term.
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losing the game's status as the "national pastime" caused them to appoint a dictator. But
once the "guilty season" was past, they realized that they had left it to the dictator to
decide what was and was not "detrimental to the game." Voigt writes:
Landis quickly consolidated his power. His best weapon
was his own image as the personification of baseball
integrity. He used publicity masterfully and kept himself in
the news along with the swashbuckling Babe Ruth. Each in
his own style grabbed headlines, and together they
epitomized the baseball revolution that produced the new
golden age. 92
Voigt goes on to describe Landis and Ruth as "two poles of attraction" for Americans,
with Ruth representing "the nation's faith in skill and power" as well as "the yearning for
unrestricted pleasure," while Landis epitomized "lingering Protestant values" and served
as "the antidote to Ruthian excess."93Baseball historians are mixed on the question ofwho
saved baseball in the wake of the Black Sox scandal. Some argue that it was the hard line
discipline of Landis; others contend that the Sultan of Swat simply made everyone forget
about the past. Undoubtedly, both men contributed to the rehabilitation of baseball's
image in the 1920s
Landis' job was to restore the good name of baseball. He was not involved in
creating or changing the rules of the game, unless there was a conflict, in which case he
acted as arbitrator. First and foremost, Landis was charged with putting the shadow of
the Black Sox scandal behind and forging a new wholesome image for the game. To
91 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, Organized Baseball, (H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82
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accomplish this, Landis imposed the severest punishments, often quite disproportionate to
the offense.
In his first year of 1921, Landis banned more than a dozen players from baseball,
including the infamous eight. Upon banning the eight Black Sox players Landis
announced: "Regardless of the verdicts ofjuries, no player who throws a ball game, no
player that sits in conference with a bunch ofcrooked players and gamblers where the
ways and means of throwing a game are discussed and does not promptly tell his club
about h, will ever play professional baseball."94 Among the other players banned in 1921
were Hal Chase and Ben Kauff. Chase was repeatedly linked to gamblers, and Kauffwas
banned for consorting with car thieves.95 In addition, Landis suspended three Yankees,
including Babe Ruth, for barnstorming in the off-season, and also ordered Charles
Stoneham and John McGraw ofthe New York Giants to divest themselves of their
interests in race tracks in New York and Cuba.96
On May 29 1922, the Supreme Court, ruling on a case lingering from the Federal
League challenge gave baseball an exemption from the federal antitrust laws. This gave
government sanction to what some have called baseball's private self-government, with
Landis as an independent and chief executive.
97
In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce and
was therefore beyond the reach of federal antitrust law. Based on the logic that the actual
94 White, G. Edward, Creatine the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms Itself (1903-
1953) . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 104-105.
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playing of a game was within one state, Holmes held baseball to be a "purely state affair."
He held further that the interstate travel necessary for games was "mere incident, not the
essential thing."
98
With this, baseball was officially "special." Many commentators argue that the
Holmes decision does not say that baseball is special, or that it has special cultural
significance as our national pastime. One year after the Federal Baseball decision,
however, in the case ofHart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange Holmes ruled that traveling
vaudeville shows were engaged in interstate commerce." By ruling that traveling
vaudeville shows were engaged in interstate commerce, despite the fact that the shows
appeared to be "purely state affairs" for which interstate travel was "merely incident,"
Holmes inadvertently signaled that baseball was indeed special.
In the Federal Baseball decision, Holmes took pains to mention in his opinion that
the appeals court "went to the root of the case" and "got it right." 100 This endorsement of
the appeals court decision is important because, in addition to holding that baseball was in
effect not a matter of interstate commerce, the lower court held specifically that the
reserve clause was not an unreasonable restraint of trade and that baseball was sport, and
not trade. By endorsing the appeals court decision, Holmes was therefore endorsing the
entire decision, including its specific language about baseball's reserve system as well as
its distinction between sport and trade.
With the blessing of the highest court in the land, Landis ruled baseball's private
self-government without regard for trifling concepts such as due process. Landis fined,
98 See Federal Baseball Club ofBaltimore v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
99 See Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923).
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suspended and banned anyone who, in his estimation, endangered the image of the
national pastime. At the same time, Landis' ability to gage public opinion enabled him to
temper his wrath when the situation called for greater subtlety. In 1927, two of the
game's living legends-Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker-were linked to fixing games in the 1919
season. Landis chose not to expel these popular players. Instead, he chose merely to
move them to other teams and justified this lenient punishment on the fact that the alleged
infraction occurred before he took office. Most baseball historians agree that Landis'
mercy was motivated by his desire to protect two baseball legends from a scandal that
would have reflected badly on baseball as a whole. 101
David Voigt argues that the Cobb/Speaker decision marked a shift in Landis'
tactics. Because the public was beginning to forget the Black Sox scandal, Landis
transformed himself from stern disciplinarian to "efficient priest." 102 Landis' rulings during
the remainder of his tenure were no less arbitrary, but they were less harsh.
The 1 920s was a decade of prosperity in the nation and in Organized Baseball.
The Age ofBabe Ruth brought renewed popularity to the game. The American economy
was growing and the standard of living in the nation was rising precipitously. National
prosperity was matched by economic prosperity in baseball. Average attendance at major
league games rose fifty percent in the 1920s.
103
Baseball's economic prosperity was also
helped by the rapid growth of urban areas in the 1920s as well as the explosion of
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industry. Factory production almost doubled in the 1920s. 104 Indeed, the "roaring '20s"
brought prosperity to a growing nation and provided an excellent environment for
refurbishing baseball's tarnished image. It was easy to forget the troubled past amidst the
rosy present.
The most lively debates in baseball in the 1920s may have been about the minor
leagues. Before reaching a stabilizing agreement in 1931, the issue of the minor league
draft was hotly debated. On one side were minor league owners who saw the draft as
antithetical to their property rights. They wanted to buy and sell players at will. On the
other side, Commissioner Landis and the big league owners advocated a universal draft
wherein any minor league player could be taken by a major league club. After several
patchwork compromises during the 1920s the Landis position won out in 1931. 105
Another minor league controversy in the 1920s revolved around the St. Louis
Cardinals President Branch Rickey's farm system. Rickey's team owned and operated
minor league clubs and thus in effect controlled large numbers of minor league players
from the outset of their careers. Commissioner Landis opposed farm systems arguing, like
a good Progressive, that they created monopolies of talent inimical to free and fair
competition for players. They were, he insisted, a perversion of the reserve rule, which
left player fortunes in the hands of a single club instead of a free market or player draft.
Throughout his tenure Landis fought farm systems. Unable to outlaw the practice,
he attempted to utilize his power to discourage them and to scuttle their use when they
were in clear violation of the spirit of free competition. Landis repeatedly chastised the
104 Seymour, p. 343.
105 White, p. 278-284.
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owners for their covert support of the practice of farming. 106 In 1921, Landis got wind of
four players being purchased by big league clubs and sent to minor league teams with
whom gentleman's agreements were struck to return the players to the majors at the end
ofthe season. Landis immediately condemned the clubs involved for having failed "to
obtain waivers from other clubs or use option agreements, the only recognized and
carefully restricted exception to the no-farming rule." 107 Landis declared the players free
agents able to sign with any team they pleased. Despite the Commissioner's persistent and
active opposition to farm systems, the practice continued. In 1932, the Major league
owners officially rejected Landis' position by voting unanimously to adopt a rule that
specifically permitted farm systems.
108
The rosy days of the 1920s would lose their bloom with the onset of the Great
Depression. Although big league attendance maintained its high level through the 1930
season, it declined precipitously thereafter, not returning to pre-depression levels until the
1940s. In 1933, the national economy was at its lowest point. All the economic
indicators were down. Unemployment hit record levels. Throughout the decade baseball
struggled to get by. While attitudes in politics were shifting toward support for
cooperative recovery measures, baseball remained consistent with its more laissez faire
attitudes. Historian Benjamin Rader quotes Yankee owner Jacob Ruppert as saying, "I
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found out a long time ago that there is no charity in baseball." 109 Shielded from
government interference, Organized Baseball was able to resist the effects of the
burgeoning welfare state. Perhaps most telling is the fact that, throughout the 1930s,
ticket prices never went down.
In baseball, the richer clubs like the Yankees and Giants were able to make ends
meet, while the poorer clubs became caught in a vicious cycle. Because attendance was
down, poorer clubs, such as Connie Mack's Philadelphia Athletics, were forced to
generate revenue by selling off players, which meant ability to win on the field declined, in
turn causing a further drop in fan interest and attendance. In other words, the rich got
richer and better, while the poor got poorer and worse. While this situation was not new,
the depressed economy made it particularly egregious in the 1930s. Numerous proposals
for profit sharing arrangements to help alleviate this cycle and improve competition on the
field were scuttled by the richer clubs. Nevertheless, baseball limped on, managing to
survive the worst of times.
110
Baseball in the 1930s was an important tool for boosting the morale of a dejected
nation. Franklin Roosevelt recognized the utility of the national pastime as a way to
provide hope amidst despair and as a way to promote positive thinking and wholesome
values. Dizzy Dean's biographer, Robert Gregory, captures this theme by quoting
Roosevelt upon throwing out the first ball of the 1933 season. The President said,
"Baseball has done as much as anything to keep up the spirits of the people."
111
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President's remarks made it clear that the spirit of the game would be instrumental in
seeing the country through hard times. Politicians of the day routinely invoked the spirit
of the game. Baseball metaphors were conspicuous in the political rhetoric of the
depression.
While not immune from the hard economic times of the 1930s, baseball was
nonetheless enjoying relative stability. There were no attempts to unionize by players, no
inter-league wars and no franchises were lost to financial ruin. Ironically, the economic
challenges of the decade contributed to this stability. Player revolts, which surely would
have occurred given the across the board salary reductions of the decade, were never
launched. Because of the abject poverty rampant in the nation such a revolt would surely
have met with overwhelming public disapproval.
When Babe Ruth complained about a salary cut of 33 percent, he was excoriated
in the press. Even Judge Landis was forced to take a pay cut in order to show his
willingness to shoulder some of the burden of getting the game through financial hard
times. Baseball may have been exempt from the legal regulation of antitrust statutes, but it
was not immune to the regulating influence of public opinion. Outlaw and upstart leagues
were likewise discouraged by economic conditions as much or more than by baseball's
legal monopoly or by its strong commissioner.
This stability was not seamless. Major League Baseball did face internal
controversies in the 1930s. Controversy over salary cuts was joined by debates over night
baseball and radio broadcasts of ball games. Night baseball had been banned in the big
leagues until 1934, when the Cincinnati Reds began to play under the lights. Radio
broadcasts were generally thought to be bad for attendance. Ironically, the Chicago Cubs
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were the last team to play night games at home but the first team to broadcast games
regularly on the radio.
112
Night games were an attempt to increase revenue during the depression. The
theory was that attendance would be boosted because those who were working could
attend games after work. Commissioner Landis opposed night baseball, arguing, again
like a good Progressive, that it detracted from the wholesome character of the game by
putting it on a par with the less savory activities common to the night. Financial necessity,
however, superseded Progressive values, and the commissioner acquiesced to a limited
number of night games.
While the economic exigencies of the Depression worked in favor of night
baseball, they had the opposite effect on radio broadcasts of games in the 1930s. Club
owners feared that, if games were on the radio, financially strapped fans would stay home
and listen to the games rather than come to the ball park. The prevalence of this attitude
is evident in the ban on radio broadcasts agreed to by all three New York clubs. This ban
113
remained in effect through the 1939 season.
Baseball entered the 1940s down, but not out. As the economy began to recover
due to the economic effects of war, baseball's fortunes rebounded. Just as it had been
during the ravages of economic depression, baseball was an important symbol of American
values during World War II. In a letter from President Roosevelt to Commissioner Landis
dated January 15, 1942, the President expressed his desire for baseball to continue on
during the war. He wrote that baseball would provide crucial opportunities for recreation
,12 Rader, p. 137.
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in a time when an over-burdened people desperately needed such diversion. The President
expressed confidence that despite its depleted ranks during the war, the popularity of the
game would not suffer. Roosevelt also urged Landis to permit additional night games so
that day shift workers could see a game occasionally. 114 Though long an opponent of
night baseball, Landis permitted an expansion of night games during the war.
Major League Baseball accepted its special role in the war effort. In 1941, the
owners purchased $25,000 worth of bats and balls for use by the military. The proceeds
from each of the all-star games during the war were donated to the cause. Large numbers
of big leaguers entered military service. Admission to most ball parks was free to military
personnel, and in many other ways baseball sought to pull its weight for the war effort. 115
Despite drops in attendance during the war years, Major League Baseball failed to earn a
combined profit only once, in 1943, and in that year twelve of baseball's 16 teams were
individually profitable.
1 1
6
In his nearly 25 years at the helm of professional baseball, Judge Landis presided
over a stable, if not serene, industry. In the final analysis, it was this stability that made
government intervention seem unnecessary. While the most palpable shield from external
involvement in the business of baseball may have been the antitrust exemption granted in
1922, baseball was also left to its own devices during the reign of Landis because of the
commissioner's vigorous defense of and advocacy for free market conditions within the
game itself.
114 Letter from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Commissioner Landis, on file at the
National Baseball Hall ofFame Library, Cooperstown, NY.
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The free market values of the Progressive Era had a voice inside of baseball in
Commissioner Landis. His support for a universal draft for minor leaguers and his
opposition to farm systems exemplified his commitment to free market principles. 117
Furthermore, the nation's policy makers had far more important fish to fry. Economic
depression and world war distracted policy makers from the baseball anomaly and, at the
same time, enabled Major League Baseball to contribute to the national weal in its own
unique way.
The Politics of the Depression and the New Deal
During the Landis years in baseball, national politics was being transformed. The
regulatory environment went from its Progressive Era focus on the market to the New
Deal Era emphasis on what Eisner calls "associationalism." This regulatory regime change
was but a part of a much larger change in American politics as the nation moved further
away from its nineteenth century state of "courts and parties" to the full blown
"administrative state" of the mid-twentieth century. Politics was becoming more national,
moving from its locus in decentralized political parties and state courts to one in the
federal executive branch. This transition would require a major shift in political values as
well as federal jurisprudence in order to be completed. The tension within Progressivism
between Jeffersonian democratic values and Hamiltonian concepts of nationalism, as
expressed in debates between the New Freedom and the New Nationalism, would
116
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continue to shape American politics. As the nation's politics moved toward greater
involvement of the government in the regulation of the economy, the pressure on
baseball's private self-government increased.
Marc Allen Eisner locates the genesis of the association^ regime in the experience
of war mobilization during World War One. In an effort to organize the mobilization
effort, the federal government created the War Industries Board (WIB), which was made
up of fifty-seven sections covering virtually every conceivable industry, Each section of
the board solicited the input of business rivals on the maintenance of price stability, the
establishment of production priorities and the promotion of rapid response to military
needs. The WIB succeeded in forging a closer relationship between the government and
industry representatives like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The experience of the WIB
also showed the potential benefits of quasi-corporatist schemes of industrial planning." 8
The 1920s saw a tremendous proliferation of trade associations. These
associations, made up of industry rivals, shared consumer statistics, credit information,
cost formulae, and other important industrial information. The ostensible purpose of these
associations was to curb unfair market practices, but they defined fair and unfair price
policies in ways that in effect reduced competition. In this way, these associations
dampened competition with one hand while embracing the strictures of the Sherman Act
117
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with the other. 119 In the 1920s, when trade associations flourished with the blessing of the
federal government, Baseball's unregulated monopoly seemed much less an anomaly. It
was distinct only in that no government agency facilitated the cooperation of the baseball
owners.
Secretary ofCommerce and later President, Herbert Hoover was very impressed
with these trade associations to the degree that they performed their designed purpose.
To Hoover, these associations represented an extension of the experience of wartime
mobilization. Hoover believed "that a network of cooperative associations facilitated by
the national government could serve to coordinate and rationalize production." What
Eisner calls Hoover's vision of "associational self-regulation" was designed to "provide a
means of directing economic development, eliminat[e] damaging competition, and
ensur[e] that firms producing comparable goods would agree to meet specific
standards."
120
During the 1920s the Commerce Department and the Federal Trade
Commission pursued many of these types of industry-friendly associationalist initiatives.
Major League Baseball under Commissioner Landis approximated this "associational self-
regulation" quite well despite the absence of federal oversight. Additionally, the game
was seen in the 1920s as just that, a game, not an industry. To the degree that anyone
perceived a need to regulate baseball, the creation of an independent commissioner to be
replaced by presidential appointment, was considered more than sufficient.
The stock market crash of 1929 drastically and unalterably transformed
perceptions ofeconomic stability and growth. The previous decade saw a nation
119 Wecter, Dixon, The Age of the Great Depression: 1929-1941 , (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1948), p. 22.
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ruminating over ways to expand and build on its economic prosperity. The
associationalism of the 1920s was undertaken, not out of grave necessity, but as a way to
help stabilize and expand commercial success. The collapse of the economy in the
aftermath of the stock market crash completely changed the tenor of such initiatives. Just
as world war had required a nationally coordinated mobilization effort, the collapse of the
economy would require a nationally coordinated economic recovery effort.
Despite his associationalist tendencies as Secretary of Commerce, President
Hoover refused to expand the concept in order to defeat the enemy of economic
depression. His efforts to create cooperative arrangements between industry competitors
with the help of the state had always been animated by his strong belief in a free market.
When presented with a proposal that would have required the suspension of antitrust laws
and the creation of a regulatory agency with broad powers to coerce commercial entities
into complying with its recommendations, President Hoover rejected it as a plan that
would create destructive monopolies and extend government intervention in the economy
beyond its constitutional limits. Contrary to Hoover's reluctance, there was a general
feeling among industry representatives that the present crisis required the suspension of
antitrust laws as well as some manner of government supervised trade agreements. These
measures were seen as necessary to restore stability to a highly volatile and unstable
economy.
121
The mood of the country was shifting rapidly in 1930 and 1931 toward greater
receptivity of government involvement in the economy. Hoover resisted this political
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trend. In the belief that the stock market crash was just a "paper debacle that could be
checked by intelligent cooperation at the top," Hoover encouraged industry
representatives to increase spending voluntarily to spur the economy. He acted as public
cheer leader for the "self-recuperative power and socially cooperative spirit of [American]
business." Hoover's optimism and faith proved futile, and his attempts to instill a "keep
the faith" attitude would become fodder for the satire of a generation. 122 Historian Dixon
Wecter captures Hoover's intransigence:
Hoover believed that the obligation for relief and
reemployment began with the individual. Failing there, the
effort might then call upon private organizations like the
Red Cross, thence turn to municipal and state governments
and, finally, as a last resort to the federal government-whose
succor, in this ultimate extremity, should take the form of
loans rather than gifts. Slowly and reluctantly Hoover was
driven back trench after trench in what he conceived to be
his defense of the public treasury. 123
Although historians are quick to point out that the presidential campaign of 1932
was not waged between opposing visions of economic regulation, it is fair to say that
Hoover's inability to stem the tide of economic despair led to Franklin Roosevelt's
landslide victory. Roosevelt's campaign rhetoric was bold, but inconsistent. Having
concluded that the American political spectrum ranged from those who doggedly adhered
to Jeffersonian laissez faire principles to those who supported the bold New Nationalism
of the previous President Roosevelt, FDR's rhetoric included something for everyone.
Under FDR, a new approach to economic regulation would eventually be blessed by both
public opinion and the Supreme Court.
122 Wecter, p. 43.
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Just as the political atmosphere of the previous decade was shaped by the
conservative values of Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, the politics of at least
the next forty years would be shaped by the values of Roosevelt's New Deal. The
seeming inconsistency of his campaign rhetoric reflected more than his uncanny ability to
forge winning coalitions in politics, it represented the tensions within his own mind about
American politics.
The most popular interpretation of the New Deal holds that it was a series of ad
hoc responses to the economic crises of the Depression brokered by a highly skilled
politician whose talent for coalition building was aided by his decided lack of a coherent
political philosophy.
124 Marc Allen Eisner probes deeper and enriches our understanding
of the New Deal, arguing that its transformation of state-society relations was the
combined result of experience with war mobilization and the New Nationalist strand of
Progressivism.
125
While Eisner's thesis is compelling and accurate, the work of Sidney
Milkis better illustrates how FDR transformed the political landscape. Milkis argues that
"FDR consciously patterned his leadership after that ofWoodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt, seeking to reconcile the strengths of these leaders."
FDR was drawn to Wilson's attempt to preserve the nineteenth century spirit of
individual liberty, but he was also conscious of the pathological effects of advocating a
Jeffersonian individualism in an age when the barriers to freedom were more often erected
by economic elites than by government interference. The President's heralded "brain
124 See, James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox,(New York: Harcourt
Brace Publishers, 1956).
125 See Eisner.
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trust" was headed by two men whose ideas were the product of the two strands of
Progressive thought. Adolph Berle used his influence to push the President toward
Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalist program, while Felix Frankfurter exercised his
prerogative as one of the President's top advisors to support the ideas of Wilson and
Brandeis, who preferred political deliberation and choice to the imposition of
administrative power.
To bridge the gap between Wilson and Roosevelt, indeed between Jefferson and
Hamilton, FDR laid out his philosophy in what has come to be known as the manifesto of
the New Deal, the Commonwealth Club Address, delivered during the 1932 campaign. In
the speech, written by Adolph Berle and inspired by the work of John Dewey, Roosevelt
redefined liberalism for the industrial age. This new liberalism sought to recognize an
understanding of individualism that was consistent with the realities of industrial society.
The New liberalism would get around Americans' Jeffersonian distrust of centralized
administration by convincing Americans that such arrangements were necessary for the
realization of individual liberty in an industrial age. In essence, FDR, like Dewey, was
adapting eighteenth and nineteenth century values of Jeffersonian individualism to
twentieth century conditions. He was redefining individualism and liberty in the context of
the social and economic realities of the industrial age. By cloaking his advocacy for an
expansion of the federal government in the liberal constitutional language of individual
rights, Roosevelt was able to give legitimacy to Progressive ideals in a way that Wilson
126 Milkis, Sidney, The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American
Party System Since the New Deal , (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 38.
74
and TR were never able to achieve. In so doing, he moved decisively toward nationalizing
American politics. 127
Franklin Roosevelt's new liberalism was successful in changing the mood of the
nation in a way that the Progressives were unable to do. Although FDR's new liberalism
was rhetorically compelling, the harsh conditions of economic depression no doubt helped
Americans to understand the exigencies and changed context of an industrial society.
Roosevelt's success in turning the philosophical corner from Jefferson to Hamilton was
not merely accomplished in word. The programs of the New Deal were practical, tangible
political manifestations of the transition to a nationalized politics.
Two particular pieces of legislation are often cited in regard to the spirit of the
New Deal. The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA), both passed in the early Summer of 1933, provide excellent
examples of the nationalistic goals and quasi-corporatist methods of the New Deal. In
addition, they illustrate the difficulty and the staccato rhythm of regime change.
The NIRA set up trade associations in the various sectors of industry. Much like
the War Industries Board of World War I, the NIRA created government/ industry
committees to devise codes of fair conduct, which were to be exempt from antitrust law.
Final approval of these codes was left to the President. The statute created a system run
by representatives of corporations, but there was also a specific provision guaranteeing a
place at the table for organized labor. The Act's protection of collective bargaining was
crucial for the support of labor, without which the legislation would not have passed.
Marc Allen Eisner contrasts the NIRA to initiatives of the Progressive Era, showing that
Milkis, p. 39-41.
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this law represents a clear departure from the free market ethos of the Progressives market
regime. The NIRA's virtual suspension of antitrust law and creation of government
supervised cartels represents the realization of the Theodore Rooseveh and Herbert Croly
New Nationalist vision. The Agricultural Adjustment Act was cut from the same cloth as
the NTRA. It consisted of the establishment of government supervised cartels in
agriculture.
128
These bold early initiatives of the New Deal represent the political conversion of
the nation to a nationalized politics. They were an affront to traditional political and
constitutional values. The Supreme Court, which had acquiesced to constitutional
experimentation in the face of civil war and world war, was not willing to allow these
initiatives to bury the doctrine of laissez faire constitutionalism without a fight. As
difficult as regime change is in politics, it is even more difficult in law. In May 1935, in
Schecter v. United States the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA, holding that it had
required an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by the Congress to the
President.
129
The NIRA had authorized the creation of codes of conduct by groups formed by
the President. These codes, which had the force of law, would thus be made, passed and
enforced entirely within the executive branch. The case produced a clarification of the
constitutional doctrine of nondelegation. The so-called Schecter rule states that the
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the executive branch without clear
standards and guidelines.
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In January, 1936, the Supreme Court applied the Schecter rule in striking down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act in the case of United States v. Butler. Despite these judicial
setbacks, the Roosevelt administration and Congress continued to pass sweeping new
initiatives that expanded the regulatory reach of the federal government. The continuing
New Deal initiatives despite the Court's resistance illustrates the power of the changed
political mood. The Supreme Court was widely and harshly criticized for what most
Americans thought was its failure to understand the Constitution in its modern context,
and the continuing legislative assault effectively pressured the Court into a fundamental
jurisprudential shift.
The Supreme Court finally aligned itself with the political environment in the
Spring of 1937. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrsih, the court ruled 5-4 in favor of a
federal minimum wage law. Justice Owen Roberts had reversed his position. Many
commentators argue that Justice Roberts was influenced by FDR's threatened court
packing plan as well as by the political mood of the day. In any case, this decision became
known as "the switch in time that saved nine." After the Parrish decision, the Court
regularly upheld New Deal initiatives. 130
In the remainder of 1937, the Court would give the constitutional seal of approval
to both the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act. The new liberal
majority was solidified by a series of appointments to the Supreme Court. In 1937, FDR
appointed Alabama Senator Hugo Black to replace the resigning Justice Willis Van
Devanter. In 1938, with the death of Justice Benjamin Cardozo and the resignation of
129 Kelly, Alfred, Winfred Harbison, & Herman Belz, The American Constitution: Its
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Justice George Sutherland, FDR appointed fellow New Dealers Stanley Reed and Felix
Frankfurter to the Court. In 1939, Justice Louis Brandeis resigned and Justice Pierce
Butler died. The former was replaced by William O. Douglass, and the latter by Frank
Murphy. The last remaining hold out from the conservative court, Justice James
McReynolds, retired in 1941, allowing Roosevelt to complete his total redesign of the
Court with the appointment of his Attorney General, Robert Jackson. 131
FDR appointed more members of the Supreme Court than any President before or
since. His overwhelmingly liberal and activist court would dramatically impact the
nation's politics for the next half century. Interestingly, the Court's role as inhibitor in the
regime change from the Progressive Era to the New Deal Era- from the market to the
associational regime— would not be replicated in the next regime shift precisely because of
its Rooseveltian make up. Indeed, the Court would be a leader in the shift from an
associational regime to what Eisner calls the "societal regime."
Its conversion to New Deal liberalism reversed a half century of the Court
defending corporate property rights in the face of attempts to expand state and federal
regulatory power. Throughout the Progressive Era the Court staved off legislative
assaults on traditional Jeffersonian concepts of individual rights that it felt would have
unconstitutionally expanded the regulatory power of the federal government. The
conservative jurisprudence of the Progressive Era Court was certainly a factor in the
failure of Progressives to achieve their more far reaching, New Nationalist, objectives and,
as discussed in chapter one, it played a part in upholding baseball's unregulated monopoly.
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It also provides insight into the dominance of less intrusive Progressive initiatives like
antitrust law and the rhetorical victory of the New Freedom over the New Nationalism.
The New Deal's response to the Great Depression represents the realization of
New Nationalist Progressivism The pressure created by the exigencies of economic
depression provided the impetus for a political, and eventually jurisprudential, revolution.
The Supreme Court's acquiescence to the expansion of the federal government's
regulatory power did not, however, unleash wholesale corporatism on the nation. The
intervention of World War II revitalized the American economy effectively reducing the
crisis mentality that had spawned the more far reaching New Deal experiments such as the
NIRA.
The non-interference of the federal government in baseball's private self
government in 1920s was due in part to the posture of the Supreme Court and the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department with respect to corporate combinations.
During the 1 920s the courts not only failed to dissolve a single corporate merger, they
handed down numerous decisions favorable to firms that controlled as much as 90 percent
of their markets. Despite Herbert Hoover's ostensible support of antitrust enforcement as
both Secretary ofCommerce and as President, the 1920s saw a considerable drop in
antitrust prosecutions and convictions. Of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department in the 1920s, historian Morton Keller writes that it "never met a trust it didn't
132
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The associationalism of the 1920s manifest in the proliferation of trade
associations, had the effect of dampening enthusiasm for antitrust enforcement and
encouraging cooperative relations among industry rivals. Major League Baseball's cartel,
led by the strong hand of Judge Landis, did not raise an eye brow in the 1920s. Major
League Baseball's continued freedom from government interference is hardly surprising
given that antitrust was the primary means of Progressive regulation of the economy and
that enforcement was repeatedly discouraged by the Supreme Court and an industry
friendly Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. There was in the federal
government a general acceptance of apparently benign corporate combinations such as
trade associations, among them baseball.
Major League Baseball's private self government weathered, even exploited, the
political and economic upheaval of the 1930s and early 1940s. In the wake of the stock
market crash, baseball's monopolistic cartel was hardly a prime target of policy makers,
whose overriding goal in the 1930s was the recovery and stabilization of a national
economy. These dire circumstances, combined with baseball's relative internal stability,
allowed the game not only to avoid government regulation, but also to solidify its special
status in American culture.
Political leaders, like FDR, used baseball as a way to rally an anxious nation. In
the Depression, the game exemplified America's best traditions and values, a role fully
exploited by Major League Baseball to keep the game on a cultural pedestal. Baseball's
morale boosting role was extended with the onset of World War II. By the mid- 1940s
baseball's private self government was shielded by the fact that the game had captured the
hearts and minds of the nation and because, between the Great Depression and World Wai
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II, there were simply more urgent matters before the nation. During the quarter century in
which baseball was ruled by Commissioner Landis, the stability inside the game together
with the instability outside of it both secured Major League Baseball's standing as the
national pastime and insulated it from government interference. Having seen the nation
through hard times, baseball had become a cultural icon.
Stability in Baseball Begins to Unravel
With victory in Europe and the Pacific, Americans returned to the ballparks in
droves. The wartime drops in attendance were quickly erased from 1946 to 1949 as major
league attendance doubled its pre-war levels and major league profits were in the millions
of dollars. But Major League Baseball entered this era of post war prosperity with a new
man at the helm. Judge Landis died in 1944, and Organized Baseball appointed a U.S.
Senator from Kentucky, A.B. "Happy" Chandler, as the game's second commissioner. As
economic stability and peace returned to the nation, conflict returned to baseball. In the
late 1940s and 1950s the game would grapple with a new outlaw league, racial
integration, numerous rumblings of player discontent, and its first brushes with federal
legislative interference into its governance.
Ironically, the level of cultural significance attained by baseball in the 1930s and
1940s encouraged congressional interference. The careful and successful campaign by
Organized Baseball to convince Americans that the interests of baseball were the interests
of America did help to legitimize baseball law and internal self government. But, it also
made Americans feel that the game belonged to them and not to the owners. Much to the
owners' chagrin, this view was heralded by their own hand picked successor to Judge
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Landis. Not long after his appointment, Commissioner Chandler chastised the owners
saying, "You don't own the game... the game belongs to the American people." 133
Baseball historians agree that Chandler was chosen by the owners because they felt
he was a far cry from the irascible, uncompromising Judge Landis. Chandler was a
politician and, as such, the owners expected the former U.S. Senator to "play ball." He
did not comply with their expectations. The owners were less than thrilled with
Chandler's support ofBranch Ricky's attempts to end racial segregation in the game. 134
Although he was a thorn in their sides on many issues, the owners could at least count on
Judge Landis to protect the complexion of the game, so to speak. Ultimately Chandler's
independence from the owners contributed to his contract not being renewed in 1951.
Chandler had little time to learn or enjoy his new job, as the stability of the Landis
years ended shortly after World War EL One year into his term, baseball was faced with
the first attempt to create a players union since before the Landis years. In 1946, a labor
lawyer with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) attempted to form a new
players union, the American Baseball Guild. With the onset of postwar prosperity players
began to feel more comfortable about demanding their fair share. Quickly recognizing the
fertile environment for such ventures, the owners formed a committee headed by Yankees
part-owner Larry MacPhail to improve relations with the players and alleviate any
perceived need for a union. The committee fulfilled its mandate by granting several
concessions to the players. The committee agreed to provide each player with a $25 a
week stipend during spring training, a raise in the minimum salary to $5,000, a pension
133 Quoted in Rader, p. 187.
134 Rader, p. 187.
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plan for the players, and player representation on a committee of club owners and league
presidents.
135
The MacPhail committee had fended off the first, but hardly the last,
attempt to form a players' union in baseball.
Chandler also faced a more serious challenge at the outset of his tenure. The so-
called "Mexican League War" broke out as a result of raids on Major League rosters by
Mexican League President Don Jorge Pasqual. In the winter of 1946, eighteen big
leaguers either jumped their reserve clauses or jumped their contracts outright to play in
the Mexican League that spring. Responding to the threat of the Mexican League, which
enticed such notable players as the Brooklyn Dodgers' catcher Mickey Owen and St.
Louis Browns shortstop, Vern Stephens to play south of the border, Commissioner
Chandler suspended all but one of the league jumpers. Before handing down blanket five-
year suspensions, the commissioner offered amnesty to any player who agreed to return
immediately to his Major League club. Stephens took the commissioner up on his offer.
Chandler's harsh penalty was unprecedented for the commissioner of baseball.
Even during the Federal League war no penalties as harsh were handed out.
Commissioner Landis, well known for his harsh brand ofjustice, never faced the threat of
an outlaw league and therefore had not been tested under such circumstances. After
Chandler handed down the suspension, and despite its unprecedented severity, the owners
ratified the commissioner's action.
At a joint meeting of the major leagues on August 28, 1946, the Chicago Cubs
general manager proposed an amendment to the leagues' rules which would sanction the
penalty of a five year suspension for league jumpers. The proposal, meant to support
135 Rader, p. 187-188.
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Chandler's action, was agreed to unanimously. A congressional report later quoted Mr.
Gallagher of the Cubs at that meeting as saying that "[t]he sight ofMickey Owen sitting
on his farm or starting the races at the Springfield Fair will do a lot more to discourage
Stan Musial from going to Mexico next winter than any suits we may file on the reserve
clause."
136
Musial, all-star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardnals, had been tempted with a
lucrative contract to jump to the Mexican League with the others. Gallagher's comments
are illustrative of the attitude within Organized Baseball. Throughout the game's history it
was the extra legal maneuvers such as blacklisting and boycotts which quelled unrest and
the owners expected this trend to continue. Unfortunately for them it was quickly
apparent that the postwar world would be much more complicated than the old days.
In a report to the league committees received the day before the joint meeting
mentioned above, Commissioner Chandler warned of the legal vulnerability of current
baseball law. The reserve clause, a principle component of baseball law, was in jeopardy
of being nullified by the courts. Chandler writes in the report that "the present reserve
clause could not be enforced in an equity court in a suit for specific performance, nor as
the basis for a restraining order to prevent a player from playing elsewhere, or to prevent
outsiders from inducing a player to breach his contract."
The implications of the commissioner's warning in the aftermath of the Mexican
League War were clear. Without modification, the reserve clause would not hold up and
136 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Study of
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the players who sought to return to Major League Baseball after being dissatisfied with
the Mexican League might prevail in court, effectively negating the power of the
commissioner to punish those who violated the reserve clause. 138
Although some of the players who jumped to the Mexican League had actually
jumped newly signed contracts, others, including Danny Gardella, had merely jumped their
reserve clause. Gardella, who had left the New York Giants to play one season in Mexico
before deciding to return, filed an antitrust suit in federal court against the commissioner
and the league presidents as representatives of Organized Baseball. Gardella' s restraint of
trade suit relied on both the Sherman and Clayton antitrust laws. The federal district
Court ofNew York City dismissed Gardella' s suit for want ofjurisdiction. In his opinion
for the court, Judge Goddard stated that, despite the "clear trend toward a broader
conception ofwhat constitutes interstate commerce," the court was bound by the
precedent set in the Supreme Court's Federal Baseball decision.
139
On appeal this decision was reversed and the case was remanded for trial on the
grounds that the issue of baseball's interstate character was sufficiently unclear to warrant
a trial. Before Gardella' s trial was scheduled to take place another federal court refused
to grant injunctions reinstating Gardella and other players who were suing Major League
Baseball. The court ruled that the plaintiffs' rights to reinstatement depended on
questions of law and fact that were in dispute.
137 Chandler, A.B., "Commissioner's Report to the Major League Committee." (August
27, 1946), p. 10.
138 The modifications to the reserve rule recommended by Chandler were adopted by
Major League Baseball in 1946. The modified reserve clause was less harsh than its
predecessor
.
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Only days after the circuit court of appeals declined to reinstate Gardella and the
others, Commissioner Chandler offered to reinstate all the players who had jumped to the
Mexican League. 140 Chandler justified his change of heart by saying that the court's refusal
to reinstate the blacklisted players was a victory for the authority of the commissioner of
baseball and that as such it had made clear to future would-be violators of baseball law
that the penalty will be harsh, and more importantly, it will hold up in court. In fact,
Chandler's mercy was motivated by the desire to salvage baseball's antitrust exemption
which could have been seriously jeopardized by an appeals court's ruling in the Gardella
case.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overruled a lower court judgment against
Gardella, holding that the existence of television and radio broadcasts of baseball had
made the game a matter of interstate commerce, thus bringing it within reach of the
Sherman Act. Major League Baseball responded to this apparently deadly strike to their
exemption by appealing the decision. In the interim, Gardella, surely convinced that
Organized Baseball would tie him up in court forever, settled the case for $60,000 and a
trade from the New York Giants to the St. Louis Cardnals. 141 The settlement left the legal
status of baseball's exemption up in the air. Would Federal Baseball continue to rule, or
would the Gardella verdict take precedence? The matter would not be clarified by the
Court until 1953.
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While Organized Baseball was quietly suppressing attempts to unionize players and
fighting the legal battles of the Mexican League War, the Brooklyn Dodgers' Branch
Rickey was breaking the twentieth century color barrier in Major League Baseball. In
1946, Jackie Robinson was chosen by Rickey to test the informal color barrier in the big
leagues. Rickey picked Robinson not only for his superior playing ability, but also for his
character. A four sport star at UCLA and a World War II veteran, Robinson was seen by
Rickey as capable of handling the tremendous pressure and harsh treatment that would
befall the first black player in the major leagues. 142
Jackie Robinson's accomplishment, while certainly controversial, stands apart from
other controversies in baseball. Inter-league wars and player revolts are festering
problems to which Organized Baseball responds. Moreover, baseball's great social
experiment did not contribute to the game's efforts to maintain its independence from
external regulation and may indeed have fueled significant anti-baseball sentiment.
The internal stability of baseball continued to be fragile as the 1940s turned into
the 1950s. The players' pension plan, created by the MacPhail Committee, was a source
of continuing controversy. Some baseball historians argue that Commissioner Chandler's
sympathy with the players on the issue of funding the pension plan with media receipts
hastened his removal from office by the owners in 1951 . Chandler was replaced with
former sports writer and National League President, Ford Frick.
With the changing of the guard in the commissioner's office in 1951-52 and with
the legal status of baseball's exemption uncertain, the United States Congress began to
142 Falkner, David, Great Time Coming: The Life of Jackie Robinson From Baseball to
Birmingham, (New York: Simon & Schuster Publishers, 1995), p. 106-108.
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take a closer look at the game of baseball. The cases of Danny Gardella and other
Mexican League jumpers had cast a shadow, however faint, over baseball. As early as
1949, sensing the growing vulnerability of the game's special status as a result of
damaging litigation, "friends of baseball" in the Congress were proposing legislation to
validate baseball's judicially created antitrust exemption by statute.
Congressmen Wilbur Mills (D-Ark) and A.S. Herlong (D-Fla) proposed legislation
that would provide legislative sanction to baseball's immunity from antitrust laws. Their
proposals sought to utilize analogous language in the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Webb-
Pomerene Act to craft a statutory exemption for Major League Baseball. The Clayton Act
specifically declared that the "labor of a human being" is not a "commodity or article of
commerce."
143
The Act had been construed to give antitrust exemptions to labor unions,
and some non profit agricultural organizations. The Webb-Pomerene Act specifically
exempts export trade associations and any of their activities which do not "artificially or
intentionally enhance or depress prices within the United States of commodities of the
class exported by such association, or which substantially lessen competition within the
United States or otherwise restrain trade therein."
144
A confidential internal memo sent to Commissioner Chandler in the fall of 1949
discusses the strategy of Major League Baseball in seeking legislative protection of its
anomalous status. The memo illustrates the increasing organizational sophistication of
Organized Baseball's efforts to preserve its governance structure. In the memo, Major
League Baseball attorney, John Lord O'Brien, explains that the Mills and Herlong bills,
143 The Clayton Antitrust Act (1912).
144 The Webb-Pomerance Act (1918).
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using ostensibly analogous provisions of Clayton and Webb-Pomerene, were on the right
track. Mills and Herlong were proposing to amend the Communications Act of 1934, not
the Sherman Act. This tactic would serve to circumvent a serious obstacle. Because the
interstate nature of television and radio broadcasts of baseball were increasingly
threatening to jeopardize baseball's exemption created in Federal Baseball, these bills
proposed to limit antitrust applicability to broadcast rights, thus preserving the core of the
exemption while jettisoning the most potent arrows being shot at the Federal Baseball
decision.
145
Although these first proposals died in committee, they opened the congressional
door to others. By 1951, the number of legislative proposals calling for a statutory
exemption from antitrust for baseball had grown to four, three in the House of
Representatives and one in the Senate. Mills and Herlong were joined in the House by
Congressman Melvin Price (D-IL) and in the Senate by Edwin Johnson ( D-CO).
In 1951, three pending House bills seeking complete exemption from antitrust laws
for all organized professional sports enterprises were sent to the House Subcommittee on
the Study ofMonopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary. The Chairman of this
subcommittee was New York Representative Emanuel Celler, a long time advocate of
vigorous antitrust enforcement. Chairman Celler ordered a thorough investigation into the
business of baseball. The subcommittee held hearings on the matter in the fall of 1 95 1
.
Witnesses were questioned on nearly every aspect of the game. Of specific interest were
the nature and operation of the reserve clause, which had been the focus of numerous
145 Confidential memorandum titled "Proposed Legislative Program" sent to Commissioner
of Baseball, A.B. Chandler. The memo was dated November 30, 1949 and signed by John
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lawsuits. Every witness supported and defended the reserve clause, be they player or
owner.
The hearings produced no smoking gun and in the end the subcommittee
considered five options: 1) to outlaw the reserve clause, forcing baseball to operate in a
free market for player talent; 2) to provide baseball with complete immunity from antitrust
law; 3) to create a federal agency to regulate Major League Baseball; 4) to create a limited
statutory exemption for baseball's reserve clause; and 5) to avoid influencing pending
litigation and refrain from anticipating judicial action by declining to take any legislative
action at that time.
146
The Subcommittee chose the fifth option, thus passing the buck to
the judiciary. The option of outlawing the reserve clause was never seriously considered.
The testimony in the hearings, as well as public opinion, unanimously supported some
form of a reserve rule to maintain competitive parity on the field. Discomfort with a
complete exemption as well as with creating a new regulatory agency eliminated these
options. The option of creating a partial exemption was seriously considered but action
was deferred pending new pronouncements from the courts.
147
Ultimately, the subcommittee felt that, while baseball's private self government
was problematic, they were not capable of addressing the problems. The committee felt
that while many aspects of professional sports leagues were indeed unique, the
differentiation of essential and non-essential practices in professional sports was a job best
Lord O'Brien.
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left to the courts. With this decision baseball was off the hook, for the time being.
However, the Supreme Court would pick up where Congress left off. In Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., the Court returned the legislature's favor.
George Toolson was a player on a New York Yankee farm team who refused to
honor his reserve clause. Toolson filed a restraint of trade suit under the Sherman Act
against the Yankees. The trial court dismissed the case for lack ofjurisdiction based on
the precedent set in Federal Baseball. The case came before the Supreme Court in 1953.
The Court surprised Organized Baseball by ruling that since the Congress had addressed
the issue of baseball and its antitrust exemption in 195 1 and chosen to let the Federal
Baseball holding continue to rule, it would honor the wishes of the legislature by
reafErrning the lower court's judgment in Toolson. Furthermore, the court held that since
baseball had developed for 30 years under the assumption that it was exempt from
antitrust law, the task of reversing that assumption was purely political and thus a
legislative prerogative.
148
Several rulings by the Supreme Court over the next few years made it clear that
baseball's exemption was special and would not be extended by the courts to other sports.
In 1955, in United States v. Shubert, the Court held that traveling theatrical companies
were engaged in interstate commerce and did fall within the strictures of the Sherman Act.
The Court also held in 1955 that boxing promoted and broadcast on radio and television in
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several states was indeed interstate commerce subject to the Sherman Act. 149 In 1957, the
court would solidify its position even more in the case of Radovich v. National Football
League.
William Radovich was an All-Pro offensive guard with the Detroit Lions who was
offered a job as player/ manager of a minor league club in San Francisco. The Lions
threatened the minor league club with punitive action. The minor league club
subsequently withdrew its offer. Radovich filed a restraint of trade suit under the Sherman
Act. The Court's holding in Radovich read in part: "In Toolson we continue to hold the
umbrella over baseball that was placed there some 3 1 years earlier by Federal Baseball. .
.
Vast efforts had gone into the development and organization of baseball since that
decision and enormous capital had been invested in reliance on its permanence. . ." 15° The
Court reasserted that it had washed its hands of baseball and the antitrust laws, deferring
to the legislature. In the case at hand, the Court ruled against the NFL holding it
accountable under the Sherman Act.
The disparate treatment enjoyed by Major League Baseball, as well as the issue of
television broadcasting in all major professional sports, spurred more action on Capitol
Hill throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Major League Baseball exploited the game of
hot potato being played by the Court and the Congress, actively assuring both branches
that it was within the purview of the other branch to alter baseball's status.
151
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In 1957, following the Radovich decision, seven legislative proposals were
introduced in the U.S. Congress to deal with baseball's exclusive right to engage in
monopoly practices. None of the proposals was proffered or advocated by Major League
Baseball. This legislative assault was mounted by the "friends" of professional football
basketball and hockey. One of these proposals sought to extend baseball's immunity to all
professional team sports. Two proposals sought the explicit subjection of all sports,
including baseball, to the full measure of the antitrust laws. The remaining four bills called
for partial exemptions for all professional team sports, in order to protect the types of
collective arrangements that leagues require in order to maintain competition on the
field.
152
The seven bills were sent to Chairman Celler's subcommittee, which undertook its
second thorough investigation of professional sports and antitrust. Since Celler's last
investigation the Court had muddied the waters by creating disparate policies for different
sports. The subcommittee was now charged with examining all sports in an effort to
standardize policy. Hearings were conducted with witnesses from all the major sports.
The hearings were largely inconclusive, although it was clear to the committee that the
options of a blanket exemption or blanket subjection of all major team sports to antitrust
law was unacceptable. The Committee's report concluded that the most feasible option
was some type of partial exemption for these sports, allowing them to undertake those
practices required by the unusual nature of the business as well as the need to maintain
152 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws
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competition on the field. They reported a bill which took a middle course. The report
stated:
It is the intent of the committee in this bill to permit each of
these sports in general to continue the types of self-
regulation that it has developed historically... The
committee has concluded that this course is preferable to, in
the alternative, the imposition on these businesses of the
widespread direct controls by Government officials that
customarily accompanies exemption from, or relaxation of,
the requirements of the antitrust laws. The bill, however,
assures that the courts under the antitrust laws will be able
to proscribe activities that are not essential for continuation
of the sports involved. 153
The bill contained controversial language that would ultimately preclude its
passage into law. In language supported by Chairman Celler, it called for the antitrust
laws to be applied to all professional sports, exempting only those practices which were
"reasonably necessary" to accomplish four conditions. Those conditions were 1)
competition on the field, 2) the right to operate in specific geographic areas, 3)
preservation of the integrity of the sport, and 4) regulation of telecasting and other
broadcast rights.
154
There was strong opposition to the phrase "reasonably necessary." It was argued
that such vague language would open the flood gates to nuisance litigation. Opponents
charged that the "reasonably necessary" clause was so vague as to expose professional
sports leagues to the full force of the antitrust laws, which would jeopardize their ability to
maintain competitive balance on the field. An alternative to the Celler bill was proposed
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by fellow New Yorker, Republican Representative, Kenneth Keating. The Walter-Keating
bill removed the reasonably necessary clause and spelled out the practices which would be
exempt. It was believed that this would accomplish the goals of the Celler bill without
creating opportunities for unreasonable litigation. 155
The House passed the Walter-Keating bill over the strenuous objections of
Chairman Celler and with the considerable help of representatives of all the major sports
leagues who descended on Capitol Hill like locust. The bill then went to the Senate where
it would be scrutinized by Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly. Like Chairman Celler, Kefauver was a committed advocate of vigorous
antitrust enforcement.
156
Kefauver's subcommittee held hearings that made up for lack of productivity with
some very entertaining testimony. New York Yankees manager, Casey Stengel, and
player, Mickey Mantle, testified together providing the Senators with great amusement.
Mr. Stengel was well respected by the Senators who listened patiently to his fumbling
double talk, unable to make any sense of it. In hopes of more lucid comments the
Senators turned to Mantle asking his impressions of the matter. To the delight of all
157
assembled Mantle responded, "My views are just about the same as Casey's."
The Senators were persuaded by the testimony of Chairman Celler, who
vigorously opposed the Walter-Keating bill. He convinced the Senators that the bill was
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too broad, virtually granting complete immunity from antitrust laws. Celler also told the
Senators that such legislation in the absence of a regulatory agency with jurisdiction over
baseball would constitute an unprecedented departure from past regulatory policy. 158 The
85 th Congress closed without Senate action on the bill.
As baseball entered the 1960s the legislative stalemate continued. The changing
demographics of the country as well as the expanded importance of television and radio to
professional sports were the primary obstacles in the way of maintaining baseball's private
self-government. The nation's population was shifting south and west. Even in the cities
of the northeast, people were moving to the suburbs in record numbers. These new
population centers were increasingly watching their sports on television, and increasingly
they were tuning in to football and basketball, as well as baseball. Congressional scrutiny
throughout the 1950s had not produced government regulation of baseball, but it did play
a part, along with competition from other sports and changing demographics, in forcing
expansion on Major League Baseball. Members of Congress such as California
Republican Pat Hillings relentlessly urged Organized Baseball to expand to the West Coast
or in the alternative to elevate the Pacific Coast League to major league status. 159
The economic pressures created by competition from other sports as well as the
continuing political pressure from Members of Congress forced Major League Baseball to
face the hard issues presented by expansion. The refusal to expand had been motivated by
the desire to maintain the value of current clubs, the need to manage competition for
158 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust^ and
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player talent and the issue of territorial rights. With its back against the wall Organized
Baseball, according to baseball historian James Miller, had four options:
First, the major leagues could give the Pacific Coast League
(PCL) a special classification, suspend the draft, and permit
it to build up its talents to major league levels. A second
possibility would be to form a special classification league
out ofPCL and other minor league teams in major cities and
grant this new league freedom from the draft until it was
competitive. A third alternative was to add two or more
teams to each of the existing major leagues. Finally,
Organized Baseball could achieve the goal of increasing the
number of cities with major league teams by moving some
of its financially weaker franchises out of cities that already
had two teams. 160
The first three options were unpopular with owners because they would reduce the
value of existing franchises. The last option was the least injurious to present owners. In
1952, both the American and National Leagues modified their rules to make it easier for
financially strapped teams to relocate. The new rules were quickly exploited by the
Boston Braves, the St. Louis Browns and the Philadelphia Athletics. Less than one month
before the 1953 season, the Braves moved to Milwaukee. Also in 1953, the Browns
became the Baltimore Orioles. The following year saw the Philadelphia Athletics move to
Kansas City.
161
The migration of the Giants and Dodgers to California at the end of the 1957
season was the next major change. Brooklyn Dodgers owner, Walter O'Malley decided to
make the move out west. The major obstacle to moving west was that there were no
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other teams on the West Coast to play. The other major league teams would have a
financial disincentive to travel to the West Coast to play just one team. With this in mind
O'Malley convinced the owner of the financially struggling New York Giants, Horace
Stoneham, to move west with him. By moving two teams to California O'Malley
increased the economic viability of such a move. Additionally, the move of the Dodgers
and Giants greatly reduced the political pressure coming from Members of Congress such
as Los Angeles Representative Pat Hillings. 162
While the Dodgers' and Giants' migration may have quelled pressure from western
Members of Congress, it also created bad feelings in New York. In Congressman Celler's
second investigation into baseball in 1957-58 the migration issue was examined. In
hearings before Celler's subcommittee in the aftermath of the move, the chairman angrily
chastised the National League owners for allowing O'Malley to move to the West Coast.
Celler denounced the pure profit motive of the move implying that if decisions in baseball
would mirror those in other businesses, then baseball's antitrust obligations should too. 163
Unable to prevent the loss of the Dodgers and Giants to the West Coast, the
Mayor ofNew York City, Robert Wagner, began courting other National League teams.
Failing to attract a new National League club to New York, the Mayor encouraged New
York Lawyer William Shea to organize a third major league, placing a franchise in the
city. Baseball's commissioner, Ford Frick, had throughout the 1950s been publicly
supportive of the creation of a third league, however, he never took any action to
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encourage such a league. Under pressure from Shea's attempt to start a third league
Organized Baseball modified its rules in 1958 to allow for a second major league team in
cities with over two million people. Organized Baseball in the person of Commissioner
Frick made it clear, however, that expansion would require settlement of the current major
league map as well as a total reorganization of the minor leagues. 164
On May 21 1 959, Major League Baseball announced that it would welcome a
third league. Shea, who had hired an elderly Branch Rickey to head up the new league,
and who had the support ofkey Members of Congress who begrudged Organized Baseball
its monopoly, accepted the offer. However, it was made clear that if Organized Baseball
was trying to draw out or stall the process, Shea's backers in Congress, such as Chairman
Celler and Senator Kafauver, were prepared to push through legislation creating a third
league.
165
With this Branch Rickey's Continental League came into being. Negotiations
surrounding the Continental League were strained and, in 1960, Senator Kafauver called
for hearings regarding the creation of the Continental League, hoping to pressure
Organized Baseball into expediting the formation of the new league. In the Spring of
1960, the new league was at odds with Major League Baseball over Rickey's attempt to
establish a new minor league. In response to Major League Baseball's refusal to sanction
the new minor league, Rickey threatened to raid major league rosters. After some
wrangling in Congress with Major League Baseball allies getting the best of the
Continental League supporters, Organized Baseball did what it had always done in the
164 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Organized Professional Sports Teams. Hearings , (85
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face of challenges to its monopoly. They co-opted the upstart league. Voting to expand
the National and American Leagues, Major League Baseball effectively absorbed the
Continental League. 166
In 1961, with the issue of expansion settled for the moment, Congressional interest
shifted. With the encouragement of lobbyists from all the major sports leagues, the
Congress began to focus on the specific issue of television contracts. Senator Estes
Kafauver had been sponsoring bills in each of the last two Congresses that would subject
professional sports teams to the strictures of antitrust laws, exempting only those activities
which were deemed essential for the commercial viability of the sports. Among the
provisions in Kafauver' s bills was a provision to give league television contracts an
antitrust exemption. 167
Friends of baseball, as well as all the other professional sports, in Congress were
able to separate out this specific exemption making it a stand alone bill. With the help of
serious lobbying by the major professional sport leagues, congressional allies of sports
exemptions were able to push through this limited exemption. Public Law 87-331 would
allow professional football, basketball, hockey and baseball leagues to enter into certain
television contracts. The opposition of the major television networks, as well as
congressional antitrust advocates like Celler and Kafauver, was blunted by the fact that
there was consensus on the need for such an exemption. The fact that it was a provision
in Kafauver' s more comprehensive bill made it difficult for antitrust advocates to fight.
'"Miller, p. 81.
,66 Zimbalist, P. 16-17.
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This was a major victory for Organized Baseball. More often than not during the
1950s baseball had stood alone in defending its special status. The other sports had
backed off early on from a strategy of seeking a blanket exemption for all sports.
Unfavorable court decisions and a clear unwillingness on the part of Congress to enact
such an exemption forced professional football, basketball and hockey to take a fall back
position, which put them at odds with Organized Baseball. The other major sports
leagues began advocating that all sports be subjected equally to the antitrust laws and that
all sports be granted limited exemptions.
When the issue of exempting television contracting by leagues came up, all the
professional sports leagues supported it. Television revenue was an increasingly important
aspect of the business of professional sports. Indeed, professional football, basketball and
hockey only began to rival baseball as a commercial enterprise with the advent of televised
sporting events. Baseball, however, would benefit disproportionately by this limited
exemption. For the other major sports the exemption provided the potential for greater
television revenue and control. For Organized Baseball, it also short circuited one of the
most dangerous threats to its private self government. Media contracts had been one of
the most controversial aspects of professional sports in the 1950s and 1960s. It had been
the onset of television that made baseball's interstate commercial character so clear. Team
revenues from television broadcasts had by 1961 become almost as important as
attendance. By resolving the contentious issue of television contracting the Congress
gTeatly reduced the political pressure on Organized Baseball, leaving only the question of
167 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws
to Certain Aspects of Designated Organized Professional Team Sports, (88
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baseball's disparate treatment with regard to antitrust law. This issue was not new and by
cutting television out of the equation Congress effectively eliminated a major source of
pressure for eliminating baseball's privileged position.
With the expansion following the Continental League challenge and the apparent
legislative settlement of the high stakes matter of media regulation, baseball's special
status once again receded from the spotlight. Although legislative proposals regarding
professional sports and antitrust laws would re-emerge in 1964-65, baseball's special
commercial status would be eclipsed in the minds of the American people by greater
political and social issues in the 1960s. Baseball's anomalous legal status would face
threats from within its ranks in the coming years.
Baseball in the immediate postwar era saw the transformation of its game from an
exalted position as the nation's "national pastime" and as a source of tremendous cultural
pride to a position of one among many. The explosion ofmass media technology, the
changing demography of the nation and the increased popularity of other professional
sports all combined to alter drastically the environment in which baseball operated.
Despite their successful efforts to protect baseball's special legal status in the courts and in
Congress, Organized Baseball took some lumps during the ao^ninistrations of
Commissioners Chandler, Frick and William Eckert (1945-1965).
Judge Landis' successors would not have the unlimited power of baseball's first
commissioner, nor would their game be unrivaled in the national consciousness. As the
position of commissioner became increasingly an arm of management through the 1950s
and '60s, the position of the players, or labor, evolved in turn. Controversy over the
Sess.,1964), p. 4-5.
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funding of the players pension fund in 1953 has spurred the creation of the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), which at the time was merely an information
clearinghouse for players. However, this organization would evolve into a full fledged
union by 1966. Also, competition from other sports such as basketball, football and
hockey would become significant in the 1950s and 1960s with the advent of television,
which lent itself to these fester, time-bound sports.
The MLBPA led by Marvin Miller would transform baseball's antiquated
labor/management relations into a much more conventional industrial arrangement. The
business of baseball, by the late 1960s, would increasingly be conducted like a business,
not an enterprise with special cultural significance. Baseball's united front in defending its
anomalous status would be irreparably fractured by the development of the players union.
The threat to baseball's private self government would in the future come as much from
within as from without.
Baseball's evolution into a more conventional industry, with the conventional
adversarial relationship between labor and management, would greatly threaten the pillars
of its private self-government. The ability of players in other sports to operate without
undue restrictions caused baseball players to increase the pressure on Organized Baseball
to dismantle the cornerstone of Baseball Law, the reserve clause.
103
CHAPTER III
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD BALL GAME
Baseball's unregulated monopoly survived the Progressive Era because it shared
the values and goals of the Progressives and because the regulatory institutions of the state
were not yet mature enough to bring affirmative regulation to baseball. As the state's
institutions grew, the nation moved into what Eisner calls the associationalist regulatory
regime. This quasi-corporatist regime, in which the regulated community was
incorporated into the regulatory decision-making apparatus, was pre-occupied with the
imperatives of economic depression and world war. Organized Baseball preserved its
anomaly by providing comfort to a troubled nation and not raising any eyebrows. Internal
stability in the game, as well as its role in boosting public morale, camouflaged baseball's
private self government during a time when government regulators had more urgent
matters with which to deal.
Although it is commonly seen as the genesis of the welfare state, the New Deal
actually created what sociologist John Wilson calls a "franchise state" in which regulatory
decisions were largely delegated to the regulated community.
168
The real welfare state, in
which there was a shift to predominately direct regulation of industry, is more accurately
associated with Eisner's societal regime, which he sees as existing in the 1960s and 1970s.
Its origins trace to President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs in the mid-1960s.
168 Wilson, John, Sport. Society, and the State. Plaving by the Rules , (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press, 1994), p. 147.
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It was during the societal regime that baseball's unregulated monopoly would come under
its most severe attack.
The Regulatory Regime of the 1960s and 1970s
Eisner's societal regime, "like the Progressive Era and the era of the New Deal,
was characterized by the formation and mobilization ofnew interests demanding a new
role for the state in the economy."
169
The result of the emergent interests was the creation
of public policy and institutional change shaped by a new administrative philosophy and a
new conception of political economy. With the dawn of Keynesian economic stabilization
policy in the 1930s the harsh fluctuations in the nation's economy were gradually tamed.
By the post-World War II years the roller coaster that was the business cycle had been
transformed into a merry-go-round. Eisner sums up the distinction between the old
regimes and the societal regime:
Owing to active macro-economic management, the
fluctuations in the business cycle during the first two
decades after World War II were mild by comparison with
those during the previous half-century; and thus, during this
later period, unlike the earlier ones, structural
transformations in the economy did not drive group
mobilization. In addition, the new regime differed with
respect to the kinds of policies initiated. Whereas earlier
regimes had focused on questions of economic regulation,
the new regime concentrated on new social regulations.
170
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University Press, 1993), p. 1 18.
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Because the structural economy had been stabilized, in that the nation was essentially
insulated from extreme economic depression, regulatory focus shifted to social problems,
particularly those resulting from the capitalist production process.
The late 1960s and 1970s saw the creation ofnumerous "public" interest groups,
which sought to address the negative externalities of the capitalist production process.
These public interest groups were animated by the political and economic philosophy of
the so-called "New Left." 171 Their substantive purpose was to "improve the quality of the
goods and services that are produced, and the by-products of the industrial economy
which threaten human health and life, and the environment." 172 These public interest
groups of the societal regime 173 were dominated by the belief that the New Deal had
devolved into an "impersonal, bureaucratic, centralized form of governance that was
dehumanizing American society." 174 The New Left charged that the quasi-corporatist
policy making procedures of the administrative state were controlled by big business
interests whose lust for profit crowded out the public interest. The destruction of the
environment, the manipulation of consumers, and the endangerment of workers were said
to be the result of the "capture" of the government's regulatory agencies by big business
171 For a comprehensive description of the "New Left" see, Lindbeck, Assar,. The Political
Economy of the New Left . (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), and Reich,
Charles, The Greening of America. (New York: Random House Publishing, 1970).
172 Eisner, p. 119.
173 Eisner's regulatory regime framework in general and his societal regime in particular
find parallel expression in Harris, Richard and Sidney Milkis' The Politics of Regulatory
Change: A Tale ofTwo Agencies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Harris
and Milkis call the regulatory regime of the late 1960s and 1970s the "public lobby
regime."
174
Milkis, Sidney, "The Presidency, Policy Reform, and the Rise of Administrative
Politics," in Harris and Milkis, (eds.), Remaking American Politics, (San Francisco:
Westview Press, 1989), p. 164.
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interests. In baseball, this translates to the capture of the commissioner by the owners'
interests.
These public-interest groups, which proliferated at an extreme rate between 1965-
1975, sought to open up the regulatory decision making process to average citizens and
consumers. Staffed by veterans of the civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s,
public interest groups sought to democratize legislative and administrative politics by
introducing public participation into regulatory policy making. Armed with the New Left
critique of both big business and big government, public interest groups and New Left
political activists shepherded dramatic reforms in the regulatory process. Participatory
reforms included extensive congressional reforms ushered in by the policy entrepreneurs of
the "Class of '74" as well as significant amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act,
which governs executive branch agency rule-making. 175
The public-interest group movement was made up of people who hold what
sociologist, Ronald Inglehart, calls "post-industrial values." 176 Inglehart, whose work is
premised on the validity of Abraham Maslow's hierarchy ofhuman needs, hypothesizes
that people who enjoy high levels of economic and physical security in their formative
years develop distinct political and social values. In this view, the generation that grew
up in the economic and physical security of the postwar years had fulfilled its lower order
175 The "Class of '74" refers to the liberal Democratic freshman class of congressmen that
year, who distinguished themselves as reformers of legislative and administrative
processes. For a comprehensive discussion ofNew Left reforms see, Brand, Donald,
"Reformers of the 1960s and 1970s," in Harris and Milkis (eds.), Remaking American
Politics , (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), p. 27-51.
176 See, Inglehart, Ronald, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles
Among Western Publics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Inglehart's work,
107
needs and thus shifted its focus to higher order needs. 177 Based on Maslow's hierarchy,
people who no longer need to strive for food, shelter and clothing (i.e., materialist ends)
are able to strive for the higher order needs of love, esteem and self actualization (i.e.
post-materialist values).
178
These higher order or post-materialist values shaped the social
and political perceptions of the generation that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, which
in turn shaped the ideology, institutions and even the interests of the societal regime.
While the associational regime was characterized by the need to bring about
economic stability, the societal regime took economic stability for granted and instead
focused on the goal of improving social justice and the quality of life in America. New
agencies created in furtherance of social regulatory goals included among others the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (1965), the Environmental Protection Agency
(1970), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1970), the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (1970), the National Oceanic and Aeronautic
Administration (1970), the Consumer Product Safety Administration (1972), and the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (1973).
These agencies, unlike their New Deal Era predecessors, were not focused on the
management of economic competition within industries. They were, in fact, focused on
the amelioration of negative externalities produced by unregulated production processes.
These agencies would impose broad regulations affecting numerous industries. The
although seminal, is only one example of a wide literature on the shift from materialist to
post-materialist values in advanced industrial societies.
177 By implication this means that the people who grew up in the physical and economic
insecurity of the first half of the twentieth century developed materialistic values and thus
focused on lower order needs, which colored their social and political perceptions.
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harmful effects of these new social regulations upon economic efficiency and competition
were deemed inconsequential compared to their social and environmental benefits. These
social regulations would impose high compliance costs on industrial firms that would cut
into profits. The regulatory initiatives of the societal regime destroyed the harmonious
relationship between the regulators and the regulated, forged in the regulatory regime of
the New Deal, and replaced it with a much more adversarial one.
The societal regime of the 1960s and 1970s saw a shift in the political, institutional
and social environments toward consumers, workers, and individuals, and away from
concentrated economic or political power. The new politics of baseball, characterized by
a players union that negotiates from a power position of virtual parity with the owners, is
also a product of the political and regulatory environment of the 1960s and 1970s. Just as
the institutions, interests and values of the Progressive Era and the New Deal had been
instrumental in determining the fate of baseball's private self government, so too would
the regulatory regime of the 1960s and 1970s affect the game's anomalous status.
The 1960s and 1970s saw the partial erosion of Baseball Law. Because of the
emergence of a powerful players association, whose pressure tactics brought collective
bargaining to the game, Baseball Law has increasingly become subject to public
regulation. Television and mass sports marketing removed any doubts that the game was
indeed a matter of interstate commerce. The political atmosphere of the societal regime
made it easier for players to turn to the state for relief and protection from the tyranny of
the owners. The political climate of the 1960s provided legitimacy and public support for
178 See Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality , (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1954).
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the players attempts to claim full citizenship in baseball. The players were not fighting
simply for more money. They were fighting for rights—"workers" rights. In this way,
they can be seen as animated by "post-materialist values."
Most useful to the players cause were laws created during the New Deal that
sought to protect workers' rights. 179 The most significant of these was the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935. This act created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
which would have regulatory jurisdiction over labor/management relations in all industries
engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. 180 The first opportunity for this law to affect
baseball was in 1946 when the ill-fated players union, the American Baseball Guild, sought
redress from the NLRB over its claim that the owners had engaged in unfair labor
practices. The NLRB declined to investigate the matter on jurisdictional grounds.
Echoing the courts, the NLRB ruled that baseball was not a matter of interstate
commerce, and therefore fell outside the jurisdiction of the board. 181
The posture of the NLRB would not change until the late 1960s. In 1969, the
NLRB reversed its 1 946 position on baseball by claiming jurisdiction in a case involving an
attempt by American League Umpires to unionize. In American League ofProfessional
Baseball Clubs and Association ofNational Baseball League Umpires, the Board held
that recently the courts had found that baseball was a matter of interstate commerce,
despite their failure to lift the exemption created in Federal Baseball. Accordingly, the
179 Wilson, p. 186- 187.
180
Kelly, Alfred H., Winfred A. Harbison, & Herman Belz, The American Constitution Its
Origins and Development. Vol. IL (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), p. 488.
181 Wilson, p. 187.
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Board ruled that "professional baseball is an industry in or affecting commerce, and as
such is subject to Board jurisdiction under the Act." 182
The Board spelled out four factors that mitigated in favor of their assertion of
jurisdiction. First, the Board found that Organized Baseball's system of "internal self-
regulation," which relies upon the commissioner to resolve labor disputes, "appears to
have been designed almost entirely by employers and owners." The Board found this
arrangement to be unlikely "either to prevent labor disputes from arising in the future, or,
having once arisen, to resolve them in a manner susceptible or conducive to voluntary
compliance by all parties involved." The second factor was the board's finding that the
Umpires' Union was indeed a labor union within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act. The third factor was baseball's undisputed interstate character. And
finally, the board rejected the owners contention that the umpires were supervisors, and
thus did not meet the definition of labor contained in the Act.
This 1969 NLRB decision guaranteed the players' association the right to engage
in collective bargaining. The players union would marshal this state endorsement of its
collective bargaining rights with great effect. The threat ofNLRB action stood behind all
of the gains of the players' association in the 1970s. The emasculation of the century old
reserve clause could not have been accomplished without the state's protection of the
players right to bargain collectively.
182 U.S. Congress. House, Select Committee on Professional Sports, Final Report, (H.
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The development of the MLBPA into a full-fledged, and very powerful, union was
the by-product of the regulatory climate of the 1960s. While the legislative and
administrative initiatives ofthe societal regime were not directly related to unions, they did
create an atmosphere that was amenable to the empowerment of the disenfranchised. In
baseball that meant the players. The spectacle of public-interest groups, and activists like
Ralph Nader, speaking out for the rights of consumers and citizens to participate in
regulatory decision making, as well as the emergence of post-materialist values across
society, contributed to the efforts of the MLBPA to claim participatory rights for the
"locked out" citizens of baseball, the players. The players union's goal was to inject the
players into the governance of baseball in the same way that Ralph Nader and others were
attempting to inject consumers onto the production process.
The New Left critique of a closed system of governance, dominated by corporate
interests would surely not sound foreign to baseball players in the 1960s. The New Left's
attempt to correct the defects of pluralism by securing a place at the policy making table
for the public interest was not unlike the players union's attempt to attain a role for the
players in the policy making process ofMajor League Baseball.
Marvin Miller and the MLBPA
The onset of conventional labor/ management relations in Organized Baseball in
the mid-1960s transformed the sport. While baseball had been a big money business since
at least the turn of the century, it had never resembled a conventional industry. The
evolution of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) from an
information clearinghouse into a full fledged labor union was the catalyst for
major reform
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in Organized Baseball's private self-government. The MLBPA would become a powerful
player in the struggle over baseball's unregulated monopoly. The primary target of the
players' association would be the century old reserve clause.
The union would become an effective counter balance to the owners unhindered
control of the game. The post of commissioner of baseball, which was originally designed
to act as a disinterested arbitrator, had by the late 1960s become increasingly sympathetic
to the owners. Since the death of Landis, the baseball owners gradually weakened the
power of the commissioner, subjecting the post to more control by the owners. Without a
truly independent commissioner to protect their interests, the players turned to the
union.
184
Unionization was not popular with owners or players in the 1950s. The MLBPA,
created in 1953, had been intended to perform the limited duty of administering the
pension fund. The organizers of the association were careful to rebut fears that a union
was being formed. Player representative Allie Reynolds tried to calm these fears by
telling The Sporting News that he had "nothing against unions in industry. But if I had any
suspicion that we in baseball were moving towards a union, I would not have anything to
do with the enterprise." 185 Reynolds and fellow player representative, Ralph Kiner, had
raised the fears of unionization by their efforts to secure various concessions from the
owners in the summer of 1953. They gave the owners a list of demands, which included
184 For a comprehensive treatment of the history of labor relations in baseball see David
Voigt, "Serfs versus Magnates," in Paul Staudohar & James Mangan (eds.), The Business
of Professional Sports
.
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matters such as a raise in the minimum salary as well as the issue of funding the players
pension fund. When the owners rejected their demands the players hired lawyer J.
Norman Lewis to advise them. The owners, who initially acquiesced to Lewis' attendance
at player/management talks, suddenly barred the attorney from talks on the pension fund in
December, 1953. 186
The pension fund matter was settled without Lewis and the newly formed MLBPA
was relegated to the role of assisting in the administration of the fund. Sentiment
throughout the game remained staunchly anti-union well into the 1960s. The MLBPA's
first president, Bob Feller, was a strong opponent of collective bargaining. In 1963, Bob
Friend, the National League player representative for the MLBPA, wrote an article in The
Sporting News that sharply denounced calls to unionize Major League Baseball players.
He argued that "the reserve clause is an absolute must for the survival of baseball" and
that the players did not need a union at all. He concluded that a baseball union would be
bad for the game because it would betray the special cultural significance of the national
pastime. He claimed that possible player strikes would threaten baseball's image and that
the "spectacle of someone like Stan Musial picketing the ballpark" would destroy the
187
game.
The MLBPA's anti-union sentiments were also made clear by the appointment of
Robert Cannon as the association's legal advisor replacing Lewis in 1960. Cannon, a
185 Quoted in Korr, Charles P., "Marvin Miller and the New Unionism in Baseball," in Paul
Staudohar & James Mangan (eds.), The Business of Professional Sports, (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1 99 1 ), p. 1 1 6.
186 Miller, James E., The Baseball Business: Pursuing Pennants and Profits in Baltimore,
(Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1990), p. 13-14.
187 Quoted in Korr, p. 116.
114
Milwaukee circuit court judge, was widely known to be interested in the job of
commissioner of baseball. Historian James Miller characterizes Cannon's management of
the players' affairs as being "in the interests of labor peace and the owners'
pocketbooks." 188 Several commentators have quoted Cannon's testimony in a 1964 Senate
committee hearing on baseball and antitrust issues in which he praises the reserve clause
and claims on behalfof the players that "we have it so good we don't know what to ask
for next."
189
Marvin Miller would later write that Cannon "never met an owner he didn't
like."
190
By 1966, the players were ready to appoint a full-time executive director for the
MLBPA. Still not comfortable with the idea of a labor union, the players offered the job
to Judge Cannon, who surprisingly refused it. The issue of creating a permanent director,
an office, and a staff* for the association created tension between the players and owners.
The owners feared that a permanent executive director would move the organization
toward a more adversarial relationship with management in order to legitimate his own
position.
191 The selection ofMarvin Miller by the MLBPA executive committee
contributed to those fears.
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Miller was a recognized labor law expert. He had earned his reputation as the
chief economist with the Steelworkers Union. The members of the players' association
executive committee knew that Miller would bring a more adversarial perspective to
labor/management relations. By 1966, players were beginning to feel that they were being
exploited. Complaints about playing conditions, minimum salary levels, inadequate
pensions, large bonuses to amateur players, and even racial discrimination were common.
After his selection by the executive committee of the MLBPA, Miller's
appointment would have to be ratified by the players. Miller spent the spring of 1966
going from team to team, explaining to the players how a strong independent organization
could protect and forward their interests. The owners tried to paint him as a labor agitator
and a thug. His critics accused him of brainwashing players. They called him a
Svengali.
192
The players' apprehensions about unions, however, would be overridden by a
general atmosphere of discontent in the nation, as well as specific grievances that made a
union seem palatable. The players saw salaries rising rapidly in professional football, the
expansion of their own sport, and the huge amounts ofmoney that television broadcasts
were bringing to the game. These factors combined to make players feel that they were
not getting their fair share. In addition, the players appetite for collective action was
wetted by the example of the Dodgers Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale.
193
Prior to the 1966 season, as Miller was campaigning for the players vote of
confidence, Koufax and Drysdale teamed up in an effort to gain increases in their salaries.
192 Korr, p. 121-123, 133.
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Combining their interests, they hired a lawyer to negotiate their 1966 salaries. The
Dodger management was forced to negotiate with the two star players who staged a
collective holdout until they were offered an acceptable salary increase. In April 1966,
the players ratified the appointment of Miller.
The owners reacted to Miller's appointment by reneging on their promise to fund
the MLBPA permanent office with proceeds from the all-star game. In addition,
according to historian James Miller, the owners vented their anger by blacklisting veteran
pitcher Robin Roberts, who, as a member of the MLBPA executive committee, had been
instrumental in selecting Miller.
194
The seemingly punitive nature of the owners refusal to
fund Miller's office, as well as the successful collective bargaining of Drysdale and
Koufax, provided the new executive director with the opportunity to win over players
who had been reluctant to create a labor organization.
The owners claimed that funding the office would constitute a violation of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits employers from paying money to employee
organizations. The owners tactics would have several unintended consequences. Not
only would the episode solidify player support for Miller and a strong union type
organization, it also opened up a Pandora's box of legal vulnerabilities for Organized
Baseball. By invoking Taft-Hartley the owners exposed baseball's labor-management
relations to legal challenges.
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Using the threat of such challenges Miller negotiated a player friendly settlement
with the owners. The settlement included a raise in the owners' contribution to the
pension fund and the elimination of the requirement for the players regular contribution.
Essentially, the owners were forced to assume responsibility for funding the entire pension
plan in order to wiggle out of their ill-considered decision to renege on funding Miller's
office.
Prior to the 1967 season, Miller announced that he would pursue negotiations with
management on a contract covering all aspects of labor/management relations. Any hopes
the owners might have harbored about the players' association not becoming a full-fledged
union were crushed by Miller's declarations. The owners, however, did not believe that
Miller would be able to hold the players together under pressure. The negotiations were
bogged down by continued management stalling tactics designed to test the players unity.
Finally, in January 1968, Miller and the owners recently hired professional negotiator,
John Gaherin, made a deal. Baseball's first "Basic Agreement" was acceded to by the
owners in the face of threats by Miller to bring in federal mediators. The agreement was a
two-year contract that increased the iriinimiim salary from $7,000 to $10,000, gave
players the explicit right to hire professional agents, and established a grievance procedure
whereby the commissioner arbitrated contract disputes for players who had at least three
years in the league. The agreement also set up a joint study group on the reserve
clause.
196
The following year, Miller moved on the issue of increasing the owners
contribution to the pension fund. Given the huge profits being garnered by television
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contracts, Miller sought to obtain a percentage of those profits for the pension fund. The
owners were indignant about Miller's proposal. They claimed that the players had no right
to television revenues. In response to the owners unwillingness to link their pension
contribution to television revenues, Miller asked the players to refuse to sign their 1969
contracts.
The resulting holdouts left spring training camps without the majority of their
veteran players. When the holdout threatened the regular season the television networks
threatened not to pay to televise games played without the veteran players. Historian
Benjamin Rader quotes an NBC executive as saying that his network would not "pay
major league prices for minor league games." 197 The pressure from the television networks
hastened a settlement of the dispute. Because Commissioner Eckert had been fired by the
owners earlier that year, National League lawyer, Bowie Kuhn, was called on to broker an
agreement between the owners and the union. In the settlement the owners would agree
to increase their contribution to the pension plan but not to contribute a percentage of the
television revenues. Shortly after this settlement, Kuhn was appointed commissioner of
baseball.
In the winter of 1969, the new commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, received a letter from
a player. Curt Flood was a thirty-two year old outfielder with the St. Louis Cardinals, a
team with which he had spent his entire eleven year career. He was writing to the
commissioner to complain about having been traded suddenly to the Philadelphia Phillies
without his consent. Flood asked Kuhn to intercede on his behalf, arguing that his tenure
196 Rader, p. 189-191; J. Miller, p. 142-144; Korr, p. 125-128.
197 Rader, p. 190.
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in the league had earned him the right to determine his own destiny. The commissioner
refused to assist Flood. In January 1970, with the backing of the players association,
Flood filed an antitrust suit against Major League BasebalL 198
MLBPA executive director Marvin Miller orchestrated Flood's challenge of
baseball's storied exemption. Miller convinced the association to finance Flood's lawsuit.
Miller also personally recruited former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg to
represent Flood. Despite the financial backing of the players union, Flood received no
significant public support from any major league players. In his autobiography, Miller
laments that the association made little effort to organize big name players in support of
Flood. He speculates that the players were not yet solidly united as a union and that if the
case had come up after the 1972 players strike, there might have been a greater show of
support from the players. The only support offered by fellow players came in the form of
court testimony from Jackie Robinson, Hank Greenberg, Jim Brosnan and Bill Veeck. 199
It may be argued, however, that the silence of the players during the Flood case represents
an improvement compared to the dozens of active-players who were compelled to testify
in support of the reserve rule during congressional hearings in the 1950s.
Flood's lawsuit was heard in federal district court by Judge Irving Ben Cooper.
Judge Cooper heard the case without a jury, weighing more than 2,000 pages of testimony
and dozens of evidentiary documents as well as the arguments of the litigants.
20 The trial
Judge ruled against Flood, upholding the Federal Baseball decision as a matter of stare
198 Lowenfish and Lupien, p. 206-207; Zimbalist, p. 18-19.
199 The Flood case is discussed extensively in Miller, p. 169-202.
200 Koppett, Leonard, "Reserve Clause Could Aid Management, Veeck Says," The
Sporting News (June 27, 1970), p. 30.
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decisis. In his opinion for the court, Judge Cooper revealed his understanding of
baseball's significance when he wrote, "Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so
pervasive that it would not strain credulity to say that the court can take judicial notice
that baseball is everybody's business....The game is on higher ground; it behooves every
one to keep it there."201
The second circuit court of appeals also rejected Flood's assault on baseball's
treasured immunity. In its decision the court held, "If baseball is to be damaged by
statutory regulation, let the congressman face his constituents the next November and also
face the consequences of his baseball voting record."202 The appeals court opinion, like
that of the trial court, was littered with praise of baseball's cultural significance. In his
concurring opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Moore recounted the
heroes of baseball's past claiming that baseball's most notable players "were probably
better known to a greater number of our populous than many of our statesmen; and their
exploits better remembered than some of our outstanding public figures." 203
In the summer of 1 972, the Supreme Court received the Flood case and thus was
faced with the antitrust exemption question once again. Once more, the Court refused to
tamper with its Federal Baseball decision, holding that while baseball indeed was a matter
of interstate commerce, the game's long standing reliance on the Federal Baseball
precedent made it necessary for the legislature to address the anomaly. In Flood v. Kuhn,
the Supreme Court opinion, written by Harry Blackmun, reads like a testimonial to the
cultural significance of baseball in America. Blackmun' s ode to baseball was even more
201 Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (1970).
202 Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264(1971).
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extravagant than that of the lower courts. Throughout the legal odyssey ofFlood, from
the trial court to the Supreme Court, one message is repeatedly affirmed: Baseball is
special!
204
Despite the instability in baseball since the end of World War II, the reverence
for the game was alive and well in 1972.
The Supreme Court decision in Flood v. Kuhn served to focus the efforts ofthe
players association on the collective bargaining process as the way to effect reform of the
reserve clause. After half a century and numerous court challenges, it was clear that the
judicially created exemption was not going to be corrected by the courts. Moreover, the
court opinions in the Flood case illustrated the continuing reverence for the game and any
practices deemed necessary for its stability. Even Marvin Miller himself had doubts about
the wisdom of repealing Federal Baseball. In an interview in the spring of 1969 Miller
told a reporter that "a chaotic situation could exist if a law suit overthrew the legality of
the reserve clause." He went on to recommend that a "substitute arrangement" should be
made that "would be fair to both the club and the player and that would stand up in
.
,,205
court.
Even before the outcome of Flood, the players association set its sights on the
collective bargaining process to achieve its goals. The second Basic Agreement of 1970
included another raise of the minimum salary and a reduction in the maximum salary cut.
Impasse in negotiations over the funding of the pension fund would set off the first regular
203 Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F. 2d at 269.
204 This argument is made by David Curie in "On Higher Ground: Baseball and the Rule of
Flood v. Kuhn:' Legal References Services Quarterly 8 (1988), p. 29-62.
205 Broeg, Bob, "Just What Prompted Flood Lawsuit?" The Sporting News (February 1,
1970), p. 33.
122
season, industry-wide players strike in April, 1972. Historian Benjamin Rader describes
the issues surrounding baseball's "first real strike."
Ostensibly, the strike revolved around how the players'
pension fund would be financed, but in the background
hovered the general agreement that would be negotiated in
1973 and the status of the reserve clause that was being
argued before the Supreme Court. Even though the owners
had just negotiated a new television contract with NBC for
$70 million, they initially rejected any increase in the share
going to the player pension fund. A powerful minority of
the owners wanted to seize the opportunity to break the
206
union.
Baseball's first industry-wide strike lasted only nine days into the 1972 regular
season. The settlement of the strike garnered the players a $500,000 increase in the
owners contribution to the pension fund. It cost them $600,000 in lost wages. For the
players, however, the real benefit of the strike would be reaped later. The unity of the
players in 1 972 contrasted sharply with the disunity of the owners. The strike had cost the
owners much more than the players. The players demonstrated their willingness to suffer
short term losses for long term gains and in so doing greatly increased their bargaining
power in an increasingly adversarial relationship with management.
The resolve demonstrated by the players in 1972 would benefit them in
negotiations over the third Basic Agreement in 1973. Although the reserve clause was left
in tact, the players were granted the right to impartial arbitration of contract disputes.
Instead of the commissioner settling salary disputes, any player with at least two years in
the league could submit his case to a three-member arbitration board. The board would
consist of one member chosen by the owners, one member chosen by the players, and one
206 Rader, p. 191.
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independent member. The board was charged with accepting either the player's salary
request or the owner's proposed salary, with the decision binding on both parties.207
Salary arbitration would become one of the most significant achievements of the players
association and would lead to the virtual dismantling of the century old reserve clause.
In the winter of 1975, the new arbitration procedure bore its most significant fruit.
Two National League players, the Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Andy Messersmith and
the Montreal Expos pitcher Dave McNally, petitioned for free agent status. They argued
that the reserve clause was a one-year option clause and that by playing the 1975 season
without a contract, they had fulfilled their obligations.208 Independent arbitrator Peter
Seitz ruled in favor of the players.209 The owners responded by firing Seitz and appealing
his ruling to the courts. U.S. district court Judge, John Olver ruled that the Seitz decision
should stand. The Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld Seitz' s ruling,
holding that the collective bargaining agreement between the players and owners gave
Seitz the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the grievances ofMessersmith and McNally. The
court, however, was careful to note that it was not ruling on the reserve clause itself, but
rather on the specific case at hand. Furthermore, the appeals court echoed the sentiments
of previous courts in saying that baseball is not a matter for the courts.
210
207 Quirk, James and Rodney Fort, Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports ,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 194-195.
208 Quirk and Fort, p. 195.
209 Seitz had been an arbitrator between the NBA and the NBA Players Association in the
late 1960s when he helped to clarify the NBA standard contract making it clear that
players were effectively free agents after playing out their option year without a contract.
The reserve clause in NBA contracts was exactly the same as Major League Baseball
Contracts.
2,0
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rd
Loss in Row," The Japan Times (March 11,
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In July 1976, when baseball's Fourth Basic Agreement went into effect the reserve
clause had been emasculated. A fifteen-day lock-out during spring training had prompted
both sides to make major concessions. Free agency had come to America's national
pastime. Under the reformulated reserve clause, players were no longer tied indefinitely to
one team. For contracts signed prior to August 9, 1976, the team could renew for one
year after the expiration of the contract. If the player remained unsigned through this
"option" year, he automatically became a free agenL For contracts signed after August 9,
1976, players with six or more years in the major leagues at the end of his contract could
become a free agent simply by giving notice to the players association. 2,1
In 1977, the first free agent market in baseball produced significantly higher player
salaries and a pronounced increase in multiyear contracts. Commissioner Bowie Kuhn
released a report showing that the average player's salary rose from $51,501 in 1976 to
$76,349 in 1977. The explosion in the number of multiyear contracts began as soon as the
Seitz decision was rendered. Recognizing what the decision would mean for the reserve
clause, many clubs signed players to multiyear contracts before the 1976 season "[I]n all
57 players signed such pacts, 36 hitters and 21 pitchers. Of these 57 contracts, 26 were
for two years, 18 for three years, 7 for four years, and 6 for five years."
212
In 1977, 281
players signed multiyear contracts. The break down that year was 1 1 1 contracts for two
years, 105 for three years, 21 for four years, 33 for five years, 10 for six years, and one for
ten years.
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Hill, James R. and William Spellman, "Professional Baseball: The Reserve Clause and
Salary Structure," Industrial Relations 22:1 (Winter, 1983), p. 3.
212
Hill and Spellman, p. 5.
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Despite the apparent advances in reforming baseball's private self government with
regard to labor/management relations, pressure for government regulation again increased
in the mid-1970s. In May 1976, the U.S. House of Representatives created the Select
Committee on Professional Sports under the chairmanship of California Democrat, B.F.
Sisk. The purpose of the Sisk Committee was to investigate the stability of America's
professional sports leagues and to recommend any legislation thought necessary. One of
the main issues on the committee's agenda was to determine whether Organized Baseball
should continue to enjoy an exemption from the nation's antitrust laws. The recent failure
of the ABA and NBA merger, franchise relocation's in football and baseball, several law
suits and findings of unfair labor practices by the NLRB, were all regular stories on
America's sports pages. The introduction to a study prepared for the use of the select
committee chronicles the woes of professional sports and concludes, "[i]t is rare that the
formation of a special investigative committee receives such instant justification for its
existence."
213
The committee held extensive hearings in which they heard from a wide array of
witnesses from all the major sports. Baseball representation at the hearings was heavily
weighted in the owners favor. Testimony was heard from Commissioner Kuhn, New
York Mets Chairman, Grant Donald, National League President Charles Feeney, and
American League President, Lee MacPhail. Each spoke to the committee about baseball's
storied tradition and its tireless efforts to operate in the public interest. Each assured the
committee that baseball's exemption was crucial to the sports continuing conmiitment to
2,3 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Professional Sports, Professional Sports
and the Law. Study , (94
lh
Cong., 2d Sess.,1976), p. 1.
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the public interest. The arguments advanced for the exemption were already well known
to the committee. Nonetheless, the "baseball men" reiterated the need for the exemption
to control franchise migration, manage competition between clubs, and avoid costly and
destructive litigation. Most potent, however, were their veiled promises of expansion
Members of the committee were assured that Major League Baseball intended to expand
and that their states were certainly in the running.214
These overtures from Major League Baseball were countered by the impassioned
testimony ofMarvin Miller, as well as testimony from several noted scholars who argued
for the repeal of baseball's exemption. Economist Roger Noll and Lawyer Steven Rivkin,
both contributors to a 1972 study entitled Government and the Sports Business, testified
that baseball's exemption created an unequal and destructive tension between the major
professional sports and that the Congress should consider legislation to eradicate the
anomaly.
215
After balancing the competing interests and arguments of those who testified
the committee chose a compromise recommendation.
The final report of the Sisk Committee states:
Based upon the information available to it, the Committee
has concluded that adequate justification does not exist for
baseball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and that
its exemption should be removed in the context of overall
sports antitrust reform.
216
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Despite the Sisk committee's conclusion that baseball's exemption should be lifted,
it recommended no such legislation. The extensive investigation produced an
encyclopedic report, but no legislation. The committee did, however, recommend that its
successor committee undertake an extensive study of sports antitrust law. The proposed
sports oversight committee was never convened, but a study was prepared and published
in 1981.
217
At the time, it was widely acknowledged in the press that Sisk's committee was
the result of his failed attempt to convince Organized Baseball to locate an expansion team
in Washington, DC. Sisk and fellow Congressman Frank Horton (R-NY) had fought for a
new team in the nation's capital since 1971 when the Senators left town for a second time.
Other Members of Congress had been rattling their sabers at Organized Baseball as well.
Rep. Gillis Long (D-LA), who wanted a major league team for New Orleans, sponsored
legislation to strip Organized Baseball of its exemption. In a widely reported tirade during
a hearing in which NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien was testifying, Rep. Long
interrupted to announce his bill to strip Major League Baseball of its "favorite son
treatment" because, he said, baseball "is beginning to respond to such treatment as many
favorite sons do - as a prodigal son." 218 Long's bill, supported by other members whose
cities sought major league teams, died in committee.
Baseball's owners went into negotiations over the Fifth Basic Agreement in 1980
determined to roll back some of the players association's advances. The owners sought to
217 Professors Jesse Markham and Paul Teplitz of the Cambridge Research Institute
conducted an extensive analysis of the economics of Major League Baseball in Baseball,
Economics and Public Policy , (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1981).
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end salary arbitration and to modify the free agency rules. Unable to come to terms in
1980, it was decided to postpone negotiations until a joint player-owner committee could
study the issues at hand. The 1980 season was played without an agreement.
During the 1980 season the owners took steps to deflect injury from an expected
strike in 1981
.
They used a percentage of gate receipts as a strike fund and they took out
strike insurance with Lloyds ofLondon. The 1981 season opened without an agreement
Negotiations broke down on June 10 and the next day a 50-day player strike began.
During the protracted dispute the players charged the owners with bargaining in bad faith.
The National Labor Relations Board sought injunctive relief for the players, then began
unfair labor practices proceedings against the owners. The parties finally came to
agreement on August 1, the day after the owners strike insurance ran out.219 The
settlement left salary arbitration unchanged and created a complicated formula for
compensating teams who lost free agents.
In the 1 980s, the impetus for change was shifting from the players, who were
making great strides against their "indentured servitude," to the fans. It was during the
mid-1980s that baseball's place as an American cultural icon eroded. The rise of the
players' union to a position of virtual parity with the owners in terms of bargaining power
contributed to the changing public mood. As Organized Baseball moved into the 1980s
the public's perception of the relationship between the players and the owners began to
2,8 Brady, Dave, "Congress Aims Anti-Trust Blow at Baseball," The Sporting News
(August 28, 1976), p. 8.
219 For a detailed description of the events surrounding the 1981 strike see, McCormick,
Robert A., "Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional
Baseball," Vanderbilt Law Review 35 (1982), p. 1 131-1 169; Also see Zimbalist, p. 20-
21.
129
change. While the 1970s saw the players association achieve numerous victories over the
owners with the general support of the American public, the aftermath of the 1981 strike
saw fan disgust with both sides.220
The Fifth Basic Agreement expired in 1984 and once again negotiations were
strained. It had become almost routine for the expiration of each Basic Agreement to set
off a highly contentious negotiation over a new contract. The 1985 season was no
different. A two-day strike in August was settled when the players agreed to a three-year
major league tenure requirement for any player seeking salary arbitration. In addition, the
free agency compensation rules were modified so as to limit teams that lost players to
compensation through amateur draft choices. 221
The concessions made by the players association in the 1985 Basic Agreement
were indicative of the changing mood in the nation regarding baseball. Particularly telling
was the players agreement to a reduction in their share of television receipts from thirty-
three to eighteen percent.
222
Baseball scholar James Quirk writes that, from the players
perspective, "the mid-1970s to early- 1980s were 'Star Wars,' and the mid-1980s looked
more like The Empire Strikes Back.'"223 The owners were beginning to win the public
relations war. Their cries of poverty were having a positive effect on negotiations with the
220
"Baseball's New Strike - By the Fans," U.S. News & World Report, (Aug. 24, 1981),
p. 8. This article is representative of the type of stories in the press following the 1981
strike.
221 In 1982, Marvin Miller resigned from the MLBPA. He was replaced by former federal
mediator, Kenneth Moffitt. After just one year in office Moffitt was fired by the union for
failing to take aggressive stands against management. Miller resumes control of the union
until Donald Fehr, the union's general counsel, was named the new executive director in
1984.
222 Jennings, Kenneth, Balls and Strikes: The Money Game in Professional Baseball, (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 67.
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players. In 1984, the owners complained that they were losing $100 million a year. An
independent auditor, appointed by the owners in compliance with National Labor
Relations Board rules, estimated that the owners were losing between $25 million and $35
million a year by 1985.
After the 1985 season it became apparent that the owners intended to "strike
back." Commissioner Peter Ubberoth laid the groundwork for the owners revenge when
he reported to the owners the results of a cost/benefit analysis of free agency. The
statistical study concluded that the benefit of signing free agents was outweighed by their
cost. Sixty-two players filed for free agency; none was offered a contract by teams other
than the team with which they were already playing.224 The MLBPA charged the owners
with collusion and sought redress through the grievance procedure. After two years of
what became known as the "collusion hearings" in baseball, an independent arbitrator
ruled against the owners finding that there was owner collusion in the free agent market.
Owners were exchanging information about their salary bids for free agents. It was not
until 1990, however, that the arbitrator fined the owners $280 million for their collusion.
In the 1990 Basic Agreement the players preserved both the arbitration system and free
agency, as well as a provision that provided for triple damages to the union if the owners
were again found guilty of collusion.
After the collusion decision, the players regained some leverage against the
owners, and the new politics of baseball were once again near equilibrium The outside
environment, however, was poisoned by the travails of what had become the baseball
223 Quirk and Fort, p. 193.
224 Cited in Quirk and Fort, p. 197.
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"industry." The price of labor equity in baseball was not insignificant. The rancorous
battles between the players and the owners brought the national pastime into the 1990s
looking much different than it had in the 1960s. Baseball had lost its status as a cultural
icon. By the 1990s Americans had grown cynical about the game, seeing it more as a
nasty business than a national treasure.
Other Sports: Is Baseball Unique or One Among Many?
Organized Baseball was the national pastime and a highly profitable industry before
the advent of television or the coming of age of professional football and basketball. With
the postwar explosion ofmass media technology these other sports slowly began to rival
baseball's popularity. As television became an important part of the American lifestyle in
the 1960s and 1970s, the nation was also undergoing profound demographic change. On
the one hand, there was a movement of population from the northeast and midwest to the
sun belt and the west. On the other hand, all regions of the country were experiencing
sizable migrations from urban centers to outlying areas, the suburbs. The changing
demography of the nation and the appearance of television in every living room across the
country changed the habits of American sports fans dramatically.
In a younger and more mobile population, the sports best for TV — basketball
football, and even hockey, with their combination of faster action combined with set time
limits - drew increasing audiences. Prior to the advent of television, baseball ruled among
spectator sports. Going to the ball park to see a major league game was an experience
unrivaled by other professional sports. Gradually, however, especially with the advent of
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television, the other professional sports cut into baseball's popularity, reducing it to one
among many.
The development of football and basketball as professional sports, both of which
came of age in the 1950s and 1960s largely through television, had an impact on baseball's
private self government. The fate of these other sports since the 1950s has provided
Major League Baseball with the knowledge ofwhat might have been. These other sports
dealt with the empowerment of players unions, the explosion of television revenues, and
the transformation of professional sports markets without a pre-existing immunity from
federal antitrust laws. Their development, despite subjection to antitrust laws, exposed
baseball's private self government. The baseball anomaly, which had gone largely
unnoticed until the 1 950s, would be repeatedly besieged in the era of television. The
perception that baseball was no different than other professional sports, yet it received
special treatment, would constantly fuel antagonism with baseball's exemption. As these
other sports dealt with antitrust issues, baseball's anomaly was increasingly a target for the
press, the public, and the policy makers on Capitol Hill.
Professional football experienced a markedly different path of development from
that of baseball in terms of labor/ management relations and especially in its relation to
federal antitrust statutes. Football in America can be traced to the 1870s, when colleges
began inter-collegiate play. In 1920, the American Professional Football Association was
created, featuring the legendary college football star Jim Thorpe. In 1921, this league
became the National Football League (NFL), which enjoyed moderate success until its rise
to big time status in the 1960s when it was rivaled, and then joined, by the newly formed
American Football League (AFL).
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Professional football's first brush with antitrust law came in 1953 when a
Pennsylvania federal district court ruled that the NFL's sale of pooled television contracts
constituted a violation of antitrust law. The decision, which came in the same year the
Supreme Court in Toolson upheld baseball's exemption from antitrust, stated explicitly
that the court considered football to be interstate commerce by virtue of its commercial
broadcast on radio and television.225 This decision fueled ongoing sentiment in the halls of
Congress that baseball's special legal status among sports must be remedied.
In 1957, in Radovitch v. National Football League, the Supreme Court echoed the
1953 decision of the federal district court, finding that professional football is indeed
subject to federal antitrust laws.226 This decision put to rest any expectation or
speculation that football was exempt from antitrust because of the Court's decision in
Toolson. The Radovitch decision also had a profound effect upon the players union
movement in football. Like baseball, professional football had a reserve clause in all
standard player contracts which bound players to the team that originally drafted them for
the duration of their careers or until their team sold, traded, or released them.
227
The National Football League Players Association, formed a year before the
Radovitch decision, had failed to make any headway with the owners in 1956 on the issue
of the reserve clause or any other player grievances. The 1957 Supreme Court decision,
however, greatly improved the bargaining position of the players. By threatening the
225 United States v. National Football League, 1 16 F Supp 319 (Pa., 1953).
226 Radovitch v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). The facts of this case
are discussed in chapter two.
227 For a history of the reserve clause in football see, Garvey Edward R., "From Chattle to
Employee: The Athlete's Quest For Freedom and Dignity," in Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science , 445 (September, 1979), p. 92-95.
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football owners with a multimillion dollar antitrust suit, the football players association,
headed by attorney and former player, Creighton Miller, was able to secure important
concessions from the owners. The minimum salary for players was increased to $5,000;
players were guaranteed $50 for each exhibition game played and won the inclusion of an
injury clause in their contracts, that would continue salaries and pay for medical care after
an injury; and they also won a pension plan for the players that began in 1959.228 At the
same time the fledgling baseball players association continued to languish in a position of
virtual powerlessness vis-a-vis the baseball owners.
In 1961, a federal district court, citing the 1953 Pennsylvania federal appeals
decision, struck down the validity of a $9.3 million television contract between the NFL
and CBS on the grounds that it was in violation of antitrust law.229 Just months after this
decision, Congress granted professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey an
antitrust exemption that would nullify the court's decision and allow leagues to enter into
television broadcasting contracts as a single entity, rather than requiring each team to
make its own broadcasting deals. The practice of leagues entering into television
contracts as a unit greatly increased television revenues. The statutory exemption granted
by Congress was vigorously opposed by the television networks.
230
While this exemption
allowed professional football, basketball, and hockey to increase television revenue
dramatically, it was much more significant for Organized Baseball.
228 Staudahar, Paul, The Sports Industry and Collective Bargaining, (Ithaca: ILR Press,
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230 Public Law 87-33 1 , The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 is discussed in detail in
chapter two.
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By removing the issue of television revenues, Congress had taken away the most
potent weapon in the struggle to repeal the Federal Baseball exemption. Television was
the most significant factor in exposing Major League Baseball's interstate character as
well as its "special" treatment. Professional football basketball and hockey only caught
on with American sports fans when television brought them into everyone's living room
Television transformed American spectator sports. It leveled the playing field as far as fan
interest in sports. Television made baseball just one among many and it revealed
baseball's unfair legal advantage over the other sports. The Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961 eliminated the most potent argument for repealing baseball's exemption and gave
new life to the baseball anomaly.
In 1962, football's reserve clause was apparently shattered, more than a decade
before any significant alteration in baseball's reserve clause. San Francisco player R.C.
Owens played out his option year and signed with the Baltimore Colts for the 1963
season. Given the recent judicial declarations that football was subject to antitrust laws,
this move seemed to signal the end of peonage for football players. The owners, however,
responded the following year with a creativity reminiscent of their baseball counterparts.
The so-called "Rozelle Rule," named for then-commissioner Pete Rozelle, was instituted
in 1963. By awarding compensation in the form of players, draft choices or money to be
paid by the team hiring the free agent to the team losing one, the Rozelle rule effectively
negated the viability of free agency. The amount and type of compensation would be
determined by the commissioner of football. This disincentive to signing free agents was
so significant that only a handful of free agents were signed between 1963 and 1976.
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In 1963, the players of the newly formed American Football League created the
American Football League Players Association and almost immediately joined their
colleagues in the NFL in opposing the merger of the two leagues. The players contended
that the merger would reduce their ability to negotiate player salaries. The merger was
officially approved by Congress in October, 1966. The newly consolidated NFL began
unrivaled play in the 1967-68 season-
Congressional approval of the merger did not come without a fight.
Representative Emanuel Celler ofNew York, a well known foe of baseball's exemption,
fought hard to scuttle approval of the merger. But the plan was approved by the Senate in
what was widely considered a deal wherein key Senators traded their votes for the
promise of expansion teams. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R- 111) used a
parliamentary trick to get the merger past Celler' s forces in the House. He attached it to a
House-passed anti-inflation bill. The overwhelming support for the anti-inflation bill in the
House allowed the Senate to hold it hostage with the merger plan as ransom Unwilling to
jeopardize the anti-inflation bill, House opponents were forced to acquiesce in
conference.
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The football merger legislation is a good example ofhow institutions, and
institutional contexts, affect public policy outcomes. Pro-merger forces did not have the
political clout to get the merger through the House of Representatives, however, by
exploiting the rules of the legislative process pro-merger forces were able to get the plan
passed despite not having a majority on their side. The regulatory environment at the time
of the merger was such that contravening antitrust principles was very unpopular. Had
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Congressman Celler and the opponents of the merger been prepared for the parliamentary
maneuvering of pro-merger legislators, the merger would surely have failed. A decade
later Congressman Celler and his allies on Capitol Hill were prepared for parliamentary
strategy when the NBA-ABA merger came before the Congress. The failure of that
merger better represents the sense of the majority.
While the passage of the Sports Broadcastinp Art of 1 Q61 might seem to indicate a
softening of support for antitrust enforcement, in fact it was the result of the pervasive
influence of television, not eroding support for the vigorous enforcement of antitrust law.
In 1961, only the NFL, as a result of the aforementioned court decisions, was restricted
from selling pooled contracts to television networks. Major League Baseball was beyond
challenge on this point due to its blanket exemption. The NBA's and NHL's practice of
pooling TV contracts had not yet been successfully challenged in court. Even the NFL's
rival the American Football Conference (AFC) remained free to pool TV contracts. The
desire to bring parity to this situation combined with the pervasive influence of a relatively
new mass media medium enabled advocates of the broadcasting exemption to argue that
the "rule of reason" dictated that pooling TV contracts was not injurious to economic
competition.
In 1968, the NFLPA became the first players association to register with the U.S.
Department ofLabor as a labor union. Football players seemed poised to join baseball
players in pressuring for significant reforms through collective bargaining agreements,
protected under the National Labor Relations Act. In contrast to the MLBPA, however,
the football players association achieved little in the early 1970s because they were faced
231 The merger fight in Congress is described in Wilson, p. 131-132.
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with the owners refusal to recognize them as a legal unit for collective bargaining.
Because the NFL union had merged with the AFL union, it was forced to seek re-
certification from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During the complex
process of re-certification that resulted, the owners were able ignore the union and go
their own way. While advocates of baseball's exemption often point to this disparity
between the effectiveness of the baseball and football players unions, the success of the
baseball players cannot easily be linked to the exemption. The football players union
certification problems muddy the comparison, making it a strained analogy at best.
After brief pre-season strikes by football players in 1968 and 1970 and a forty-four
day long strike at the beginning of the 1974 season, which was undermined by the lack of
player solidarity and lackluster public support, the NFLPA once again looked to the courts
for relief. Baltimore Colts tight end, John Mackey, who was president of the NFLPA,
sued the NFL charging that the Rozelle rule violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. In the
case ofMackey v. National Football League, a federal district court ruled in favor of
232
Mackey, finding the Rozelle rule to be in violation of antitrust law. The decision was
upheld by the Eighth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 1976.
233
The decision in Mackey was among the events sparking attention on Capitol Hill in
1976. The Sisk Committee, or Select Committee on Professional Sports, held hearings in
the summer and fall of 1976. Although the committee recommended no specific
legislation, it did endorse the application of antitrust laws to all professional sports
mdiscriminately.
232 Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F Supp 1000 (Minn.,, 1975).
233 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F2d 606 (8
th
Cir., 1976).
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Despite the victory in court and a relaxation of the Rozelle rule negotiated in the
1977 Basic Agreement with the NFLPA, the owners continued to enjoy the benefits of
restricted player mobility by employing the age old tactic of blacklisting. The NFLPA
limped into the 1980s, and in 1982, encouraged by the 1981 baseball players strike, the
football players went on strike. For the players union, the 57 day strike was a failure. The
players were, in the end, forced to accept a settlement on management terms. Adding
insult to injury was the fact that several prominent players who were union representatives
found themselves either cut or traded after the 1982 season.234 The NFL players would
strike again in 1987. That strike ended, after several games in which teams used
replacement players, with little change in player/ management relations. The 1980s ended
with the football players union disorganized and dispirited. Despite the strictures of
antitrust law, football owners had been far more successful than their baseball counterparts
in controlling the demands of players.
The contrast between football and baseball on labor/ management issues extended
to the issue of franchise migration. In contrast to the success of football team owners in
restraining player demands, the owners had trouble controlling each other. It was
franchise movements, not player relations that caused problems for football. The
problems began when Oakland Raiders owner Al Davis moved his club to Los Angeles in
1982, despite the lack of league approval. Unable to get the required three-fourths vote of
the owners needed to relocate his club, Davis sued the league, arguing that the voting
requirement for relocation violated antitrust law.
234 Harris, David, The League: The Rise and Decline of the NFL , (New York: Bantam
Books, 1986), p. 184.
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A U.S. district court agreed with Davis, finding the NFL in violation of the
Sherman Act in its efforts to block the Raiders move. Upheld on appeal, this decision
touched off what the economist Paul Staudahar calls the "free agency" era of franchise
movement in football.235 In affirming the lower court decision, the Ninth U.S. Court of
Appeals stated that the Raiders move to L.A. would promote competition with the Los
Angeles Rams, as well as produce lower ticket prices and greater consumer choice. The
court, therefore, justified its invocation of antitrust law by arguing that the move would
enhance consumer welfare.236 Despite concerted efforts to gain statutory exemption for
the NFL's ability to restrict franchise mobility, numerous clubs have been relocated. Since
1982, the NFL has seen several high profile team relocation's that have evoked much
controversy. Organized Baseball commonly cites the disruptions caused by franchise
relocation in football as an argument for preserving its antitrust exemption on the grounds
that it serves the public interest.
Basketball's development has resembled football's in some respects; however, the
players association in basketball has been much more effective than its football
counterpart. The National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) was created in 1954.
In 1956, basketball had its first encounter with antitrust law. In the case of Washington
Professional Basketball Corp. v. National Basketball Association™ a federal district
court ruled in favor of a prospective team owner who had been prevented from entering
235 Staudahar, p. 93.
236 Freedman, Warren, Professional Sports and Antitrust , (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1987), p. 78.
237 Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. N.B.A., 147 F Supp 867 (SDNY, 1956).
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the ranks of professional basketball by the NBA. The court held that the NBA operates
across state lines by virtue of its travel and its sale of broadcast rights and is therefore
subject to the strictures of the Sherman Act.
The basketball owners did not recognize the players union until 1967, when
competition from the newly formed American Basketball Association greatly enhanced the
players leverage over the owners. In 1967, the players and owners agreed to the first
collective bargaining agreement in basketball. During the next nine years, the players
association did not pursue collective bargaining vigorously.
Suffering from escalating salaries the owners in both leagues began to press for a
merger in 1969. The players association strongly opposed the merger, which would of
course reduce their leverage against the owners. When the two leagues came to terms on
a merger agreement, the players association, lead by NBPA president Oscar Robertson,
filed an antitrust suit to block it, which included challenges to the draft, the uniform
contract, and the reserve clause. A federal court issued an injunction preventing the
merger until the merits of the case could be determined. The court also rejected an NBA
argument that the court lacked jurisdiction in the case and that the NLRB was the
appropriate adjudicative venue. This created a situation peculiar to basketball, as it made
recourse to the courts for antitrust challenges the weapon of choice in basketball.
That weapon was used by Spencer Haywood, an all-American basketball player
from the University of Detroit and member of the 1968 United States Olympic basketball
team. Haywood had signed a contract with the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA. The
NBA Commissioner voided the contract because Haywood had not yet been out of high
school for four years, as required by the NBA rule designed to discourage the signing of
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college underclassmen. Haywood sued the NBA charging them with an unlawful
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The courts agreed. In the case ofHaywood v. NBA, the
Supreme Court ruled that the NBA rule was indeed a violation of the Sherman Act.238
This decision officially placed basketball in the same position vis-a-vis antitrust law as
football and it further illuminated the disparity between baseball and these other sports.
In the meantime, the NBA and ABA sought approval for their merger plan on
Capitol Hill in 1971. The same approval had been obtained by the NFL and AFL in 1966,
but the politics of the basketball merger were different. Unlike the NFLPA, the basketball
players were well organized and a potent lobbying force against the merger. In addition,
those in Congress who opposed the football merger would not be duped by parliamentary
trickery this time. The basketball merger hearings in 1971 were brief and unremarkable.239
There was not great support in Congress to contravene the antitrust laws once again. This
combined with the vigorous and well organized opposition of the NBA players association
made passage of the merger unlikely. Seeking the support of the players for the merger
the owners offered to ease the reserve clause, bringing it in line with the football reserve
clause at the time, which included the Rozelle rule. The players refused this offer and
managed to block congressional approval of the merger.
240
In 1975, a federal district court settled the Robertson case by striking down
basketball's version of the Rozelle rule, which had acted as a disincentive to signing free
agents, the player draft, and the uniform contract, finding them all illegal under the
™Haywoodv. NBA,40\ U.S. 1204(1971).
239 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, Professional Basketball Hearings , (92
nd
Cong., 1
st
Sess.,1971).
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Sherman Act. The court also ruled that the NBA-ABA merger would be a violation of
antitrust law.
241
In 1976, following the Robertson decision the players and owners
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in which the players acquiesced to the
merger plan in exchange for major concessions.242 The newly consolidated NBA began
play in 1976-77 season.
The issue of franchise migration came to the NBA in the person ofDonald
Sterling, owner of the San Diego Clippers. In 1982, he tried to move his club to Los
Angeles. After two years of litigation, encouraged by the decision in the Raiders case,
Sterling moved his team without the NBA's permission. The NBA sued Sterling and, in
1987, a federal appeals court provided the NBA with some hope by throwing out a lower
court's dismissal of the NBA's suit and ordering a new trial. In its decision the court
stated that leagues can put "reasonable restrictions" on franchise movement. The NBA
eventually lost the case but it did create hesitation regarding unrestricted franchise
migration.
243
The NBA's labor/ management relations have been the most litigious, but also the
most productive. Unlike baseball and football, basketball has not had to endure a major
strike or work stoppage. The threat of antitrust action has chastened the basketball
owners and provided the players with a powerful weapon in labor/management
negotiations. Additionally, franchise migration has not been a controversial issue in the
NBA. Unlike football, the history of professional basketball and the antitrust laws
240 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, Professional Basketball Hearings , (93
rd
Cong., 1
st
Sess., 1972), p. 241-245.
241 Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F Supp 867 (SDNY, 1975).
242 For a detailed description of the terms of this agreement see, Staudahar, p. 120.
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indicates that productive labor/ management relations and franchise stability can be
maintained despite exposure to federal antitrust law.
The impact of the emergence of other professional sports like football and
basketball, which are subject to antitrust law, on the baseball anomaly is mixed. On the
one hand, these sports were the beneficiaries of the advent of television. As such they
became as popular, and in the case of football more popular, than baseball. At the very
least, these sports came to be equally as popular as baseball, which had the effect of
exposing the inequity of the baseball anomaly for all to see.
On the other hand, television changed the nature of the game. While it certainly
made clear the interstate character of the business of baseball, it also facilitated greater
understanding of the cooperative nature of sports leagues and in so doing expanded what
would be considered "reasonable" collaboration among members of such leagues. More
importantly, by shielding broadcast activity from the antitrust laws, television diluted the
case against baseball's exemption. Baseball limped into the 1980s with its private self
government battered but in tact and as the regulatory environment shifted with the Reagan
revolution that private self government began to look more like the emerging norm rather
than an outdated anomaly.
The Regulatory Regime of the 1980s
The new politics of baseball involve the players' association becoming a powerful
labor union, which by the mid-1970s would deal with Organized Baseball's management
on a virtually equal basis. That is to say that the fortunes of the players association
were
243 NBA v.SDC Basketball Club, 815 F. 2d 562 (1987).
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aided by the political environment of the day. The societal regulatory regime of the late
1960s and 1970s was animated by the mobilization of popular sentiment against the
exploitation of the capitalist production process by "big business." This sentiment worked
against the baseball owners, and facilitated the progress of the players association in the
1970s. But, the player friendly political environment shifted in the 1980s. The onset of
what Eisner calls the "efficiency" regime provided the owners with some relief from
negative public opinion, allowing them to stem the tide of player advances in collective
bargaining.
The so-called Reagan revolution of the 1980s caused a shift in regulatory policy.
Eisner sees the onset of the efficiency regime as a reaction to the expansive regulatory
push of the late 1960s and 1970s. He identifies four defining characteristics of the new
regime. First, the efficiency regime is characterized by an "unprecedented centralization of
regulatory authority in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and in White House
review bodies." Second, regulatory initiatives during the late 1970s and 1980s were
subjected to unprecedented amounts of economic analysis prior to promulgation. Third,
regulators assessed the need for regulation and designed new policies with economic
markets as a benchmark. Finally, the efficiency regime is characterized by an
"overwhelming concern with corporate compliance costs" on the part of advocates of
regulatory reform and deregulation. The common thread pervading these characteristics is
the pursuit of economic efficiency
244
Eisner's identification of the shift in regulatory policy in late 1970s and 1980s as a
new regulatory regime is controversial. Students of regulatory policy, Richard Harris and
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Sidney Milkis, contend that no coherent consensus developed in support of the type of
anti-government, market based regulatory program that dominated administrative politics
during the period in question. They agree that the regulatory reform and deregulation
initiatives of the 1980s were a reaction to the social regulation of the previous decade and
a half, but they see the forces of deregulation as achieving parity with, rather than
overwhelming, the forces of social regulation and the societal regime.
Although no firm consensus has developed in support of a
market-oriented regulatory regime, the principles of "real
economics" pose a strong challenge to the public philosophy
that gave impetus to social regulation... Quality-of-life
issues and citizen activism will be challenged by well
organized business interests and advocates of economic
theories, who provide a theoretical alternative to the moral
imperatives of social reformers. In one sense this suggests a
stalemate between two visions of regulatory politics. In
another sense, however, it signifies a confirmation of the
public lobby movement.
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In contrast to the prevailing continuity of Harris and Milkis' "public lobby regime"
Eisner distinguishes the efficiency regime from the societal regime. He argues that the
lack of consensus in the electorate regarding the wisdom of regulatory reform and
deregulation does not preclude the existence of a new regulatory regime. Eisner locates
the origins of the efficiency regime in elite politics, rather than democratic politics. He
identifies three contributing factors in the development of the efficiency regime, none of
which is directly related to electoral politics. They are: 1) the use of presidential initiatives
to affect regulatory reform, 2) new administrative practices and changes in staffing in
244
Eisner, p. 172.
245 Harris and Milkis, p. 293.
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regulatory agencies, and 3) shifting power configurations in the public interest group
system.
These factors did not appear suddenly in the late 1970s. All began to develop in
the early 1970s, and thus overlapped with the societal regime. The societal and efficiency
regulatory regimes overlapped because of their disparate origins. Like its predecessors,
the societal regime resulted from mass political mobilization. It was a regime supported
by a majority political coalition, by public opinion. The efficiency regime has its origins in
elite politics and finds expression in administrative politics and the mobilization of
distinctly minority corporate interests.
While the early 1970s were dominated by more populist citizen and consumer
advocacy groups, it was only a matter of time before corporations, and Major League
Baseball, began marshaling their superior resources in an effort to regain advantage in the
new political environment. By 1980, almost three quarters of the active lobbyists in
Washington, DC represented corporations or trade associations. Big business exploited
the institutional reforms of the societal regime to recapture the reigns of regulatory power,
despite the absence of pro-business sentiment in the electorate.
246 What Thomas Edsall
calls the "politicization of the business community" was undertaken in the face of a
reform-minded Democratic Congress with strong ties to the consumer and environmental
movements.
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In many ways Major League Baseball was ahead of the learning curve in
246 Of particular importance to corporate lobbyists were the reforms in rule-making
procedures which guaranteed access and input for interested private parties. With their
superior resources such lobbyists are able to exert disproportionate influence on the
regulatory process using the very reforms intended to end such advantages.
247 EdsalL Thomas Byrne, The New Politics of Inequality , (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1984), p. 107.
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this strategy. Major League Baseball's organized lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C. go
back to the 1950s.
Large corporations and trade associations used vast armies of professional
lobbyists to influence both legislative and administrative policy making. Taking advantage
of the 1974 campaign finance reforms, which increased the importance of so-called
political action committees (PACs), as well as a 1975 Federal Election Commission (FEC)
decision allowing corporations to use corporate funds to create and administer PACs,
corporations and trade association lobbyists in the mid-1970s and 1980s dramatically
increased their financial support for conservative policies and candidates.248 The intricacy
and complexity of regulatory policy together with the power of corporate money in
elections enabled corporate interests to influence even Democratic Members of Congress.
Corporate interests also sought to "redefine the terms of the policy debate over
state-economy relations" by spending huge amounts of money on corporate advertising
and the funding of new conservative "think tanks."
249
The former was designed to soften
the anti-business sentiment of the public at large, while the latter was designed to press the
fight among the nation's intelligencia.
Corporate advertising failed to create a discernible shift in public opinion in the
1970s, but may have contributed to the wave of conservative values in the 1980s. The
effort to influence the scholarly debate, however, met with significant success. The list of
conservative "think tanks" created in the 1970s and 1980s includes, among others, the
Heritage Foundation; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; the National
248 Eisner, p. 176.
249 Eisner, p. 175.
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Bureau of Economic Research; the Center for the Study of American Business; and the
American Council for Capital Formation.250
These conservative think tanks largely succeeded in changing the terms of the
debate from the appropriate level of government intervention in the economy to whether
such intervention was appropriate at all. The virtual consensus on the propriety of
government regulation of the economy that had animated the associationalist and societal
regimes was fractured by the 1980s. The policy debate was transformed into a battle of
laissez-faire advocates versus interventionists, devotees of the Chicago school's "new
learning" versus defenders of the traditional structure/ conduct/ performance paradigm,
neo-conservatives versus neo-liberals. 251 Major League Baseball exploited the increasing
influence of the Chicago school's view of antitrust policy. Lobbyists for Major League
Baseball consciously adopted the economic argument against antitrust policy, adding it to
their rhetorical arsenal in their fight to preserve baseball's unregulated monopoly. 252
The change in the terms of the debate over state-economy relations combined with
the regulatory reform and deregulatory initiatives of presidents of both parties constitutes
what Eisner calls the "triumph of economics."
253 By the 1980s, the economic costs of
regulation was a prominent feature of the regulatory decision making process. The
Reagan administration, claiming a mandate for the drastic reduction of the size and role of
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Edsall, p. 117.
251 Adams, Walter and James W. Brock, Antitrust Economics on Trial: A Dialogue on the
New Laissez-Faire . (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. XI.
252 Major League Baseball's Director of Government Relations acknowledged in an
interview with the author that baseball's lawyers and lobbyists, beginning in the 1980s,
consciously adopted the economic arguments which condemn antitrust policy as
counterproductive. Interview with Gene Callahan, conducted on 8 January 1997.
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government, marshaled all of its resources and power to give effect to its conservative,
laissez-faire economic ideology, which constituted an all out assault on the Keynesian
consensus that characterized the previous fifty years of American economic policy. 254
One of the cornerstones oftwentieth century American economic policy has been
antitrust law. As discussed in chapter one, antitrust policy became a principle means of
regulating the industrial economy because it was compatible with both the liberal tradition
of limited government intervention and the developing institutional capacities of the state.
Falling short of the direct regulation envisioned by the New Nationalists of the Progressive
Era, antitrust policy, cast as law enforcement, was a means of regulating an expansive
industrial economy without abandoning the limited government traditions of America's
founders. Antitrust policy was seen by its creators and proponents as a way to preserve
the fairness of the pre-industrial free market, as a means of protecting the individual
property rights and economic opportunities of Americans that the industrial economy
might endanger.
The Reagan administration's assault on established economic policy, animated by
the economic ideology of the so-called "Chicago School," included a virtual one hundred
and eighty degree turn in antitrust policy.
255
Chicagoans believe in the superior efficiency
253
Eisner, Marc Allen, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics , (Chapel Hill: University
ofNorth Carolina Press, 1991).
254 This term refers to the general consensus on economic policy that grew out of efforts to
stabilize the economy after the Great Depression. Keynesian economics encompassed all
attempts of the state to manage the economy through macroeconomic policy.
255 The Chicago school refers to a very conservative, laissez-faire view of state-economy
relations. Free markets are understood to be self-regulating and efficiency producing.
This school of thought has been vigorously advocated by scholars from the University of
Chicago since the 1950s. Adherents to this philosophy are considered devotes of the
Chicago school whether or not they are directly associated with the University of Chicago.
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of the market as well as the superiority of self regulating market forces. They condemn
state regulation of markets as wasteful and corrupt. Their view of antitrust law effectively
condemns the economic policies of the United States for the last half century. The Reagan
administration's influence, both institutional and political, as well as the ascendance of the
Chicago school's view of antitrust policy, created an environment in which legislative
assaults on baseball's private self government were very difficult.
One of its widely recognized adherents, Judge Robert Bork, identifies the two
primary characteristics of the Chicago school's view of antitrust policy. First is the belief
that the singular and exclusive goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare. The
second requires the application of rigorous economic analysis to justify antitrust policy.
For an application of antitrust law to be legitimate, it must produce greater economic
benefits than costs to consumers. The pursuit ofmaximum consumer welfare via rigorous
cost/benefit analysis translates into the preservation ofmaximum business efficiency,
which in turn allows for lower prices to consumers. 56
Wider definitions of consumer welfare as well as the goals of preserving small
businesses and a decentralized economy are considered by mainstream scholars to be
among the primary goals of the antitrust statutes.
257
The Chicagoans, however, reject the
Conservative economist Milton Friedman is often seen as the father of this school of
thought.
256 Bork, Robert, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, (New York: Maxwell
MacMillian International Publishing, 1993), p. xi.
257 The traditional, and still dominant, scholarly view of antitrust adheres to monopoly
power theory. This is the view that sees antitrust as means of preserving free and fair
competition in the industrial market. The social and political assumptions of antitrust are
spelled out well in Estes Kafauver's, In a Few hands: Monopoly Power in America, (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1965.), and Earl Latham's, Political Theory of Monopoly Power,
(CoUege Park: University of Maryland Press, 1957). The economic theory of antitrust is
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possibility of political or social goals for antitrust policy. They claim that the legislative
history of antitrust supports their conclusion that business efficiency, in pursuit of
maximum consumer welfare, is the singular goal of antitrust policy.258
In baseball, the 1970s and 1980s saw the achievement of virtual equilibrium in the
struggle between labor and management. These decades also saw the achievement of near
parity in the public policy debate over state-economy relations between advocates of
laissez-faire economics of the Chicago school and proponents of the more interventionist
philosophy that had dominated regulatory politics since at least the 1930s. The advances
made by the players to elevate themselves from virtual peonage ran their course and,
although the central pillar of baseball law which concerned the players had been drastically
reformed, the owners' private self government continued. The ideology of the efficiency
regime may not have achieved a coherent consensus in the electorate, but the landslide
victory of Ronald Reagan preserved and strengthened the institutional weapons in the war
against antitrust enforcement. The so-called Reagan Revolution also created at least the
appearance of an electoral mandate sufficient to chasten antitrust advocates in Congress.
Congressional interest in antitrust policy and professional sports in the 1980s
reflected the conservative values of the day. In 1982, the Congress considered several
bills to exempt professional sports leagues from exposure to antitrust law with regard to
franchise relocation decisions. As the Oakland Raiders were entangled in litigation that
explained in Thomas Karier's, Bevond Competition: The Economics of Mergers and
Monopoly Power, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993); and Hans Thorelli's, The
Federal Antitrust Policy : Origination of an American Tradition, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1954).
258 This interpretation of the legislative history of antitrust is one of the main themes in
Judge Bork's work.
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would eventually result in the courts striking down the ability of sports leagues (other than
baseball) to regulate individual owners' ability to relocate their teams, the Congress was
considering alterations to antitrust law that would extend part of baseball's immunity to
other sports.
259
Congressional support for exempting the ability of sports leagues to
regulate franchise relocation from antitrust law was bipartisan, reflecting the changing
attitudes about antitrust among policy elites.
Although the 1982 legislation died in committee, owing partly to the highly vocal
opposition of the NFL players association, and the forceful opposition in the Senate lead
by Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), the issue re-emerged in 1985 following the
midnight escape of the Colts NFL franchise from Baltimore. Once again, both the House
and the Senate considered legislation to protect communities from franchise relocation's
by exempting the NFL from exposure to antitrust law with regard to league control over
franchise migration. The Senate considered three bills, while the House considered five
measures. None of these proposed measures included the repeal of baseball's antitrust
exemption; rather all sought to extend it partially to other sports in the interest of
stabilizing franchise locations.
260 As was the case in 1982, the effort to provide antitrust
immunity to the NFL was spearheaded in the Senate by Senators Arlen Specter (D-PA)
and Dennis Deconcini (R-NM). These Senators reintroduced bills which would exempt
NFL regulation of franchise migration from exposure to antitrust law. Spector and
259 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports Antitrust
Immunity. Hearings on S. 2784 and S. 2821 , (97
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Deconcini were spurred by the public outcry from communities such as Oakland, and
Baltimore, that had been the victims of relocated professional football franchises. Once
again the opposition to this effort was lead by Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who in a
Senate hearing in 1985 argued;
I say, let the leagues fight it out. Repeal the baseball
exemption; require the National and American Leagues to
really compete with each other. ... I don't kid myself. That
is not going to happen; that is not the road we are going to
go. I am not going to introduce any legislation, not because
I do not think that it should pass, but because I am a
realist.
26 '
Metzenbaum's comments reflected the ascendant influence of opposition to
antitrust policy in the 1980s. It was a time when attempts to repeal baseball's antitrust
immunity were "unrealistic" and ill advised in Congress. While the issue of baseball's
antitrust exemption was being debated on Capitol HilL the question was whether to extend
it to other sports not whether to repeal it. The proposals to extend antitrust immunity to
the other sports, with regard to franchise relocation decisions failed to get out of
committee in both the House and the Senate.
The preservation of baseball's anomaly in the 1980s was aided by a paradox in the
political environment. During the efficiency regime, Organized Baseball felt the wrath of
disgruntled fans who were highly critical of its business practices, while at the same time it
benefited from the institutional and rhetorical protection of the dominant faction in the
elite public policy debate over state-economy relations. This contrasts sharply with the
260 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
Professional Sports Protection Act of 1985. Hearing , (99
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Cong., 1
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261 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports Antitrust
Immunity. Hearings , (99
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155
previous three regulatory regimes in which Organized Baseball capitalized upon its strong
support among the American people, the fans, to fend off the imperatives of the dominant
regulatory philosophy of government. With the rise of the Chicago school's view of
antitrust policy in the 1980s, Major League Baseball's private self government looked at
times more like a harbinger of industrial policy to come than a threatened regulatory
anomaly.
156
CHAPTER IV
THE BASEBALL ANOMALY IN THE 1990s
Baseball's unregulated monopoly entered the 1990s without much pressure from
Congress, despite continued conflict with both the players union and the minor leagues.
Legislative proposals designed to repeal baseball's exemption from antitrust laws, which
routinely accompanied labor disputes between the owners and the players, had since the
late 1970s been overshadowed by the issues of cable television broadcasting and franchise
migration in all professional sports.
262
Work stoppages in baseball in 1981, 1985, and 1990 were greeted by legislative
proposals to repeal baseball's exemption; however, none was given more than cursory
consideration. The anti-government atmosphere in the nation was redounding to the
benefit of Major League Baseball's efforts to retain its unregulated monopoly. In
February 1990, a Gallup poll asked, "If there is a strike, whose side do you favor, the
owners or the players?" Fifty-seven percent responded that they would favor the owners,
while only 22% would favor the players. 263 Another poll, conducted in April 1990, found
that 70% of people polled felt that baseball players were overpaid, more overpaid than any
other major sport. 264
262 Only a handful of bills were proposed in the 1980s which would have repealed
baseball's antitrust immunity. None of these was ever given serious consideration.
263 Hueber, Graham, "Majority Expects Baseball Strike and Would Side with Owners,"
The Gallup Poll Monthly (February, 1990), p. 37
264 Newport, Frank and Linda DeStefano, "Football Top Sport Among Fans; Basketball
Gains Support," The Gallup Poll Monthly (April, 1990), p. 19.
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In 1994, however, Major League Baseball suffered its longest and most costly
player strike in its history. The strike canceled the playoffs and World Series for the first
time since 1904 and resulted in the cancellation of the early weeks of the 1995 season. On
Capitol Hill, calls for the repeal of baseball's exemption were given more serious
consideration than ever before. In the previous seventy years no bills affecting baseball's
exemption had ever been voted out of committee in Congress. During the 1994-95 strike
two such bills were favorably reported out of committee. As the strike wore on, public
sympathies for the owners softened. In March 1995, a Gallup poll found Americans
almost evenly split on retaining the exemption, and support for the owners overall had
declined significantly.
265
Gradually the public came to see both sides as culpable.
Though play resumed in 1995, the final resolution of the labor dispute that led to
the 1994 strike did not come until the winter of 1996, when the owners and players finally
signed a new labor agreement that will take baseball into the next century without further
strikes.
266
Included in the agreement was a deal between the owners and players to seek
congressional repeal of certain portions of the game's antitrust exemption. The impact of
this on the baseball anomaly, if Congress acts, remains uncertain, but the limited nature of
the agreement indicates that its effects on baseball's unregulated monopoly might be
minimal.
265 Moore, David, "Most Fans Support Replacement Players," The Gallup Poll Monthly
(March, 1995), p. 39-48.
266 The strike actually ended on March 31, 1995, when the terms of the previous labor
agreement were reinstated by a court injunction. However, the new labor pact was not
agreed to until January, 1997.
158
Baseball and Antitrust Policy Re-Emerge in Congress
During the 1980s, the Congress addressed the issue of professional sports and
antitrust policy more broadly than it had before. The baseball anomaly was taken out of
the spot light. The hot topics in the 1980s were cable television deals with sports leagues
and franchise relocations. In the 1970s, the advancing technologies of television had
collided with professional sports. Network television revenues in all major professional
sports skyrocketed. The potential of paid television, such as cable and pay-per-view, was
becoming more and more clear to the owners of professional sports teams. In the 1980s
this profit potential produced political outrage. Members of Congress, for example, cried
foul when the NFL signed a television contract with the paid TV sports channel ESPN.
Many Members of Congress felt that the proliferation of such deals would result in the
inaccessibility of professional sports to those without the means to purchase paid
television. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), a vigorous antitrust advocate, foe of
the baseball exemption, and then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies, and Business Rights, opened a hearing on the signing of the NFL-ESPN
contract saying:
We know that the NFL-ESPN contract will put $153
million in the pockets of the club owners. The question I
have here today is: Will that contract increase viewership, or
will it instead limit the number of games available for
viewing by those who cannot afford to subscribe to ESPN?
Will it be in the interest of the viewing public, or is it the
first step in an effort to reduce competition and make the
public pay more?
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Senator Metzenbaum' s comments captured the feelings of many in Congress, and
also provided insight into the nexus between TV, antitrust, and professional sports. The
importance of television in the maintenance of the baseball anomaly, as noted in the last
chapter, was cemented in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 . which exempted pooled
television contracts by professional sports leagues. The effect of this legislation on
baseball was to defuse contentions that television made baseball unquestionably a matter
of interstate commerce and therefore subject to antitrust law. In the 1980s, with the
explosion of paid TV contracts such as the NFL-ESPN contract, Senator Metzenbaum
and other antitrust advocates in Congress saw their opportunity to attack antitrust
immunity in professional sports. A frontal assault on baseball's exemption was impossible
in the political environment of the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the issue of sports
broadcasting on cable television, to the exclusion of free television, gained political
salience on Capitol Hill. Metzenbaum and others in Congress used this issue to get at the
question of antitrust immunity in professional sports more broadly.
At issue was whether the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 covered television
contracts with paid television providers. The Act states that the exemption is for
"sponsored telecasting" of sporting events. The question was whether cable TV is
sponsored telecasting. Both the Justice Department's Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission, in opinions provided to the Congress, stated their belief that the 1961
Act does not cover cable television deals. Both agencies, however, also found that
existing league cable contracts did not warrant action by them. The agencies opinions
gave force to the threat of congressional action on the issue of cable television deals if the
leagues crossed the line. While no legislation came out of congressional hearings
into this
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issue in 1987, many in Congress hoped that the potential for such legislation would
chasten the professional sports leagues in their dealings with paid television.
By 1989, sports league contracts with paid television had proliferated to the
degree that Congress once again saw fit to scare the professional sports leagues. The
Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings in the fall of 1989 to discuss the possibility of
explicitly subjecting sports broadcasting deals with paid television providers to the
antitrust laws. Senator Metzenbaum set the tone in his opening statement of the 1989
hearings. After chronicling the exodus of major sporting events from network TV to paid
TV, the Senator said:
Let me make one thing clear. As long as this Senator is
around, that won't happen [i.e. sports not being accessible
on free TV]. Congress has some leverage here, given the
favorable antitrust treatment granted to sports leagues. We
will use that leverage if need be, and I want to emphasize
that. We are prepared to go back and reexamine the
antitrust laws with respect to both football and baseball, if
268
necessary.
Metzenbaum' s harsh warnings were not new. This was the type of threat that
Major League Baseball had been hearing for forty years. Once again, no legislation was
produced by these hearings, but the legislators made their point. The issue of cable
television contracts with professional sports leagues constitutes the only area where the
Congress considered applying antitrust law to professional sports in the 1980s. The
political atmosphere was simply too poisoned against government regulation for antitrust
advocates in Congress to succeed in applying antitrust law to baseball or any other sport.
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The issue of franchise migration, activated by the National Football League's
Oakland Raiders move to Los Angeles and the Colts midnight ride out of Baltimore, also
produced continued concern in Congress. The difference, however, was that on this issue
Congress considered granting antitrust immunity, not revoking it. In 1982 and again in
1985, the Congress gave considerable scrutiny, in the form of extensive hearings, to
proposals to exempt from antitrust coverage professional sports league rules that limit a
team's ability to relocate at will. In each session of Congress in the 1980s, bills were
proposed to extend such an exemption to professional football, basketball and hockey.269
The 1990s have seen a continuation of this trend. The moves of the Cleveland
Browns and others have kept the heat on for legislation to curb the destructive effects of
franchise relocations on communities. The franchise relocation problems in football have
provided ammunition to Major League Baseball in its defense of the exemption. In
addition, the fate of the minor leagues if the exemption is lifted has become a growing
concern in the 1990s, and this has redounded to the benefit ofMajor League Baseball's
defense of the exemption.
Just one month after Bill Clinton's 1992 presidential election, Congress once more
began an investigation of baseball's continued exemption from antitrust law. While bills to
repeal the exemption had accompanied every work stoppage in baseball since 1981,
including the 1990 lockout of spring training, no serious consideration, such as
Congressional hearings, had been given to repealing baseball's exemption. Sensing the
268 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
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possibility of a shift in political winds with the election of a Democratic President, the
Senate Judiciary Committee, under Senator Metzenbaum, held hearings in December
1992. This was the first time since the 1976 Select Committee on Professional Sports that
Congressional hearings addressed the specific issue of baseball's antitrust exemption. 270
One of the key witnesses at these 1992 hearings was former Baseball
Commissioner Fay Vincent. Vincent had recently been forced out of baseball. His
departure from the game was due to his involvement in the settlement of the 1990 labor
dispute that followed an owners lockout of the players during spring training. The
owners, stung by the recent settlement of the collusion cases which cost them $280
million, were determined to bring revenue-sharing and a salary cap to baseball and used a
spring training lock-out to force the issue. The owners claimed that they were losing
money every year, while the union countered that the owners had cooked the books.271
The players refusal to consider the cap resulted in the lockout, which delayed the opening
of spring training. Commissioner Vincent then stepped into the negotiations and
eventually took the salary cap and revenue-sharing off the table, which resulted in a deal
with the players.
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Although they endorsed the deal at the time, it was widely reported that Allan
"Bud" Selig, owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, and Jerry Reinsdorf, owner of the Chicago
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272 Staudohar, Paul D., "Baseball Labor Relations: The Lockout of 1990," Monthly
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White Sox, were unhappy with Vincent. Over the next two years Selig and Reinsdorf
quietly convinced other club owners that Vincent was too pro-player, not capable of
representing the owners' interests in labor negotiations. Selig was quoted as saying,
"There is no doubt in my mind that the commissioner and his entire office should never
again participate in labor negotiations or even labor-related matters."273 In May 1992,
Selig and Reinsdorf asked Vincent to agree to remove himself from labor matters.
Vincent's refusal allowed Selig and Reinsdorf to turn sixteen other owners against
Vincent, who finally resigned under pressure in September 1992. The owners then chose
Milwaukee owner, Bud Selig, to be acting commissioner until a replacement for Vincent
could be found.
As Senator Metzenbaum opened the December 1 992 hearings, baseball was
without a commissioner and the owners were restructuring the office of commissioner.
Convinced that a strong, independent commissioner is the key to preserving public
confidence in baseball, and hoping that the election of President Clinton signaled a political
shift in the country, Senator Metzenbaum called the hearings in order to pressure Major
League Baseball into hiring a strong, independent commissioner. The traditional
justification for the exemption offered by Major League Baseball had always been that a
strong independent commissioner provided effective regulation of the game in the public
interest and therefore government regulation was unnecessary. The firing of Fay Vincent
severely weakened this argument.
At the 1992 Senate hearing Fay Vincent testified that the exemption "is not
essential either to the economic health or the legal integrity of the game." He also said
273 Chass, Murray, "Diamond Business," Athlon Baseball (1995), p. 76.
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that, "if the owners of baseball continue on their stated course of making baseball into
their business, and at the same time insist that the commissioner is their CEO to be fired at
will, I would no longer support the preservation of the exemption."274 Despite these
comments, Vincent stressed that the one utility of the exemption is the ability of Major
League Baseball to control franchise migration.
Although Senator Metzenbaum made continued efforts to focus the hearing on the
issue of a strong and independent commissioner, senator after senator shifted the focus to
the franchise migration issue and defense of the exemption in this regard. The controversy
over the proposed relocation of the San Francisco Giants to St. Petersburg was fresh on
the minds of many senators. Senators Hank Brown (D-CO), Arlen Specter (R-PA), Diane
Feinstein (D-CA), Paul Simon (D-IL) and even Senator-elect Barbara Boxer (D-CA) all
expressed concerns about franchise migration. Each emphasized that changes to
baseball's exemption must not jeopardize a league's ability to control franchise migration.
Franchise migration and even cable television deals were resonating with the public, but no
significant public support existed for lifting baseball's antitrust exemption. It was not until
the 1994 strike that Senator Metzenbaum was able to begin to sway a significant number
of his colleagues on the issue of the exemption.
The 1992 hearing produced no legislation. It did, however, lay out the various
positions on the exemption issue. Those who favor repeal of baseball's exemption make
one or all of the following arguments. First, the exemption underwrites the artificial
scarcity of franchises by allowing baseball owners to control entry into the industry, both
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in terms of expansion and inter-league competition. In addition, the owners ability to
maintain artificial values for their franchises gives them greater leverage with their local
communities with which to extract lucrative and exploitative publicly-financed stadium
deals. Second, The exemption provides owners with an unfair advantage in labor
negotiations, especially if the commissioner is nothing more than the owners
representative. Because baseball players do not have recourse to the courts, baseball's
labor disputes have resulted in more work stoppages than in all the other major
professional sports combined. These arguments have been advanced by the players union,
as well as by Members of Congress, academics, and local officials concerned with the
escalating costs born by local communities of keeping or obtaining professional baseball
franchises.
Those who oppose the repeal of the exemption do so for one or all of the
following reasons. The repeal of the exemption would result in destructive franchise
relocations, an argument that is supported by pointing to football's recent and widespread
troubles with franchise migration. Had the NFL been immune from antitrust law, Al Davis
would not have prevailed in court and thus the string of franchise relocations in football in
the 1980s and 1990s would never have occurred. Others point to the destructive effects
repeal would have on the minor leagues. Without the exemption big league clubs would
not be able to reserve minor leaguers in the manner they currently do. This would have
the effect of reducing the incentive of big league clubs to subsidize the minors. Without
the ability to hold players for at least the six years from the date of initial signing, as minor
leaguers are now reserved, the majors would not be willing to spend as much on player
2d Sess.,1992), p. 4-5.
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development. Without subsidies from major league clubs, many minor leagues might fold,
unable to sustain profitable enterprises in small town, small market, areas. Another
argument against repeal stresses its irrelevance to labor relations in baseball, which are
covered by the nation's labor laws. Arguments for retaining the exemption are routinely
accompanied by predictions of excessive and frivolous litigation that would be ever more
injurious to the national pastime.
Opponents of the exemption's repeal have found that their predictions ofdoom for
the minor leagues and of chaos from franchise relocation are the most potent arguments
for the exemption. The minor leagues argument has been particularly successful on
Capitol Hill, where around 125 Members have minor league teams in their districts, a large
enough number to warrant the creation of the Minor League Caucus in the House of
Representatives in 1993. Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), whose district includes
Cooperstown and baseball's Hall of Fame, organized the Caucus in cooperation with the
National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues. 275 The primary purpose of the
caucus was and is the promotion of the interests of minor league baseball and, although
Rep. Boehlert denies it, this means opposing the repeal of the antitrust exemption.
In a letter to his congressional colleagues inviting them to join the caucus, Rep.
Boehlert chronicles the recent threat to the minor leagues by noting that, "Congress may
consider repealing baseball's antitrust exemption, a move that could have serious
consequences for the minors." Boehlert implies that the exemption's repeal could put the
minor leagues in "real trouble." Despite a disclaimer in the letter assuring Members that
275 Boehlert's upper-state New York district includes three minor league teams as well as
the Baseball Hall of Fame.
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involvement in the caucus "doesn't commit you to a particular stand on the antitrust
exemption issue" the message was clear.276 Of the 162 Members of Congress who
belonged to the caucus in 1996, none has publicly supported the repeal of baseball's
exemption. The caucus is clearly a vehicle for organizing opposition to repeal of the
exemption.
The creation of the Minor League Caucus came in the wake of House hearings
into baseball's exemption held in March 1993. While the 1992 Senate hearing had
exposed all the various arguments for and against the exemption, the 1993 House hearings
brought the question of the minor leagues into greater focus. The witness list was largely
the same as the Senate hearing in 1992. Much of the testimony was also the same. One
difference, however, was the presence oftestimony from a representative of the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues (NAPBL), the governing association of the
minor leagues. In the 1 992 hearing the only minor league representation was a former
minor league player named Roric Harrison who testified that the antitrust exemption kept
him from catching on with an expansion team and kept him stuck in the minors at the
pinnacle of his career.
277 NAPBL Vice President, Stanley Brand represented the minors at
the 1993 House hearing, arguing that repeal of the exemption would crush the minors.
While the NAPBL has always assisted Major League Baseball in the defense of its
exemption, that assistance expanded considerably in the 1990s. The NAPBL became a
more sophisticated lobbying organization. Before 1991, the Association had a small staff,
276 The quotations come from a "Dear Colleague" letter to Members of the House dated
Feb. 1, 1995.
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a limited conception of its role and was not a very professional operation.278 Operating
from their offices in Florida, they played only a minor and inconsistent role in baseball's
lobbying effort in Washington. 279 In fact, in 1990, several minor league owners took it
upon themselves to come to Capitol Hill during their very tense negotiations with Major
League Baseball over the Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA) which governs relations
between the majors and minors, and in that instance they actually lobbied against the
exemption.
Major League Baseball had decided that it needed to cut expenses. Having just
lost $280 million in the resolution of the collusion cases, they wanted to cut corners and
the minors seemed like a good place to start. Lower subsidies to their minor league clubs
would help cushion the blow of the collusion payments. But, after minor league owners
met with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), he began calling for immediate hearings into the
matter. Under pressure of threatened congressional hearings and amidst a barrage of
invectives in the press from minor league owners, an agreement between the majors and
minors was reached.
280
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hastening of a settlement, it is important to note that both sides were moving toward a
sensible deal independently of the political pressure.
In 1991, Stanley Brand, newly elected Vice President of the NAPBL and former
General Counsel to the House of Representatives, began from his Washington, DC law
office what has been a steady and sophisticated campaign in support of baseball's
* 28
1
exemption. Brand's entrance on to the scene evinces a recognition of the importance of
the minors in protecting the exemption in the 1990s, and the desire ofMajor League
Baseball not to have to worry about minor league owners causing trouble on Capitol Hill.
In January, 1993, Major League Baseball created the post of Director of
Government Relations, headquartered in the Washington DC offices of the powerful and
politically connected law firm, Baker and Hostetler, which has represented the American
League since the 1 920s. This made baseball the only professional sport with a full time
office in Washington. The first incumbent of this newly created office was Eugene
Callahan, a Washington insider who had spent ten years as an aid to Senator Allan Dixon
(D-IL). Callahan, who had close personal relationships with numerous key legislators,
was a well known and respected figure on Capitol Hill until his retirement in early 1997.
Callahan's experience in the Senate complimented Brand's experience in the House.
Together Brand, Callahan and the Congressional Minor League Caucus have
maintained steady pressure on Members of Congress since 1993, keeping the negative
consequences for minor league baseball from the repeal of the exemption on the front
entitled "Baseball's Antitrust Exemption - A Resource Book," (1992). p. 22-23; Madden,
Bill, "Baseball; Grass Roots Chaos," The Sporting News (Dec. 3, 1990), p. 44.
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burner. Numerous "educational" opportunities for Members of Congress are routinely
sponsored by the NAPBL, when minor and major league owners are brought to Capitol
Hill for "courtesy calls" on legislators. The Minor League Caucus and NAPBL also co-
sponsor social events several times a year where minor league owners can spend time with
legislators.
282
Increased sophistication and coordination of baseball's lobbying effort in
Washington has become more important in the 1990s because, while the public continues
to side with the owners more often than not, they also continue to register their growing
disgust with the business of professional sports. As recently as the 1970s, baseball seemed
able to exploit the cultural significance of the "national pastime" in their efforts to preserve
the exemption, but that significance had eroded significantly by the 1990s and, with it, the
strategy. Public opinion polls in the 1990s reveal that Americans now identify football as
America's game as often or more often than baseball. 283 This volatility in public sentiment
increased the need for vigilance in baseball's courtship of Congress.
The creation of an official Major League Baseball lobbyist position in Washington,
as well as the existence of a Washington based minor league lobbyist, both unprecedented,
illustrates this increased vigilance. Prior to the 1990s baseball had no such permanent
lobbying presence in Washington. In the 1990s, the tag team of Stan Brand and Gene
Callahan has worked tirelessly and well to preserve baseball's antitrust exemption. The
281
It is noteworthy that Brand was not affiliated with the NAPBL in 1990 when several
minor league owners challenged the exemption. Of that effort Brand simply says that they
were a small number of recalcitrant owners acting without NAPBL approval.
282 Interview with Stanley Brand, Vice President, National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues, 8 January 1997.
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creation of the Congressional Minor League Caucus is also an example of the increased
sophistication and professionalism in lobbying that Major League Baseball has deemed
necessary for the protection of its antitrust exemption in the unstable political environment
of the 1990s.284
The owners' increased fire power on Capitol Hill was also made necessary by their
hard line approach to labor relations in the 1990s. In December 1992, the owners,
meeting in Louisville, Kentucky, voted 15-13 to re-open the part of the collective-
bargaining agreement dealing with the game's economic system In addition to reopening
the sections on free agency, salary arbitration and the minimum salary, the owners passed
a resolution requiring the assent of three-quarters of the owners to initiate a lockout.
Armed with data from a recently released report by the Major League Baseball Economic
Study Committee, which predicted economic hard times for baseball, the owners began
planning for the 1994 labor negotiations.285 By 1993, the owners had agreed among
themselves on a revenue-sharing plan that would require the imposition of a salary cap on
the players. During this same time period the owners were claiming poverty on Capitol
Hill. In the 1992-93 hearings, representatives of Major League Baseball defended their
283Gallup, George Jr. and Frank Newport, "Football Remains America's Number One
Spectator Sport," The Gallup Poll Monthly (October, 1992), p. 36-38.
284Interview with Eugene Callahan, MLB Director of Government Relations, 9 January
1997. Mr. Callahan retired from this position February 1, 1997. As of this writing no
replacement has been named.
285 The Economic Study Committee was commissioned during the 1990 collective
bargaining process. In the labor agreement of 1990, the committee was created to
determine the actual financial heath of baseball, in order that the exaggerated claims of
both sides would be minimized in the next labor agreement negotiations. See also Baldo,
Anthony, et al., "Secrets of the Front Office: What America's Pro Teams are Worth,"
Financial World (July 9, 1991), p. 28-43.
172
restructuring of the commissioner's office - the appointment ofBud Selig as acting
commissioner -- as a necessary step to save the game from financial ruin.
The economic study committee report, which the owners used to justify the re-
opening of the collective-bargaining agreement, was not the propaganda document the
owners had hoped it would be. Although the whole committee did conclude that baseball
faced many serious economic problems, one member of the committee attached a
supplemental statement to the report in which he strongly condemned the broad
conclusions of the report. Independent committee member Henry J. Aaron, of the
Brookings Institution, did not agree that baseball had any significant economic troubles.
He wrote:
Through the 9,000 words of text, however, the majority
report leads readers up one blind alley and down another,
suggesting that an industry whose companies are valued in
the market at prices as high as, or higher than, ever before is
on the brink of some vague sort of economic trouble286
Aaron's statement went on to say that baseball's problems were political, not
economic, caused by the game's lack of a strong, independent governing structure.
Instead of a powerful, objective piece of evidence supporting the owners, the report
produced a powerful piece of evidence for the players union. The report's majority
conclusions were drowned out by Mr. Aaron's statement, which would be liberally
referred to by the players union representatives on Capitol Hill.
The owners cries of pending economic collapse were given some support by
continuing disclosures from CBS and ESPN on their revenues from baseball broadcasts.
286 Statement of Henry J. Aaron, attached to the Major League Baseball Economic Study
Committee Report issued December 3, 1992, p. 10.
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From 1990 through 1993, the television networks made public their large losses and
indicated that, when broadcast contracts with baseball were reviewed in 1994, they would
not be willing to pay nearly as much.287 Going into the 1994 player negotiations, the
owners pushed their revenue-sharing and salary cap plans, earlier versions of which had
been rejected by the players in 1990. They argued that changes were needed to make up
for the huge losses they claimed for the last several years as a result of escalating player
salaries and because of additional losses expected from decreases in television revenue.
On January 18, 1994, the owners, meeting in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, adopted a
revenue-sharing plan that would distribute $58 million to low-revenue teams.
Implementation of the plan required the imposition of a player salary cap. The cap,
however, would not be proposed to the players until June, six months later. By March
1994, a year and a half after forcing Fay Vincent from office, the owners had still not hired
a new commissioner. Incensed by the owners failure to find a new commissioner, as well
as by the structural changes made in the powers of the commissioner's office, Senator
Metzenbaum scheduled a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing for St. Petersburg, Florida,
on March 21, 1994, to coincide with Major League Baseball's spring training.
Metzenbaum opened the hearing saying:
Today's hearing will focus on major league baseball's
decision not to name a new commissioner and to destroy-
and I use the word destroy advisedly-to destroy the
commissioner's power to police the business of major
league baseball. By reason of the new restrictions on the
commissioner, the commissioner doesn't become much
more than a "lackey", working for baseball, rather than the
287 Many commentators argue that the networks claims of huge losses are nothing
mo
than posturing designed to illicit more favorable deals in the future.
See, Zimbalist, p.
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independent commissioner that we have known over the
years.
288
The effort to repeal baseball's exemption was clearly picking up steam. The St.
Petersburg hearing, which was considering a bill introduced by Senator Metzenbaum to
repeal the exemption, brought attention, not only to the need for a commissioner, but also
to baseball's slow expansion schedule and its failure to allow the relocation of the San
Francisco Giants to St. Petersburg. This had led Florida Senators Connie Mack and Bob
Graham of Florida to become advocates of the exemption's repeal. Throughout the
summer and fall of 1994, Major League Baseball employed several public relations
strategies to divert pressures. Periodically, they leaked names of possible replacements for
Vincent, including the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate, Democrat George Mitchell of
Maine. They also used the veiled promise of expansion. Senator Connie Mack (R-FL)
reported to a Florida newspaper that baseball owners had issued "veiled threats" to him
that Florida would not get an expansion team unless he backed off the exemption issue. 289
In the months before the March hearing baseball formed an expansion committee to look
into expansion sites. It seemed no coincidence that Florida topped the list.
The 1994 Player Strike
The 1994 season opened in April amid threats of work stoppages. On June 14, the
owners finally proposed the salary cap to the players. Their plan would split revenue 50-50
288 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies, and Business Rights, Professional Baseball Teams and the Antitrust Laws,
Hearings, (103d Cong., 2d Sess.,1994), p. 1.
289Dahl, David. "Baseball Owners Dealt Blow By Panel," St. Petersburg Times
(September 30, 1994), p. 1C.
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between owners and players in exchange for payroll limitations. The owners also
proposed eliminating arbitration in exchange for lowering free agent eligibility from six to
four years of service, with the provision that a player's former team could match any offer
through the player's sixth year of service. On July 18, the players publicly rejected the cap
proposal and countered with proposals to lower the tenure requirement for arbitration to
two years, eliminate restrictions on repeat free agency, and raise the minimum salary.
With the back and forth maneuverings of the players and owners being widely
reported in the press, the Small Business Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
began to inquire into the business of minor league baseball. The House hearing, held July
20, 1994, was to investigate the possible negative effects that the repeal of baseball's
antitrust exemption would have for the minor leagues. That such a hearing was held was a
victory for Major League Baseball, because the uncertainty around the impact of the
exemption's repeal on the minor leagues has in the 1990s become the most important
political weapon in Major League Baseball's arsenal.
The network of minor league teams across the country has since 1993 made
unprecedented efforts in support of baseball's antitrust immunity. While it is true that
baseball has long enjoyed a lobbying advantage in Congress due to its vertically integrated
governance structure, which makes all of the 170 minor league owners and local officials
de facto baseball lobbyists, the game had never utilized this advantage in such a
coordinated and professional way.
290
In the past, the minor league advantage remained in
290 Discussion of basebaU's lobbying advantage resulting from its vertically integrated
governance structure can be found in Ellig, Jerome R., "Law, Economics, and Organized
Baseball: Analysis of a Cooperative Venture," (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Mason
University, 1987), p. 41-62.
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the background, while baseball justified its privileged legal status by citing the special
nature and cultural significance of America's national pastime. Baseball's owners were
able to exploit the cultural significance of the game, as well as the uncertainty of applying
antitrust laws to major league baseball. With the erosion of baseball's special cultural
significance and the rise of the players association, which dismantled the reserve clause,
much of what the exemption had arguably protected has been lost. This has left Major
League Baseball with only two significant arguments for its exemption: to prevent
franchise migration and protect the minor leagues.
At the House hearings in July 1994, several witnesses testified about the negative
effects of repealing the exemption. Stanley Brand gave what had by then become a well
worn speech. In feet, Brand, Selig, and all the other exemption defenders who had
testified in Congress since 1991 were literally reading from the same script. A document
entitled "Talking Points Regarding Baseball's Antitrust Exemption" had been distributed
to all ofMajor League Baseball's defenders, including several Members of Congress291
The document includes six sub-headings: franchise stability, preservation of the
minors, governance, labor relations, expansion, and the inappropriateness of applying the
antitrust laws to baseball. The script prompts baseball advocates to argue that, without
the exemption:
• the Oakland Raiders precedent would become the norm in baseball;
• the minor leagues would crumble without big league subsidies for player
development.
291 The author was provided with copies of these "Talking Points" by Stanley Brand
(NAPBL), Gene Callahan (MLB), and Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY).
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The script further prompts the reader to mention that:
• the commissioner search committee is "now actively working to identify a
strong leader of unquestioned integrity";
• the exemption is irrelevant to player relations because those relations are
governed by the labor laws, and the players union in baseball has gotten more
than any other players union at the bargaining table;
• baseball expansion is on a par with non-exempted sports because baseball has
the same number of teams as the NFL and more than the NBA and NHL; and,
antitrust laws are inappropriate because sports leagues are joint ventures, single
entities, whose internal rules and regulations are wholly appropriate.
Attention to the arguments of baseball's officials, lobbyists and congressional allies makes
clear that everybody is following the same script.
The transcript of the House minor league baseball hearing in July, 1994, chaired by
Rep. John Lafalce (D-NY), himself an active member of the Minor League Caucus,
revealed a decided bias on the part of the committee members. In an opening statement,
the chairman of the Minor League Caucus, New York Republican Representative
Sherwood Boehlert passionately defended baseball's exemption and drew praise from
many committee members ~ even a standing ovation from one member, California
Republican, Michael Huffington. The hearing appeared to be almost a public relations
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event staged by the Minor League Caucus.
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The House hearing illustrates well the institutional advantage of Major League
Baseball in defending its exemption from legislative repeal. While the Senate became
embroiled in the substantive policy debate on the exemption, the House remained firmly in
the grip of baseball's lobbyists, who because of the great number of minor league teams
maintain much greater leverage with members in the House. U.S. Representatives also
must face the voters every two years and run in districts rather than in statewide elections.
This enables local interests, including minor league teams and their local supporters, to
exert a greater influence in House elections than in Senate elections. This institutional
advantage is further illustrated by the fact that no Member of the House who has a minor
league team in his district has publicly opposed the exemption.
Meanwhile, on July 27, 1994, the owners rejected the players latest proposals and,
the next day, the executive committee of the players union voted unanimously to strike
beginning August 12. On August 1, 1994, the owners, not happy with the players
rejection of the salary cap, refused to make a scheduled payment of $7.8 million to the
players' pension plan. The owners failure to make the payment resulted in charges of
unfair labor practices being filed by the players with the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). On August 12, the strike began.
At the heart of the strike was the disagreement between the owners and players
about the financial health of Major League Baseball. The owners claimed that they were
losing money because player salaries were out of control due to free agency bidding wars.
The competitive balance on the field was also said to be jeopardized by the continued
escalation of these wars. Smaller market teams, the owners argued, were disadvantaged
because they could not attract huge television deals. The players responded that the
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owners were lying about revenue losses, that television revenues, among other things,
evinced huge profits in baseball, and that even the smaller market teams were profitable.
The players union argued that revenues were in fact rising at twice the rate of player
salaries.
The owners refused to open their books to public scrutiny and relied on the report
of their Economic Study Commission to make the case that the game's financial health
was threatened by escalating player salaries. The players, whose incomes are made public
by the union, countered the owners references to the Economic Study Committee report
with the supplemental statement of committee member Henry Aaron of the Brookings
Institution. The players augmented their rhetorical weaponry in August 1994, when a
study, commissioned by the Players Association, was released. Conducted by economist
Roger Noll, this study found that baseball was financially healthy and that poor
management, not declining viability of small market teams and decreased value ofTV
contracts, was to blame for its troubles.
293
Major League Baseball responded to the Noll
report with a statement that simply cited the counter conclusions of their Economic Study
Committee Report. It was a standoff between the experts on both sides.
294
As the players strike got under way in August 1994, opinion polls revealed the
precarious nature of baseball in the hearts and minds of Americans. A Gailup poll
conducted just days before the strike began revealed the danger of continued labor unrest
in baseball. The poll found Americans disgusted with the greed of the players and the
293 Noll, Roger, "Baseball Economics in the 1990s: A Report to the Major League
Baseball Players Association," (August, 1994).
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dishonesty of the owners. Two-thirds of those polled supported a cap on player salaries
and by 45 to 27% said that the term "greedy" applied more to players than to owners.
Halfof those surveyed felt that the players demands were "unreasonable," while only 29%
felt the owners demands were unreasonable. The owners, however, were not immune to
public disgust. The poll also found that half of the people surveyed felt that the players
were "honest," while only 16% thought the owners were. In addition, the poll found that
most Americans believed the players, not the owners, were "bargaining in good faith."
More alarming perhaps for baseball was what the poll said about Americans love of the
national pastime: Less than half of those surveyed indicated that they would miss baseball
at all during the strike. 295
Selective results of this poll, as well as internal polls regularly commissioned by
Major League Baseball, were publicly trumpeted by Organized Baseball as showing
support for the owners' position on baseball's exemption. Privately, Major League
Baseball was aware of the volatility of public opinion. 296 Just days before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, chaired by Democrat Jack
Brooks of Texas, opened hearings on baseball's antitrust exemption in September 1994,
Major League Baseball released the results of an internal poll that they would claim
indicated, among other things, public support for baseball's antitrust immunity.
294 A copy of a document entitled "Response Prepared By MLB to Roger Noll Analysis"
was provided to the author by the Congressional Research Service. The documents
author was not cited and it was undated.
295 McAneny, Leslie and Lydia Saad, "With Popularity On The Upswing, Baseball Strikes
Out," The Gallup Poll Monthly (August, 1994), p. 28-31.
296 Interview with Len Sanderson, Media Consultant with Eisner & Sanderson, 15 January
1997.
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The September 19 press release was entitled, "Baseball Fans Reject Government
Role in Players Strike." Conducted by the polling firm of Penn & Schoen, the poll found
that 80% of those surveyed saw no role for government in resolving the strike. When
asked if Congress should become more involved in the management of baseball, 89% of
the people polled said, "no." On the question of blame for the strike, 31% found the
players culpable, while only 19% blamed the owners. The poll also found strong support
for the owners proposed salary cap and revenue sharing plan. Conspicuously absent from
the poll's reported results was a direct question about the antitrust exemption.
Nevertheless, the poll would be marshaled by Major League Baseball in defending the
297
exemption.
When Chairman Jack Brooks opened the September 22, 1994, hearing into
baseball's antitrust exemption, the labor dispute between the players and owners was
being fought out in the press and the World Series had already been canceled. Brooks, a
longtime foe of baseball's antitrust immunity, began with a passionate statement about the
cultural significance of baseball in America. He spoke of the game's contributions in
helping the nation cope with hard times, and then declared that with ongoing strike "the
fabric of our national life was torn asunder." He went on to say that "the lords of the
game will have to reap their bitter harvest."
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Brooks' outrage illustrated the changing
297 The Penn & Schoen poll was conducted on September 13-14, 1994. The results were
included in a September 19, 1994, press release of Major League Baseball. The author
made repeated attempts to obtain this and other poll data directly from Penn & Schoen,
but access to the data was not provided.
298 U.S. Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and
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mood even in the House. Prior to the strike, baseball's exemption faced significant
challenges only in the Senate. The House had been tightly controlled by baseball lobbyists.
Numerous bills repealing all or part of baseball's exemption were taken under
consideration in the House in the wake of the strike. Before the strike began only two
bills affecting baseball's exemption had been considered in the 103 rd Congress. A bill to
exclude Baseball from the benefits of the Sports Broadcasting Act , which exempts pooled
television contracting by professional sports leagues, was introduced by Republican
Representative Michael Bilirakis of Florida in March, 1993. This limited proposal for
repealing baseball's exemption followed an earlier more ambitious effort in January 1993,
by Bilirakis and others that had aimed at total repeal of the exemption. Neither bill was
reported out of the Judiciary Committee.
After the players strike began in August 1994, however, there was a flurry of bills
introduced in the House calling for the limited repeal of baseball's exemption. These
included the "Baseball Fans Protection Act of 1994" (H.R. 4965), the "Baseball Fans and
Community Protection Act of 1994" (H.R. 4994), and the "Major League Play Ball Act"
(H.R. 5095). H.R. 4965, introduced by Democrat Representative Major Owens ofNew
York, called for the application of antitrust law to any term or condition unilaterally
imposed by either party in the baseball labor dispute. This limited repeal was greeted with
disdain on all sides. Those opposed to the exemption felt that it was not enough, while
defenders of the exemption felt that acceptance of this limited repeal would jeopardize the
remaining immunity in the future. Exemption opponents in the House, led by
Representative Bilirakis, introduced H.R. 4994 a week later, calling for the complete
repeal of the exemption. However, while the strike had stirred up opposition to the
183
exemption, the complete repeal was still unlikely given the activities of the Minor League
Caucus in the House.
In light of this political reality, Bilirakis and the others who sponsored H.R. 4994,
including baseball Hall of Famer, Republican Representative Jim Bunning of Kentucky,
amended H.R. 4994, bringing it into line with the more limited proposals for repeal. 299 At
the same time in the Senate, Republican Dennis Deconcini ofNew Mexico introduced a
bill to create a regulatory commission to oversee professional baseball and resolve
disputes such as the strike. Deconcini' s bill was never given serious consideration, but it
did indicate the atmosphere in the Senate, where baseball's exemption was seriously
threatened even before the strike.
The September 1994 hearings into baseball's antitrust immunity did not go well for
Major League Baseball.300 Members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Economic
and Commercial Law grilled acting commissioner Bud Selig on the propriety of the
exemption. Representative Michael Synar, a principle sponsor of a bill for partial repeal of
the exemption, very nearly called Selig a liar. Congressman Synar asked the acting
commissioner, "Why should anyone believe what you say?" He lectured Selig for
reneging on his two year old promise to appoint a strong commissioner.
30
' There were no
diversions to other issues such as franchise migration at this hearing. Players Association
299 Michael Synar (D-OK) and Major Owens (D-NY) were the other co-sponsors ofH.R
4994.
300 See, Vecsey, George, "The Owners Strike Out On Hill, Too," The New York Times
(September 23, 1994), p. B9.
301 Hosansky, David, "Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Draws Fire in Congress,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (September 24, 1994), p. 2673.
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chief, Donald Fehr, told the committee that if Congress passed the limited repeal presently
under consideration the players would return to work and fight it out in the courts. 302
The witness list at this hearing evidenced a shift in the balance of power. Until the
1994 strike, the players union had stood alone among interest groups in advocating a
repeal of the exemption. 303 Although there was plenty of "expert" testimony against the
exemption from economists, legal scholars and political scientists, antitrust advocates such
as Senators Metzenbaum and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah were hard pressed
to generate support in Congress for repealing the exemption. Once the strike began,
however, the players union was more vigorous in its campaign to end the exemption and
other groups joined in the effort for repeal.
Small organized groups of disgruntled fans began appearing in the fall of 1994,
the most notable being "Sports Fans Unlimited," whose founder, Adam Kolton,
accompanied by Frank Sullivan of "Fans First" and Bradley Stillman of the Consumer
Federation of America, testified at the September House hearing. In cooperation with the
Consumer Federation of America, which claims to represent over 50 million consumers,
Kolton's and Sullivan's groups, joined also by over a dozen other fan groups across the
country, conducted a national petition campaign to end the antitrust exemption. The
appearance of grass roots lobbying against baseball's exemption was indicative of the
increasingly precarious position of baseball's unregulated monopoly in the fall of 1994.
302 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and
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303 With the exception of the brief time in 1990, when a small group of minor league
owners were temporarily against the exemption.
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Despite their polls showing public approval of the owners positions, Major League
Baseball was quite aware of the damage being caused by the strike.
The September 1994 hearing ended with Acting Commissioner Selig trying to
object to a comment by union chief Donald Fehr. Chairman Brooks cut him off and
closed the hearing with a scathing indictment of Major League Baseball. He made it clear
that, when Congress reconvened in 1995, if the strike were not settled, Congress would
surely act.
304 One week after the hearing, the Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law became the first congressional panel to vote for the repeal of part of
baseball's antitrust immunity. The subcommittee's action was followed the next day by
the full House Judiciary Committee, which, by voice vote, passed H.R. 4994, that would
apply antitrust law to baseball's labor relations.305
While it appeared that both public and congressional sentiment was moving toward
support for at least a partial repeal of the exemption, several factors involved in the
committee approval of H.R. 4994 weighed against such an outcome. The bill passed
through the Judiciary Committee by voice vote, which meant that committee members
were unwilling to go on the record in support of repeal. In addition, the version of the
bill voted out of committee had been considerably weakened. While it would apply
antitrust laws to labor disputes, it did not include a provision, as in the original that would
provide an automatic injunction against a salary cap until the settlement of any pending
law suits. The bill approved by the committee left it to the courts to decide whether the
304 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption (Part 2). Hearings, (103
rd Cong. 2d
Sess., 1994), p. 177-178.
186
union would have to "decertify" before an antitrust suit could be heard. 306 The committee
action thus seemed more symbolic - a "threat" to Major League Baseball - and, indeed,
players union chief Donald Fehr announced that his promise to return to work for the
passage of legislation did not apply to this bill. 307
The interest of the 103 rd Congress in baseball's exemption was not exhausted by
the House Judiciary Committee vote. Representative Pat Williams, Chairman of the
House Education and Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations, who had
introduced a bill that would impose binding arbitration on owners and players if no
agreement were reached by February 1, 1995, held a hearing on his bill on September 29,
1994. He opened the hearing saying, "I intend, although I don't like binding arbitration,
to raise legislative hell between now and spring training to see that the 1995 season goes
on as scheduled." 08 Williams' hearing revealed no new information, other than that most
of his colleagues were also not fans of binding arbitration. The bill was never reported out
of committee.
In mid-October, after the Congress had gone home to campaign for re-election,
President Bill Clinton called Bud Selig and Donald Fehr to the White House. On the same
305 Dahl, David, "Baseball Owners Dealt Blow By Panel" St. Petersburg Times
(September 30, 1994), p. 1C, 4C.
306 Decertification means that a labor union disqualifies itself from acting as a collective
bargaining agent for its member. In effect, it constitutes the elimination of the union. To
decertify, a union must file a petition with the NLRB, then hold a decertification election
among its members. Decertification requires that a majority of union members vote to
dissolve the union.
307 Thomas, Jennifer, "Subcommittee Backs Anti-exemption Bill," St. Petersburg Times
(September 28, 1994), p. 9C.
308U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, Subcommittee on Labor-
management relations, The Impact on Collective Bargaining of the Antitrust Exemption:
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day Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, appointed former Secretary of Labor, W.J. Usery,
to mediate the dispute between the players and owners. 309 Secretary Reich called Usery
the "Mr. October" of labor negotiations and predicted that the highly respected mediator
would bring the two sides in baseball back together. For his part, Usery sounded a
cautious tone saying that resolution of the dispute would be very difficult. 310
Since the strike began, there had been calls for President Clinton to intervene to
stop it. Fan groups, as well as some legislators, urged Clinton in September to use his
executive powers, as he had in a recent railroad strike and the American Airlines flight
attendant strike, in order to save the 1994 baseball season. It was hoped than Clinton
would issue a 60-day back to work order, which might salvage the World Series. 311
Just days before the historic 1994 mid-term elections, on the same day Major
League Baseball was meeting in Chicago to consider proposals from groups hoping to win
expansion franchises, a small band of baseball entrepreneurs headed by famed player
attorney and agent Richard Moss announced the creation of the United Baseball League.
The United League was the first attempt to create a new league since the Continental
League in 1960, which had prompted Major League Baseball's expansion. Organizers of
the new league, which operated out of a Manhattan real estate office, included Moss,
former Congressman from New York, Robert Mrazek, and then current Member of
Congress John Bryant, Democrat of Texas. Also listed among the officers of the new
H.R. 5095. Major League Plav Ball Act of 1995. Hearings, (103
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309 Usery had served as the Secretary ofLabor in the Ford Administration.
310 Neikirk, William and James Warren, "Labor's 'Mr. October' new hope for baseball,"
Chicago Tribune (October 15, 1994), p. 2:1-2.
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league was Curt Flood, whose challenge to baseball's reserve clause in 1970 was
instrumental in eventually gaining free agency for the players. On November 1, 1994, the
group announced six charter cities where UL teams would play: Washington, Los
Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Vancouver, and San Juan, Puerto Rico. The new
league was to begin play with a 156-game schedule in March 1997.312
It quickly became apparent that the UL, organized entirely by people with serious
connections to the MLBPA, was an attempt by advocates and friends of the players
association to pressure the owners into a settlement. Nevertheless, the new league
regularly reported ambitious plans and received endorsements from economists, including
Andrew Zimbalist, who said that it could be viable. 313 The UL organizers kept the league
idea alive through the 1995 season and into the 1996 season, only folding their tent,
according to organizers, after TV and stadium deals fell through in April 1996. 314
Representatives of Major League Baseball claim that the UL was never considered
anything more than a bargaining tactic by the players union.
Other than the announcements coming from the United League, November 1994 in
Washington was consumed with after-shocks from the congressional elections. The 1 994
mid-term elections transformed the partisan make up of the House of Representatives and
the Senate, both of which were captured by the Republicans, ending 40 years of
Democratic rule in the House. One of the victims of the Republican sweep was Texas
3,1 Johnson, Chuck, "Fans ask Clinton to help save season," USA Today (September 8,
1994), p. 12C.
312 Loverto, Thorn, "United, it waits: New baseball league passes on the 1996 season,
plans for 1997," The Washington Times (February 29, 1996), p. CI.
313 Shapiro, Leonard, "New Baseball League Still Lacking Owners, Players, Stadiums,"
The Washington Post (May 23, 1995), p. El, E6.
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Democratic Representative, Jack Brooks, the leading foe of baseball's exemption in the
House.
315
In addition, Democrat Michael Synar of Oklahoma, a principle sponsor of H.R.
4994 was defeated for re-election. In the Senate, the retirement of Senator Howard
Metzenbaum removed a principle opponent of baseball's exemption as well. Toward the
end of the 103 rd Congress, Senator Metzenbaum had been pre-occupied with getting the
Brady hand gun waiting period bill passed, which he had long considered his first priority,
and had not been as involved with baseball issues.
Despite these setbacks for the advocates of repealing the exemption, the election
seemed to provide encouragement to both sides. With the new Republican majorities,
Major League Baseball's hope of appointing Democratic Senator George Mitchell of
Maine became less viable. In the Senate, Orrin Hatch, who replaced Metzenbaum as
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would himself propose a limited repeal of the
exemption, but the Republican takeover put Henry Hyde of Illinois in charge of the House
Judiciary Committee, and Hyde was an opponent of the exemption's repeal. He would
turn back the momentum for repeal in the House Judiciary Committee that had been built
up by that panel's vote in the previous Congress to lift the exemption in labor matters.
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During the winter of 1994, the players and owners had several negotiating sessions
with Bill Usery, but no agreement was reached. On December 14, the NLRB issued a
complaint against the owners for their failure to make the pension plan contribution in
August. A week later, the owners declared an impasse and unilaterally imposed their final
3,4 Shuster, Rachel, "League Folds," USA Today (April 12, 1996), p. Bl.
315 Brook's defeat cannot be attributed to his position on baseball's exemption. Their is no
record of his opponent raising the exemption issue during the campaign.
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offer, a complicated system of payroll taxes and revenue-sharing that had the effect of a
salary cap. On December 27, both sides filed unfair labor practices charges with the
NLRB. When the NLRB made it clear that they were going to issue a complaint against
the owners, alleging that the salary cap had been imposed illegally, the owners rescinded
the economic system they had imposed.
Frustrated with the lack of progress, President Clinton ordered talks to resume and
set a deadline of February 6 for progress on an agreement. The deadline came without
progress. The President extended it by one day and called both sides to the White House
for a summit of sorts. At the February 7 White House meeting, the President asked both
sides to accept binding arbitration. The owners refused. Both the President's and Mr.
Usery's attempts to mediate the strike were rebuffed by both sides. The President
thereupon sent a proposal for binding arbitration to Congress where it was dead on arrival.
During the winter, Major League Baseball felt that it was winning the public
relations war. In November, just two days before the first negotiating session with Usery
as mediator, MLB put out a full page ad in USA Today intended to win fans over to their
side.
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Their internal polling was telling them that the players were getting the brunt of
public disgust. Oakland A's General Manager, Sandy Aldersom, suggested that the union
was acting with "the same institutional arrogance that proved the downfall of the owners
in the '70s."
318
The objective of the owners was to break the union by bringing in
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replacement players for the 1995 season. Internal Major League Baseball public opinion
polls at the time indicated that fans were willing to support replacement players, a
conclusion backed up by independent polling data.319
Meanwhile, the 104th Congress, when not consumed with "Contract with America"
legislation, was considering several bills aimed at either the complete or partial repeal of
baseball's exemption. On the first day of the 104th Congress, Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, a New York Democrat, introduced a bill to repeal the exemption entirely.320
Two weeks later, Moynihan backed off his bill and co-sponsored one proposed by the new
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Republican Orrin Hatch, which was a more
limited repeal of the exemption to apply only to labor matters. Another bill sponsored by
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and South Carolina Republican Strom
Thurmond, was also proposed in the opening days of the 104th Congress and would have
removed the exemption only in labor matters. It was these measures that were under
consideration when the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust held hearings in
February 1995.
321
These hearings, chaired by Senator Thurmond, provided a sounding
board for frustrations with the ongoing strike. Both bills under consideration, while lifting
the exemption in labor matters, would have left the exemption in tact with regard to the
minor leagues and franchise relocation decisions. Several Senators expressed concerns
that these bills would have unintended consequences.
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Senator Nancy Kassebaum, Republican of Kansas, quoted a section of one of the
pending bills out of context and claimed that it would alter current labor law and give an
unfair advantage to the players union. Senator Arlen Specter repeatedly questioned the
bill's sponsor, Hatch, about whether his bill would pertain to the current strike. Specter
obstinately insisted that because no unilateral terms were imposed in the current conflict
that a bill to extend antitrust coverage to such impositions was irrelevant. 322 Despite
repeated reminders from Senator Hatch and Democrat Bob Graham of Florida, that the
owners had in the past and would likely in the future impose such unilateral terms, Senator
Specter continued to assail the bill. 323
The contrast between this hearing in the 104th Congress, where Senators openly
argued with each other about the merits of these limited repeals of the exemption, and
similar sessions held in the previous Congress, where such bills had passed out of
committee in the House, is both striking and telling. The concerns expressed by Senator
Specter and Kassebaum had not been raised in the 104th Congress. Ironically, their doubts
about this limited repeal came after the release of a study by the Congressional Research
Service, a non-partisan organization within the Library of Congress, which contravened
nearly all of the owners arguments for retaining the exemption.
The CRS report found that baseball's exemption allows owners to declare an
impasse in collective bargaining and to impose employment terms that differ from any in
322 Senator Hatch's proposed bill, S. 415, would have allowed the players to file antitrust
suits if the owners unilaterally imposed conditions other than those of the expired labor
agreement.
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prior labor agreements including those that do not qualify for the narrow nonstatutory
labor antitrust exemption which covers the collective bargaining process. The report
further found that the owners' contention that a salary cap and revenue-sharing were the
only ways to correct the problems created by inequality of resources among teams was
"questionable." The salary cap and revenue-sharing were said to be one option among
many to solve the problem. The report also concluded that these measures imposed the
"greatest share of costs on the players" and that other options would distribute the costs
more evenly. The report recommended, among other things, expanding the number of
franchises in large-revenue markets and using the new franchise fees to compensate the
present owners for their loss. This would restore competitive balance without unfairly
burdening either the players or owners.324
Major League Baseball responded to the report with a press release entitled, "The
Fallacies of the CRS Report for Congress of January 13, 1995." The release was a hastily
prepared document filled with disparaging comments about the CRS report, as well as the
qualifications of its authors. While the arguments in the press release were generally
without merit, they nonetheless convinced the right people. Senators Specter and
Kassebaum's criticisms of Senator Hatch's bill evidenced familiarity with the arguments of
Major League Baseball contained in the press release.
Enthusiasm for repealing the exemption eroded significantly with the election of
the 104
th
Congress. Despite the fact that Members from both parties can be found on both
sides of this issue, it is clear that the political atmosphere was re-charged with anti-
324 Zimmerman, Dennis and William Cox, "The Baseball Strike and Federal Policy: An
Economic Analysis," CRS Report for Congress (January 13, 1995), p. 20-21.
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government intervention sentiment as a result of the Republican takeover of both houses
of Congress. It is also clear that this sentiment, as it had throughout the 1980s, redounded
to the benefit of Major League Baseball.
When the President suggested that the Congress consider legislation to subject the
two sides in baseball to binding arbitration, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole and
House Speaker Newt Gingrich jointly responded, saying "[t]he President has apparently
thrown the ball into Congress' court. We maintain our view that Congress is ill-suited to
resolving private labor disputes."
325
This statement indicated the view of the new majority
that government intervention was to be avoided wherever possible, including antitrust
issues. Although the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee would vote narrowly
on August 3, 1995, to approve a bill to lift baseball's exemption in labor matters while
retaining it with regard to the minor leagues and franchise relocation, they did so knowing
full well that the majority leader had no intention of bringing it to the floor.326
The suddenly sour mood toward repealing the exemption, illustrated by Senators
Specter and Kassebaum, may also have been inspired by the work of Major League
Baseball. From the start of the 104
th
Congress, Major League Baseball lobbyists stormed
Capitol Hill in numbers heretofore unseen. Major League Baseball's chief lobbyist, Gene
Callahan, speaking of the lobbying effort in the 104
th
Congress predicted that, "before our
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University of Illinois Law Review 1994:3 (1994), p. 682.
326 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Maior League Baseball Reform
Act of 1995 , (Rept. No. 104-231, 104
th
Cong., 2d Sess.,1996), p. 4.
195
effort is over, every Member of Congress will be contacted by baseball people."327 Aided
by Stan Brand and the NAPBL and an array of high priced lobbyists, many ofwhom were
former staffers to key Members of Congress, Callahan conducted a massive campaign in
the first two months of the 104th Congress to save the exemption.
The success of this effort cannot be measured easily, but one Member frankly
admitted that he had withdrawn his support for a repeal of the exemption in return for a
promise of an expansion team from Major League Baseball. In a Washington Post article,
an aid to Virginia Senator John Warner was quoted as saying, "we were kind of bought
off, if you will." The aid went on to say that Boston Red Sox owner and expansion
committee chairman John Harrington had promised Warner a team in return for his
withdrawal of support for repealing the exemption. The same article went on to say that
"Warner had joined "several Northern Virginia Members of Congress who see the baseball
• 328
players' strike as a chance to score points with the owners."
In March 1995, the pressure on Congress to act was diminished by the actions of
the NLRB and a federal district court judge in New York. On March 27, the NLRB filed
for an injunction to restore the rules of the expired labor agreement. Four days later, U.S.
District Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor ruled in favor of the players and issued an
injunction to restore the terms of the expired agreement. The next day the players
association voted to return to work immediately.
329
The owners, disappointed by the
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ruling, decided that a lockout would be a public relations nightmare and allowed the
players back. With the court decision, the owners released the replacement players who
were poised to play in the big leagues and postponed opening day to April 26. The 1995
schedule had to be cut from 162 games to 144 games.
Where Does the Exemption Stand Now?
With the return of baseball, despite the lack of a new labor agreement, the politics
of the exemption changed dramatically. It was the strike and the resulting loss of baseball
that had fueled attempts to repeal the exemption. With the return of baseball, the labor
dispute lost urgency and political salience. Indeed, for the remainder of the 104th
Congress there were no more hearings on the exemption's repeal and, as it had in the
1980s, attention shifted to the issue of franchise relocation in all professional sports.
In November 1995, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust held a hearing
on franchise relocations following the NFL's Cleveland Browns move to Baltimore, the
moves oftwo Los Angeles teams, the Raiders and Rams, to Oakland and St. Louis
respectively, and the announcement that Houston's NFL team would move to Nashville,
as well as rumors of several other possible moves throughout the NFL. The NHL was
also experiencing a wave of relocations, with the Quebec team moving to Denver and
Minnesota to Dallas. Once again, as in the 1980s, talk of removing baseball's exemption
was replaced by talk of granting limited exemptions to all sports.
330
330 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Business Rights, and Competition, Antitrust Issues In Relocation of Professional Sports
Franchises. Hearings, (104
th
Cong., 1
st
Sess.,1995).
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In January 1996, the full Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on professional
sports. While the Committee was ostensibly looking into antitrust issues and professional
sports, the hearing consisted of brief references by Senator Hatch to the destructive effects
of baseball's exemption amid the overwhelming concern of most members of the
committee that professional sports needed a limited exemption to prevent what California
Senator Diane Feinstein called franchise musical chairs. Feinstein, whose hometown San
Francisco Giants were blocked by Major League Baseball in their attempt to move to
Florida, told the hearing, "this game of franchise musical chairs is why I strongly believe
that Major League Baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws should not be repealed
and why I favor extending baseball's antitrust exemption to other major professional
sports.
331
Her views were shared by the majority of the committee. Even Senator Hatch
endorsed the idea of providing professional sports with antitrust protection regarding
league rules on franchise migration.
Two weeks after the Senate hearing, the House Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on franchise relocation legislation. As in the Senate hearing, the voices speaking
out against baseball's exemption were drowned out by those calling for exemptions to
prevent franchise migration in all sports. Representative John Conyers of Michigan, spoke
in vain at the hearing about his bill to remove baseball's exemption in labor matters. In an
opening statement, he sarcastically reminded the members of the committee that his
baseball bill, on which the committee had failed to act, was also within the jurisdiction of
331U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports: The
Challenges Facing the Future of the Industry. Hearings , (104
th
Cong., 2d Sess.,1996), p. 9.
198
the committee. In June, following the hearing, a bill regarding franchise migration was
reported out of the House Judiciary Committee. 333
Despite the reprieve granted by the return of the players, Major League Baseball
lobbyists kept the heat on in the 104th Congress. RoU Call, a Capitol Hill newspaper,
reported that Major League Baseball spent $630,000 lobbying Congress in the first six
months of 1996, which dwarfed the efforts of the Players Association during the same
time period. The MLBPA reportedly spent $196,000 during the same period.334
In the 105
th
Congress, in the wake a ofnew labor agreement that will take baseball
into the twenty first century, numerous bills are being considered that would partially
repeal baseball's exemption. The new labor agreement includes a memorandum of
understanding between the players and owners that expresses the willingness of both
parties to accede to the repeal of the exemption by Congress as it pertains to labor
matters. Both sides have agreed to forego any lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill regarding
the exemption, with the exception of support for the limited repeal, throughout the life of
the new contract that expires in the year 2000 or 200 1
.
Baseball's antitrust exemption, despite reports to the contrary, continues to afford
significant benefits to Major League Baseball. If this were not so then the owners would
not be spending millions of dollars defending it. Baseball's freedom from the nation's
antitrust laws allows team owners to control expansion, preserving the inflated values of
332U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Professional Sports Franchise
Relocation: Antitrust Implications. Hearings , (104
th
Cong., 2d Sess.,1996), p. 3.
333 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Fan Freedom and Community
Protection Act of 1996 , (H.R. Rept. No. 104-656. 104
th
Cong., 2d Sess.,1996).
334 Henry, Ed, "Baseball Lobbying Hits Major League on Hill," Roll Call (October 21,
1996), p. 15.
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existing franchises. It enables the owners to manipulate labor relations to their advantage
and tightly control player development. In addition, the exemption allows Major League
Baseball to negotiate jointly for cable television contracts, without fear of antitrust
challenge. The other professional sports leagues' cable TV deals are subject to antitrust
scrutiny.
It is currently fashionable to suggest that the exemption is irrelevant today because
the players union has achieved so much at the bargaining table. While it is true that the
players lot has improved significantly, it is also true that baseball's exemption from
antitrust law continues to give the baseball owners a definite advantage over their
counterparts in other professional sports.
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CHAPTER V
THE FUTURE OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Major League Baseball's singular enjoyment of freedom from government
regulation cannot be attributed to isolated causal factors. The persistence of baseball's
unregulated monopoly is not a mere historical accident originating in judicial
sentimentality and persisting due to the rules of precedent. Nor can baseball's paradoxical
status be explained as simply the result of interest group politics as usual. However, while
the cultural significance of the national pastime has surely played a large part in its unusual
treatment by the government, the mere evolution of the game in the minds of Americans is
not in itself sufficient to explain this regulatory anomaly. The unique place of the business
of baseball in America—its regulatory anomaly—is a function of the game's historical
development as encased in the interplay of institutions and ideas, as well as politics. This
anomaly has been maintained through a succession of political environments with distinct
institutional, ideological, and political characteristics, and a fuller understanding of it is
gained by focusing on these changing regulatory regimes.
The developing national institutions of the Progressive Era together with Victorian
values, gave birth to the baseball anomaly. The Depression and World War II brought
with them a distinct regulatory environment with which baseball's anomaly at first seemed
consistent, then later ignored amid more pressing concerns. The 1960s and 1970s brought
dissensus to American regulatory politics, but baseball's unregulated monopoly weathered
the period albeit with difficulty. The 1980s and early 1990s were a period of anti-
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government politics. Governmental excesses of previous decades were decried and
actions taken to reduce the size of the public sector. A conservative politics, with a
laissez-faire attitude about government regulation, provided Major League Baseball with
some respite from the assault on its unregulated monopoly.
The player strike of 1994-95 signaled the end of baseball's reign as America's
national pastime. Public disgust with the business of baseball reached unprecedented
levels as a consequence of the game's ninth work stoppage in twenty years. As the
cultural pedestal on which baseball had rested for a century toppled, both the courts and
the Congress showed signs of altering the game's antitrust exemption. In addition, the
advent of the twenty first century and the Information Age is transforming industry
worldwide, and the globalization of markets promises to have a profound impact on
American industrial policy, including antitrust policy. The internationalization of the
baseball industry will surely have its impact on Major League Baseball's unregulated
monopoly.
The Impact of Recent Court Decisions on the Baseball Anomaly
Settlement of the most destructive labor strike in baseball came without a single
piece of legislation being enacted into law. Indeed, only two bills affecting baseball's
exemption were even voted out of committee. In the 1990s, as had been the case in the
previous seven decades, it was the judicial branch that had the greatest impact on the
baseball anomaly. Several court decisions changed the terms of the exemption debate and
contributed to Major League Baseball's decision to settle the labor dispute.
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Three decisions in the 1990s signaled the increasingly precarious position of the
exemption in the courts. In Postema v. National League, a female umpire named Pamela
Postema sued Major League Baseball after she was fired as a minor league umpire. She
charged Major League Baseball with restraint of trade. In its decision, a U.S. District
Court in New York ruled that, while Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption
"immunizes baseball from antitrust challenges to its league structure and its reserve
system," it "does not provide baseball with a blanket immunity for anticompetitive
behavior in every context in which it operates."335
In the cases of Piazza v. Major League Baseball and Butterworth v. National
League ofProfessional Baseball Clubs, the court decisions seemed to further limit the
reach of baseball's antitrust exemption. Both of these cases resulted from an aborted sale
of the San Francisco Giants. In Piazza, a group of investors from Tampa Bay, Florida,
sought to purchase the Giants from the club's owner Bob Lurie, who decided to sell the
franchise due to personal financial trouble. The two key members of the investors group
were Vince Piazza and Vincent Tirendi. Piazza, the father of professional baseball player,
Mike Piazza, and Tirendi are selfmade millionaires from Philadelphia. Before the deal
was closed Major League Baseball canceled the sale, citing the questionable character of
the two principle buyers. Fred Kuhlmann, chairman of the baseball ownership committee,
announced on September 10, 1992, that Piazza and Tirendi were being turned down
because of the results of background checks conducted by Major League Baseball.
336
335 Postema v. National League ofProfessional Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
336 Vick, Karl, "Vince Piazza still trying to make a name for himself in baseball," St.
Petersburg Times (March 20, 1994), p. 8A.
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Piazza and Tirendi sued Major League Baseball claiming that it acted illegally in
frustrating their efforts to buy the Giants and move the team to Florida. They claimed that
MLB had not evaluated their application to purchase the Giants in good faith and, further,
that MLB had violated antitrust laws by disallowing the relocation of the Giants to
Florida. Major League Baseball, in arguing for a summery judgment, claimed immunity
for their decision to cancel the sale based on the game's blanket antitrust exemption. U.S.
District Court Judge John R. Padova disagreed, ruling that baseball's antitrust immunity
applies only to the reserve clause, not to issues of relocation.337
If the logic of Judge Padova' s decision is broadly accepted by the legal community,
then baseball's exemption is one case away from extinction. Padova' s opinion held that
the three historic baseball decisions, Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood, all involved
attempts to obtain relief from the anti-competitive effects of baseball's reserve clause and
that, therefore, the exemption is limited to the reserve clause. Major League Baseball had
argued that these decisions involve broader issues, and provide an exemption for the
business of baseball, which includes much more than the reserve clause.
Padova relied on Flood in holding that the claim for a broader exemption had been
eroded. Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion in Flood supported Padova' s argument that the
reserve clause was the subject of all three of these pivotal cases. Blackmun wrote, "For
the third time in fifty years, the Court is asked specifically to rule that professional
baseball's reserve clause is within the reach of the federal antitrust laws."
338
Judge Padova
held that, even if Federal Baseball and Toolson granted a wider interpretation of the
337 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
338 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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exemption, Blackmun's majority opinion in Flood took away any precedential value these
earlier cases may have had over and above the issue of the reserve clause. Prior to Flood,
according to Padova, lower courts were bound by "stare decisis"339 to follow the rule and
result of Federal Baseball and Toolson. In Flood, the court invalidated the rule of these
earlier cases when it ruled that baseball was indeed interstate commerce, but upheld the
results of these cases by ruling that the reserve clause is beyond the reach of federal
antitrust laws. Therefore, Padova concluded that the only decisional precedent was to be
found in Flood, and Flood was unquestionably limited to the reserve clause. 340
Major League Baseball had backed up its contention that the exemption covered
more than the reserve clause by citing the opinion of the Federal Appeals Court for the
Seventh Circuit in the case of Finley & Co. v. Kuhn. In that case, the court found Finley's
claim that the exemption did not protect Major League Baseball from his suit challenging
the commissioner'' s actions voiding trades of several of his players. The court ruled that
"the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any particular facet
of that business, from federal antitrust laws."
341
Judge Padova did not share this view. In
his opinion, he argued that the Seventh Circuit had misunderstood the extent to which
Flood centered on the reserve clause.
339 Latin for "let the decision stand," this term refers to the judiciary's policy of relying on
precedent whenever possible. By so doing the court's legitimacy is enhanced by the law's
predictability.
340 Gould, Mark T. "Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Pitch Gets Closer and Closer,"
Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law 5 (1995), p. 273-289.
341 Quoted in Guarisco, John W., "Buy Me Some Peanuts And Crackerjacks, But You
Can't Buy The Team: The Scope And Future Of Baseball's Antitrust Exemption,"
University of Illinois Law Review 1994:3 (1994), p. 659.
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Major League Baseball avoided the possible damage this decision could do to its
unregulated monopoly by appealing it to a higher court and then settling the case out of
court. The terms of the settlement are secret, but Piazza and Tirendi have stated that they
were quite pleased with the deal. This, however, did not end the judicial threat to Major
League Baseball's exemption, as Padova's bold interpretation was adopted by another
court.
In the case of Butterworth v. National League, the Florida Attorney General,
Robert Butterworth, pursuant to Florida antitrust law, issued antitrust civil investigatory
demands against the National League in the aftermath of the aborted move of the San
Francisco Giants to Florida. The Florida charges alleged that Major League Baseball had
combined or conspired to restrain trade in connection with the sale and purchase of the
San Francisco Giants baseball franchise.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-1 decision, that baseball's antitrust
exemption covers only matters related to the reserve system and does not cover decisions
involving the sale or location of franchises. In its ruling, which allowed the Florida
Attorney General to proceed with his investigation, the Florida court agreed with the
court in Piazza that the decisions in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood do not extend
the exemption beyond the facts of those cases.
342
If Butterworth were appealed and heard
342 Butterworth v. National League ofProfessional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.
1994). See also Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 1995 Fla. App. Lexis 10391 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1995). This court followed the rationale of Butterworth in reinstating state antitrust
claims. But see New Orleans Pelicans Baseball, Inc. v. NAPBL, No. 93-253, 1994 WL
631 144 (U.S.D.C., E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994). This court rejected Piazza, granting summery
judgment based on the existence of the antitrust exemption.
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by the Supreme Court, it may well result in the repeal of the exemption. Consequently, no
appeals have been filed by Major League Baseball.
In addition to these direct assaults on the exemption, several court decisions
involving labor law have had an important impact upon the exemption debate. The 1994-
95 player strike caused the most serious effort on Capitol Hill to date to repeal, at least
partially, baseball's exemption from antitrust law. In the debates over these partial
exemptions, opponents of even a partial repeal rebutted attempts to repeal the exemption
in labor matters with claims that labor negotiations were already granted both a statutory
and a court-imposed antitrust exemption, which made the repeal of baseball's exemption
in labor matters irrelevant.
The statutory exemption refers to a provision of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914
by which the unilateral activities of labor unions were granted immunity from antitrust
challenge. The provision was intended to clarify the Sherman Act, which was not
intended to be used against unions. The Supreme Court extended the statutory labor
exemption to qualifying terms of collective bargaining agreements in the cases ofAllen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union 13, IBEW, UMWv. Pennington & Local Union 189, and
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 343
In these cases the Court determined that, without extending the labor exemption to
some bilateral agreements, unions would be exposed to antitrust actions in certain
circumstances. Before the Court created this non-statutory labor exemption, unions were
protected from antitrust liability in their unilateral activities to achieve their demands vis-a-
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vis management, but they lost that protection if management agreed to their demands.
That is to say, when terms went from unilateral demands to labor-management
agreements, these demands were no longer unilateral union activities and therefore became
subject to antitrust liability. The court imposed nonstatutory exemption was intended to
correct this unintended result.344
The court-imposed, or nonstatutory, labor exemption was first applied to
professional sports in the case ofPhiladelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc. in 1972.345 In this case, the World Hockey League sued the National
Hockey League for restraint of trade, arguing that the NHL reserve clause resulted in a
monopoly in the hockey player market. The NHL defended its reserve clause as a product
of collective bargaining and thus immune from antitrust challenge by the nonstatutory
labor exemption. The application of the nonstatutory exemption required that the
agreement in question be the result of union self-interest and the product of good faith
bargaining. That is to say, an agreement can only be protected from antitrust challenge if
it is good for the labor union and resulted from a negotiation in which both sides had
meaningful input. The court ruled that this standard had not been met in the World
Hockey League case. Three years later, in Robertson v. NBA,
346
the court struck down
343 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union 13, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); UMWv.
Pennington & Local Union 189, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
344 Closius, Philip J., "Professional Sports and Antitrust Law: The Ground Rules of
Immunity, Exemption, and Liability," in Johnson, Arthur T. and James Frey's (eds.).
Government and Sport: The Public Policy Issues , (USA: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers,
1985), p. 140-158.
345Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
SUPP. 462 (e.d. Pa. 1972).
'"Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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basketball's reserve clause, ruling that it was not entitled to the nonstatutory labor
exemption for the same reasons.
In the 1976 case ofMackey v. NFL, a federal appeals court clearly defined how the
nonstatutory labor exemption applied to professional sports. In Mackey, the court
constructed a three part standard for applying the nonstatutory antitrust exemption for
labor: (1) the provision being challenged must affect only the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement; (2) the challenged provision must pertain to a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining; and (3) the challenged provision must have been the result of "bona
fide arm's-length bargaining."
347
In the 1990s, three court cases seemed to aid Major League Baseball in its efforts
to turn back attempts to limit its antitrust exemption. The cases of Powell v. NFL,M * NBA
v. Williams?*
9
and Brown v. Pro Football Inc iS0 all dealt with the scope of the
nonstatutory labor exemption and, in all three, federal appeals courts held that the
imposition of terms by employers after an impasse in collective bargaining has been
reached is immune from antitrust liability so long as a collective bargaining relationship
between employers and a union exists.
In Powell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court
ruling that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues only until an impasse is reached.
The case involved a challenge to the unilateral imposition of player restraints by the NFL
347 Quoted in Closius, p. 144.
348 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788-89 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 930 F. 2d 1293 (8
th
Cir. 1989), cert. Denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
349 NBA v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 45 F. 3d 684 (2d Cir.
1995).
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after collective bargaining with the football players association broke down. The court
held that this unilateral action was entitled to antitrust immunity, despite the bargaining
impasse, because it still satisfied the three-part test established in Mackey. It affected only
the owners and players in the NFL; it concerned mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining; and it had resulted from bona fide arm's length bargaining.
The players association claimed that the player restrictions in question were not in
compliance with the third part of the test. They were not the result ofbona fide arm's
length bargaining. However, the court found that, because all the player restraints
imposed had been included in the 1982 collective bargaining agreement signed by both
parties, they did comply with the third part of the test and thus the restrictions were
entitled to antitrust immunity so long as a collective bargaining relationship existed
between the players and owners in the NFL.
In Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a lower
court ruling that the nonstatutory labor exemption continues after impasse as long as a
collective bargaining relationship exists between the relevant parties. The case involved
the unilateral imposition of a player draft and a salary cap by the NBA after collective
bargaining broke down with the basketball players association. The court found that the
test for applying the nonstatutory labor exemption had been satisfied by the employment
terms in this case. The salary cap and the player draft were terms previously agreed to by
the players in the expired labor agreement.
350 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd 50 F. 3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 518 U.S. _ (1996).
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Both Williams and Powell held that the exemption extends beyond impasse, and
that unions must decertify prior to mounting an antitrust challenge against management.
Both of these cases, however, involved the unilateral imposition of terms contained in
previous collective bargaining agreements. In the absence of its general antitrust
exemption, Major League Baseball's unilateral imposition of a salary cap, a term that had
not been a part of any previous agreement, may well have been beyond the protection of
the nonstatutory labor exemption in 1995 when Congress was debating a partial repeal of
the exemption in labor matters.
Brown grew out of negotiations between the NFL and the football players
association following the expiration of the football collective bargaining agreement in
1987. During the negotiations the NFL adopted a plan to permit each club to establish a
developmental squad made up of first year players who had not been picked up by other
teams. The plan required teams to pay developmental players $1,000 a week, no more, no
less. The union rejected the plan and eventually an impasse was reached on the issue of
the developmental squad. The NFL, then, unilaterally imposed the plan on the teams,
resulting in a antitrust law suit filed by 235 developmental squad players against the NFL
and its member teams.
The results of the Brown case, however, may have shielded Major League
Baseball's imposition of a salary cap from antitrust liability because in this case the court
ruled that the nonstatutory labor exemption both extends beyond an impasse in collective
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bargaining and applies to the unilateral imposition of any "good faith" offer by either side,
regardless whether that offer had been contained in a prior agreement. 351
The effect ofBrown on baseball's exemption is significant. Brown clarified that
unilateral terms imposed by management need not have been included in prior labor
agreements in order to be protected from antitrust challenge by the nonstatutory labor
exemption. Knowing this, Major League Baseball's agreement with the players to lobby
Congress for the repeal of the exemption as it relates to labor matters becomes much more
understandable. The limited exemption that both players and owners have agreed to
support would only put baseball players in the same position vis-a-vis antitrust law and
labor negotiations as football, basketball and hockey players. With the Brown decision, all
professional athletes are in a relatively weak position in this regard. With the new labor
agreement, Major League Baseball has reduced the political salience of the exemption
from antitrust law and, by agreeing to support a partial repeal, made all but irrelevant by
the Brown decision, Major League Baseball has co-opted the most potent force opposing
its continued unregulated monopoly— namely, the players.
The memorandum of understanding included in the new labor agreement ties the
players hands with regard to lobbying for a more extensive repeal of the exemption. The
players agreed not to lobby for a more expansive repeal at least until the present
agreement expires in 2000 or 2001. Major League Baseball's unregulated monopoly
seems even more secure given that Congress seems unlikely to pass the limited repeal of
the exemption in labor matters. When Congress considered similar legislation in 1995 and
351 The judgment of whether the term in question is indeed a "good faith" offer is subject
to adjudication by the NLRB, and ultimately the courts.
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1996, opponents inaccurately, but effectively, argued that such a repeal was made mute by
the court decisions in Williams and Powell. Since the Brown decision actually does
reduce the relevance of such a repeal, Members of Congress seem unlikely to tamper with
baseball's exemption.
In addition to the reduced relevance of such a repeal, Congress will be besieged in
the 105
th
Congress by lobbyists for minor league baseball arguing that a repeal of any kind
threatens to unleash a torrent of litigation, the results of which for them are unpredictable
at best. While the new agreement binds the owners and players in Major League Baseball
to support the specific repeal of the exemption in labor matters, the minor leagues and
their powerful lobbying organization, headed by Stanley Brand, remains free to oppose
any repeal of the exemption.
Major League Baseball, therefore, can have its cake and eat it too with regard to
the exemption. Officially they support the limited repeal; unofficially, they can rely on the
efforts of the NAPBL to stop even that. But it also means that the minor leagues may be
in the drivers seat with regard to the exemption's fate on Capitol Hill, and this may
become significant in the 1997 renegotiations of the Professional Baseball Agreement,
which governs the relationship between the majors and the minors.
The Baseball Anomaly in the 105th and 106th Congresses
As the 105
th
Congress opened, baseball's new labor agreement had been reached in
principle. While the Republicans held on to both houses of Congress, Democrat Bill
Clinton was re-elected President. Most pundits agree that Clinton retained the White
House by moving to the right, co-opting the Republican's smaller government theme, but
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his re-election nonetheless represents a retreat from the intensely anti-government rhetoric
of the previous two years.
In politics, the anti-government mood was dampened by the shut down of the
federal government, for which the public blamed the congressional Republicans who had
apparently thought that no one would miss it. In baseball, the cancellation of the World
Series and the continued war ofwords between the owners and players softened the anti-
government bias that had led most Americans to favor keeping Congress out of baseball's
governance. Increasingly, fans were receptive to government intervention. Despite these
mood swings, baseball's unregulated monopoly appears secure for now.
Indeed, the political equation now tilts in the favor ofMajor League Baseball for
several reasons. Although the players and owners have agreed to limit their lobbying
efforts to the support of a partial repeal of the exemption in labor matters, the minor
leagues are not a party to this agreement and will most certainly harness their considerable
clout to stop even a partial repeal. Despite the softening of the anti-government mood in
the nation, there are few political incentives for Members of Congress to repeal baseball's
exemption. With the exception of the major league players association, no one will be
upset at continued congressional inaction. 352 Congressional zealots like Senator Howard
Metzenbaum and Representatives Mike Synar and Jack Brooks are gone, and while
Senator Orrin Hatch and Representatives Jim Bunning and John Conyers continue the
fight, they are out numbered and have no issue, such as a player strike, around which to
352 During the strike numerous fan groups formed to protest the ongoing strike. These
groups became vigorous supporters of the repeal of the antitrust exemption. However,
with the settlement of the strike, these groups have lost most of their momentum and do
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rally support. The players will have no real leverage until the year 2000, when they have
the power to opt out of the final year of the agreement and begin bargaining all over again.
Advocates of repeal, however, see the exit of former Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole
as helping them in the 105 th Congress. Dole had been instrumental in keeping the partial
repeal bill, passed by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 104th Congress, from making
it to the floor. But, Dole's replacement, Trent Lott also failed to bring the bill to the floor,
despite his earlier support for it.
353
Another factor that weighs against even this partial repeal in labor matters has to
do with the language of the bills. In the 105th Congress, Senator Hatch proposed the
partial repeal of the exemption in labor matters in a bill entitled "The Curt Flood Act of
1997," in memory of the deceased player/activist. A companion bill was introduced in the
House by Representative John Conyers. Both bills contained language that raised a red
flag in the mind ofHouse Judiciary General Counsel, Allen Coffey. Coffey believes that
the language of these bills, which are intended to lift the exemption in labor matters but
leave it with regard to franchise relocations and the minor leagues, is unclear and may in
fact jeopardize league rules on franchise relocations as well as the minor leagues. 354
At issue for Coffey is the phrase "applicability or nonapplicability." In both the
Senate and House versions of the bill, the following language is meant to exclude issues
relating to franchise relocation and the minor leagues:
not figure to be prominent in the congressional debates on the partial repeal of the
exemption in the 105
th
Congress.
353 Henry, Ed. "Baseball Lobbying Hits Major League on HilL" Roll Call (October, 1996),
p. 1,15.
354 Telephone Interview with Allen Coffey, General Counsel to the House Judiciary
Committee, 16 January 1997.
215
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect - (1) the
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to
professional baseball's amateur draft, the minor league
reserve clause, the professional baseball agreement, or any
other matter relating to the minor leagues; (2) The
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to
any restraint by professional baseball on franchise
relocation; or (3) the application of Public Law 87-331
(commonly known as the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961).355
Coffey contends that this phrase is subject to interpretation by the courts and that
it could be interpreted to include subjecting franchise relocation and the minor leagues to
antitrust liability. Coffey's view is not widely shared. The sponsors of this language
contend that the phrase in fact protects against the very interpretation about which he is
worried. Leaving aside the merits of Coffey's argument, it is clear that his doubts will fuel
the fire being ignited on Capitol Hill by the minor league baseball lobbyists in their efforts
to avoid any legislative tampering with the exemption.
With the end of the 1997 baseball season, the Professional Baseball Agreement
between the major and minor leagues expires. At that time the minors will seek a better
deal with their senior partners. In addition to their unrestricted ability to lobby Congress
on any issue, they will enter the negotiations with a governing association, the National
Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, that may well have more clout on Capitol
Hill than Major League Baseball. This was not the case in 1990, before the arrival of
Stanley Brand to the NAPBL.
The bargaining position of the minor leagues has been augmented in the 1990s by
the increased viability of independent minor leagues. During the 1990 negotiations on the
355H.R. 21, "The Baseball Fans and Community Protection Act of 1997" was introduced
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Professional Baseball Agreement, Major League Baseball threatened to end its affiliation
with the minor leagues. 356 Knowing that without big league subsidies most of the minor
league clubs would not survive, the minors had little leverage with which to oppose this,
although they used the threat of lobbying against the exemption to some effect. 357 In 1997
things are different.
Since 1990, independent minor leagues throughout the country have sprung up and
are proving that such ventures can be profitable even in small rural markets. The most
well known of these is the Northern League whose member club the St. Paul Saints had
Darryl Strawberry before selling him to the New York Yankees. These independent
leagues and teams were a response to the 1990 negotiations over the Professional Baseball
Agreement. The agreement mandated that every minor league team affiliated with the
major leagues had to bring its stadium up to a national standard with regard to seating and
facilities. The requirements were extensive and even the most minute detail was
scrutinized. For example, one requirement was that every ladies room had to have a purse
rack in each stall.
These requirements proved expensive. Many communities were unable to afford
them and lost their teams. Independent leagues moved into many of these communities
replacing NAPBL teams, but keeping the local team names. In Elmira, New York, for
example, Major League Baseball removed its affiliate because the community failed to
bring the stadium up to requirements. An independent league came in and replaced the
by Rep. John Conyers on January 6, 1997.
356 Chass, Murray, "With the Minors," The New York Times (December 3, 1990), p. C2.
357 Smith, Claire, "Major-Minor Rift Going Legal Route," The New York Times
(November 26, 1990), p. C2.
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Elmira team. The team has prospered despite the loss of subsidies from Major League
Baseball. These independent leagues, which include the Northern League, the Texas-
Louisiana League, and as many as nine others are proving that minor league baseball can
survive without the majors. Northern League founder, Mike Veeck, commenting on the
economic viability of independent minor leagues said, "minor league baseball could survive
without the majors, although it would require improved business management of most
clubs." He went on to say, "independent leagues are very viable."358
Major League Baseball is aware of this and has taken steps to limit the ability of
the minors to compete with the majors for fan dollars. Several aspects of the 1990
Professional Baseball Agreement, such as the stadium requirements, may be interpreted as
attempts to limit the profitability of the minors. In 1995, Major League Baseball enacted
new rules which allow all professional teams to expand the territory they control. This
maneuver was motivated by "the decade long growth of the minor leagues, which are
attracting sell out crowds in new suburban markets."359 The expanded territories will limit
the ability of the minors to expand when the majors expand. Speaking of the new rules,
the owner of the Phillies farm club in Reading, Pennsylvania, said, "[tjhere are a lot of
major league owners who feel they don't want to have the competition, and there's no
downside to eliminating that competition."
360
Mike Veeck, commenting on the behavior
of Major League Baseball toward the minors said, "They constantly muscle you and
358 Telephone Interview with Mike Veeck, General Manager, Charleston River Dogs
Minor League Baseball Team, 19 March 1997.
359
Fatsis, Stefan, "Major Leagues Keep Minors at a Distance," The Wall Street Journal
(November 9, 1995), p. Bl, B9.
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Fatsis, Stefan, "Major Leagues Keep Minors at a Distance," The Wall Street Journal
(November 9, 1995), p. Bl.
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control your every move." When asked about specific examples of behavior by Major
League Baseball intended to limit the ability of the minors to compete with big league
clubs for fan dollars, Veeck said, "it's like trying to catch mercury, everything they do is
subtle. They don't let us play to win."361
As the 1997 Professional Baseball Agreement negotiations draw closer, rumors
circulate that Major League Baseball intends to impose a five affiliate limit on all major
league teams, resulting in the loss ofmany single A farm teams across the country.
Representatives of Major League Baseball, as well as the Major League Players
Association, have in the past complained that too much money is spent on player
development. If this rumor proves true, the minors are in a better position to resist this
action than they were in 1990. They will have the antitrust exemption card to play.
In 1990, a small group of minor league owners opposed baseball's antitrust
exemption. Since that time the minor leagues, through the NAPBL, has greatly improved
its ability to be heard on Capitol Hill. Stanley Brand, together with the Congressional
Minor League Caucus has made the minor leagues a visible force on Capitol Hill. If
Stanley Brand and the NAPBL choose to oppose the antitrust exemption for baseball,
which would be likely if the majors ever cut off the minor leagues, the chances of the
exemption's repeal are quite good. Prior to 1992, the NAPBL was an organization totally
controlled by Major League Baseball with respect to the maintenance of baseball's
antitrust exemption. Since the arrival of Stanley Brand, the Association has come into its
own in terms of its lobbying muscle on Capitol Hill. At this point, the minors are likely a
361 Telephone Interview with Mike Veeck, General Manager, Charleston River Dogs
Minor League Baseball Team, 19 March 1997.
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more potent lobbying force on Capitol Hill than the majors. An aid to Senator Daniel
Moynihan (D-NY) said recently that the minors "serve up the most political pressure"
among groups interested in the exemption.362
In 1997, the NAPBL's lobbying muscle will be magnified by the new labor
agreement between the major league players and owners. The provision in the new
agreement, which limits both sides in their lobbying efforts to the support of a partial
repeal in labor matters, does not bind Stanley Brand and the NAPBL. Brand and his
organization are the only powerful players in the debate who are not limited by the new
labor agreement. For this reason, the minors are in the driver's seat in regard to the
antitrust exemption at least until the expiration of the new agreement.
The newly acquired economic viability and political power of the minor leagues
will certainly enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis Major League Baseball in 1997.
However, it is important to note that Major League Baseball still holds most of the
economic cards. The threat of breaking away from the majors, while strategically useful,
and possible, would entail considerable economic hardship for the minors.
The immediate future of the baseball anomaly on Capitol Hill appears secure as
long as Major League Baseball retains the support of Stanley Brand and the NAPBL.
However, because the partial repeal of the exemption is unlikely to pass through the
Congress for the reasons discussed earlier, the expiration of the new labor agreement is
likely to touch off another dispute about the exemption between the players and owners.
Player union chief Donald Fehr has repeatedly insisted that the repeal of the exemption
362 Interview with Cassandra Hanley, Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, 14 January 1997.
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continues to be a high priority for the players. The exemption's future in the courts is also
secure for the life of the new labor agreement. Though, the decisions in Piazza and
Butterworth may indicate the direction of the courts on this issue. Nevertheless, Major
League Baseball continues to have the means to settle such cases out of court in order to
avoid the possibility of its exemption being struck down definitively.
The Baseball Anomaly in the Twenty First Century
One of the most salient features of the coming century will undoubtedly be the
globalization of economic markets of all kinds. Baseball will not be an exception to this.
The internationalization of America's national pastime is already under way. In North
America, Major League Baseball has expanded to Canada and there is talk about
expansion teams from Latin America joining the big leagues. Professional baseball exists
in numerous foreign countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic,
Australia, and in the far east. The popularity of baseball in the far east rivals that in the
United States. Professional baseball leagues exist in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
It is unclear how the internationalization of baseball will affect the unregulated
monopoly of Major League Baseball. However, the recent controversy over the signing
of foreign free agents not subject to the draft is certainly one example of the type of issues
baseball will face in the coming years. The popularity of baseball worldwide means that
players are increasingly recruited from other countries. The problem with this is that the
player draft only includes American players. Ifthe draft is not expanded to international
talent, then wealthy owners could clean up on the international free agent market.
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The issue of antitrust law becomes severely muddled when the world economy is
considered. The assault in the United States on antitrust policy by devotes of the Chicago
school approach to economic regulation could cut both ways in an increasingly global
economy. Conservative commentators argue that American industries must be allowed to
cooperate in order to compete with foreign companies that are not hamstrung by domestic
antitrust laws. On the other hand, the advantage of foreign competitors is often the result
of government subsidies and state sponsored monopolies intended to bolster the national
economy. The existence of state sponsored monopolies in Japan and elsewhere may push
American trade policy in the opposite direction. Instead of merely unburdening businesses
from antitrust law, a return to the associationalism of the 1920s might be in order for the
purpose of steering American industry through the maze of international competition.
The issue of worldwide antitrust and trade policy is one of the most hotly debated
topics in international relations today.
363
In the U.S., the conflict between internal fairness
and external competitiveness in the global market continues to be a dilemma. In baseball,
the most likely potential international competitor for Major League Baseball is Japan,
where baseball has become a national obsession, if not the national pastime. But several
recent developments in Japanese baseball indicate that they will not be able to exploit non-
western trade policy in order to cut into the American baseball market.
Antitrust policy is a western invention that does not fit easily with Asian social and
cultural norms. In Japan, antitrust law was imposed on the country by its American
occupiers after World War II. The imperial government of pre-war Japan had a long
363 See Fox Eleanor M, 'Toward World Antitrust and Market Access," American
Journal of International Law 91:1 (January, 1997), p. 1-25.
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history of state control of the economy. Traditionally, the Japanese government promoted
and managed key industries and then turned them over to private firms to run. This
practice was seen as necessary in order to protect the viability of Japanese businesses.
Because the tiny island nation lacks the natural resources to be self sufficient, it has been
forced to rely on international trade in order to provide its citizens with basic necessities.
This external reliance has traditionally prompted the Japanese government to prop
up its industries through government subsidies and state sponsored monopolies. The
imposition of Western concepts of antitrust conflicted with this established practice and
although Japan continues to have antitrust laws on the books, enforcement is selective at
best. Japan continues to exempt certain industries from the antitrust laws in order to assist
Japanese industries in being competitive on the global market.
Professional baseball in Japan has operated free from the strictures of antitrust
regulation since its inception in the 1930s. The Japanese government has never enforced
the antitrust laws against the two professional baseball leagues in the country. Japan's
Central and Pacific Leagues operate very much like the American and National Leagues
with respect to policies that might be considered restraints of trade. The freedom of
Japanese baseball owners to skirt antitrust laws in Japan seems to indicate that Japanese
baseball could in the future cut into the American baseball market by utilizing its
competitive advantages, especially with government subsidies. Recent developments in
Japanese baseball, however, may mitigate against this scenario.
364
364 See Braver, Andrew F., "Baseball or Besoburo: The Implications of Antitrust Law on
Baseball in America and Japan," New York Law School Journal of International and
Comparative Law 16 (1996).
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Although Japanese culture leads players to subordinate themselves to the needs
and good of the team, the ability of Japanese baseball owners to use this cultural affinity
to run a disciplined cartel has diminished in recent years. Japan is often recognized as a
nation that has been successful in importing American technologies and industrial methods
without allowing American cultural and social norms to erode Japanese traditions. In fact,
their ability to import Western methods while retaining Japanese philosophies of individual
subordination have been crucial to Japan's ability to become a major player in international
trade. Baseball, however, has been a bit different.
To bolster the business of baseball, the Japanese imported more than the game.
They also brought over many of the players. American players in Japan have greatly
raised the profile of baseball in that country and they have also raised the level of play.
One of the unintended consequences of importing American players, however, has been an
erosion of traditional Japanese attitudes about the balance between individualism and team
play. Japanese players, seeing the Americans come to Japan and earn five times the salary
of Japanese players, are becoming more concerned with getting their fare share. The
storied Japanese work ethic is being eroded by the example of the "Gaijin," who rarely
engage in the rigorous training of the Japanese players.
365
The influence of American ideas in Japanese baseball has been evident in the last
several years. In 1985, "the importance of the team over the individual, at least in the area
365 This term refers to foreign born players, which in most cases means American born
players.
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of player contracts, may have.
.
.become a thing of the past in Japanese baseball."366 That
was the year when Japanese players formed a union. The Japanese players union has since
become a force to be reckoned with in collective bargaining. In 1993, the union
succeeded in obtaining a system of free agency, increasing both player salaries and the
movement of players between teams.
The advent of the Japanese players union may well have the same effect on the
Japanese owners unregulated monopoly as the American players association is having on
Major League Baseball's monopoly. In both countries, the rise of labor to positions of
parity, so far as negotiations are concerned, may well bring the game of baseball within the
strictures of antitrust law in both countries. If that happens, international antitrust
regulation of baseball would become viable. In fact, the uniquely favorable position of
professional athletes in labor negotiations may make an internationally recognized antitrust
policy in professional sports more viable than such policy would be in more conventional
industries.
The baseball anomaly will not likely be altered in the 105
th
or 106
th
Congresses, but
the long term prospects for repealing the exemption are good. The intensity of the Major
League Baseball Players Association's opposition to the exemption guarantees that it will
continue to be an issue in baseball's labor negotiations. The erosion of Major League
366 Braver, Andrew F., "Baseball or Besoburo: The Implications of Antitrust Law on
Baseball in America and Japan,'' New York Law School Journal of International
Comparative Law 16 (1996), p. 451.
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Baseball's ability to exploit its cultural significance in defending the exemption will
eventually allow enough critical mass to build up in opposition to the exemption.367
While baseball's anomalous exemption may eventually fall with regard to labor
relations, it is very likely that the aspects of the exemption which protect the minor
leagues and the ability of Major League Baseball to control franchise migration will be
codified and expanded to all major professional sports within the next decade. The
lobbying muscle of minor league baseball and the destructiveness of franchise migration on
local communities and economies will eventually reach critical mass and bring about
explicit statutory exemptions in these areas. In this way, baseball's unique governance
structure is both an outdated relic and a harbinger of future policy. In terms of the players
rights to control their own careers, baseball is struggling to enter the twentieth century.
With regard to appropriate collective policies within professional sports leagues, baseball's
anomaly will likely become the norm in professional sports in the twenty first century.
367 See Dortch, Shannon, "The Future of Baseball," American Demographics 18
(April,
1996).
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